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ON FUNDAMENTALS: AN ADVENTURE

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". . . our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness, as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, while all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there are potential forms of consciousness entirely different."—WILLIAM JAMES.

"What are the crude deliverances of sensible experience, apart from that world of imaginative reconstruction which for each of us has the best claim to be called the real world?"—PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD.

"Life is an activity of imagination; the world in which we live is a world of imagination."—PROFESSOR WARNER FITE.

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MOST men experience from time to time a wish to know something about the character of the larger reality in which they live, move, and have their being; something much more fundamental than any department of research classed as "scientific" can provide. And the most incurably practical of us has good reason for cherishing this wish. Metaphysics, *i.e.* inquiry into the general nature of reality, makes appeal first to the contemplative student interested in knowledge for its own sake, but it has a very noteworthy practical side as well. Few, like Earl Russell, can build the soul's habitation on a "foundation of unyielding despair"; very many will not take life seriously unless its value, which must be lasting, is high. The problems stated by pessimism have to be solved; our burdens must be shown to be worth taking up strenuously. Religious consolations, once potent, are losing their force, and the danger of social decay has therefore to be countered. Let man suspect seriously that he is a day-fly, flitting about futilely a short while ere it perishes, and, whatever a few wild optimists may counsel, his big battalions are lost to progress. The East is right. "Earth's poor joys" and the

haunting squalor and pain incidental to life's struggle make the dream of a merely terrestrial paradise absurd. *La plus jolie fille du monde ne peut donner que ce qu'elle a.* Even were a Wellsian success attained, the air mastered fully, population swarmings prevented, peace triumphant, and the riddles of property, food supply, disease, etc., solved tolerably by men of science and statesmen, the question "to what end?" would remain to vex us. Why all this vain pother? The doom of the individual, emerging fantastically only to perish, would signify that after all the pessimist is right:

> Howsoever wise
> The governance of these massed mortalities,
> A juster wisdom his who should have ruled
> They had not been.

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"I believe that when I die I shall rot and nothing of my ego will survive," writes Earl Russell, always outspoken and frank. Well, if this be truth, if metaphysics has no message of practical value in respect of a larger hope, man will learn to forgo the pursuit of many high but useless ideals and adapt himself, disenchanted, to his contemptible world. And as the centuries are piled on one another and wisdom spreads slowly throughout his kind, he may take at last the advice of Schopenhauer and, decreeing his own extinction, renounce for ever the cheat of conscious life. The game will have been played long enough, and it will be seen that it is not worth the playing.

Thus not only intellectual curiosity but our practical interests may suggest an adventure in metaphysics. To be the best of citizens we may need certain convictions touching our place in the world-system, convictions which encourage us to live, and live strenuously and at our best. Loss of belief in a "future life" might turn the social decay already noticed by many writers as menacing Europe into disaster. No spiritual outlook worth enthusiasm can be ours, once that we have allowed the hope of survival to disappear. McDougall holds that the community losing this hope runs grave risks.[1] A normally moral individual, I am sure that my own ethical standard would suffer. Belonging to the world of a day-fly, I should behave as my petty life-span invites. The immortal degraded to mortality has less self-respect. And then . . .?

Requiring then more knowledge, I begin a series of philosophical adventures, of which the earliest may be failures and the last one, perhaps, furnish a modest instalment of truth. Holding no form of faith, disbelieving in a Hegelian "self-verifying" cosmic reason, not prepared to exploit "direct philosophical vision" to provide en-

[1] *Body and Mind*, Preface, p. xiii.

lightenment without effort, distrustful of long-drawn-out trains of thought kept aloof from fact, I have to resort to hypothesis and even guess-work; the important thing is to be verifying statements as persistently as possible in the quarter to which they refer.[1] Abstract statements become all too easily meaningless marks. On the other hand, if I test the statements well, it does not matter in what mood or manner I come by them in the first instance. All inferences, not merely tautological, are probable at best. Fancy feeds these with the indispensable novelty; reason, as Professor Montague puts it, is but the "Censor of fancy,"[2] at any rate in the domain of reflective thought. Let its controlling or harmonizing function be used well.

Under what banner am I to march? The master-hypothesis is that of Idealism. I mean by Idealism any form of supposition for which ultimate reality—the fontal power or powers—is akin to what we live directly as "experience." Mere solipsism and subjective idealism need not delay us; I mention them and I pass on. A realistic idealism provides for Nature, space-time and the causal dynamic, whether there are finite centres of consciousness to which they appear or not. It is needful to write "*akin* to our experience." For, in the first place, the fontal power or powers may resemble your or my experience only distantly. And, secondly, not all forms of Idealism allow that fontal reality is fully or even dully conscious. This reality, some tell us, only becomes conscious in certain of the finite centres which it sustains; and this so-called metaphysics of the Unconscious has counted for much in European and Eastern thought. Thus, the world-principles of Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, and others are of this kind. And to-day the God of Whitehead, conceived as primordial actuality, has "neither fullness of feeling nor consciousness." Similarly, the world-principle of Belfort Bax (who had sympathies for the Hegelian Left) is not conscious, but the "potentiality of consciousness"; conscious life being realized, he held, only in connection with animal organisms of complex sorts. This contrast between schools of Idealism is as basic as it is important, and sooner or later gives the student long, and perhaps baffling, pause.

I have dealt elsewhere with the failure of the non-idealistic hypotheses, and cannot retry their cases here. But incidentally I stress now what modern criticism seems to have established beyond dispute, namely, that the Matter of the materialists and others is a mere fiction of thought,[3] referring us to no corresponding substantial entity in the order of Nature. The Matter of science, again, is an instrumental concept; what answer to it in Nature are series of events, psychical or mind-like in character, which occur amid other natural events all psychical throughout. "Neutral stuff," of which

[1] *Zermatt Dialogues*, pp. 23–8. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 80, 84. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 33–9.

we have heard much of late, is the ghost of the discredited Matter of materialism; there is no evidence adducible for the view that it exists outside men's thinking.[1] Once we have got rid of these two concepts and their auxiliary concepts, our adventure sheds those paradoxical features which it presents sometimes to the plain man. There is no "material world," gross or subtle, which blocks the way before idealistic thinking. "Mechanical mythology"—the phrase is Mach's—is obsolete.

We are free to advance boldly. But, experimenting with Idealism, we have to respect the warning of history and avoid certain mistakes. Thus there is no promise in what my *Times* reviewer well called the "conceptual rationalism" of Hegel. Hegel's venture in penning the "romance of the infinite" (Rénan) was a grand one; and the fact that this romance missed the truth leaves his fame undimmed. The failures of great thinkers have a high value, exhausting experiments in a certain field and furthering others. Welcoming his initiative, we note next that Hegel's guiding assumption is not far to seek. He declined in his own words to treat thought as "one among a crowd of other faculties." He exalted it into the "universal" or common root of all that Nature and finite mind comprise—proffered it as the "basis of everything,"[2] or, as he calls it in *Philosophy of History*, the "energy" and "sovereign" of the world, "substance as well as Infinite Power." This selection and exaltation of reason or thought, articulated dialectically in a logic which is ontology, conditions his system. What is selected thus may be a feature only of the wider reality from which it was taken, perhaps nothing more than a feature of certain finite minds. Controversy, therefore, may reveal sooner or later that it is inadequate. The universe is more than "one among a crowd" of appearances within it! Unless Hegel can show that logical reason or thought is the "basis of everything," he has failed. His critics, who know their business, urge that this claim cannot succeed. They need do nothing more.

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The experiment is carried through stoutly. Hegel "sought to complete the cult of reason, the importance of which had been already exaggerated by the Greeks; his system embodied the belief that the real is the rational and the rational is the real. Logic becomes the 'all-animating spirit of all the sciences,' and its categories or types of rational thought a 'spiritual hierarchy'; the heart and centre of things. Logic is the system of the pure types of thought, and the philosophy of Nature and the philosophy of Mind take the place of applied logic; even such minor facts as the faculties or modes of a particular human mind are only 'additional specifications' of

[1] *Zermatt Dialogues*, pp. 67–9. [2] Wallace, *Logic of Hegel*, p. 39.

the logical thought, which is also the 'indwelling nature or substance of external things.' This logical Idealism is remarkably thorough."[1]

The attempt to connect dialectically the bloodless categories in the logic roused shattering criticism, led by Schopenhauer and Schelling, whose campaign against the "self-movement of reason" I found decisive over forty years ago and continue—no more. Categories of rational thought belong solely to finite minds such as ours, and are *substitute-facts*, mere products without power to pass beyond themselves. The source of the new in human "reason" is, as Professor Montague tells us, fancy; and the seeming "self-movement of reason" displayed in Hegel's logic reveals no cosmic "notional dialectic," but Hegel's own imaginal *tour de force*. The leaps are occasionally violent, and this is occasion for such riddles as that so often discussed, but never solved, as to how the category Being passes into its opposite and starts the "movement." But ordinarily the leaps are hidden, and then it is that we have the terribly obscure writing of which the characters in my book complain. My angry critic in the January number of this quarterly resents their mirth, but William James, Schopenhauer, and Schiller laugh louder still. And I see that in the April number of *Mind* J. Loewenberg, discussing a translation of the *Phenomenology*, charges Hegel with writing "pages of unpardonable obfuscation." And again, "such pages apart, which are untranslatable because their thought is opaque, there are others whose meaning, though clear, is expressed in perverse language." This kind of writing drives readers from philosophy and ought to be condemned. I am reminded here of the remark of an Oxford friend: "Why does X write so obscurely? He has to—if he wrote intelligibly, he would be found out." Now, Hegel is not deceiving us in the logic; he believes that his task *can* be accomplished, and that he is the man of destiny. But the task *cannot* be accomplished. There is no pure thought or reason, the "movement" of which is dialectic. Hence the actual attempt to articulate it is a play of imagining masked by "obfuscation" and verbiage.

There are many in our midst who have been influenced by Hegel, but no longer, I suppose, any Hegelians properly so-called. No one, perhaps, would accept the entire system of the master, while some thinkers, who are grateful to him, accept very little. Thus Professor Mackenzie calls the logic the only portion of Hegel's works "worthy of careful study," considers the philosophy of Nature very inadequate

[1] *Zermatt Dialogues*, p. 70. The philosophy of Nature and Mind, taken as ensouled by logic, have as their problem "only to recognize the logical forms under the shapes they assume in Nature and Mind—*shapes which are only a particular mode of expression for the forms of pure thought.*" (Italics mine.) Wallace, *Logic of Hegel*, pp. 41–2.

and the treatment of human history somewhat imperfect and misleading. The difficulty of regarding Nature and Mind as ensouled by logic, as domains of "shapes which are only a particular mode of expression for the forms of pure thought," is decisive. Who can read the pages of Schopenhauer and hold that Hegel was at grips with the actual world? Hegel seems rather a storm centre of live controversy than the bringer of philosophical truth. Allegiance to him resembles that of the Hegelian Left in which even materialists were among those who interpreted his message! A Marxist "dialectic materialism" flourishes in Russia to-day. An atheistic Hegelian (*que faisait-il dans cette galère?*) rose to fame in British philosophy. And it is worth note that Bosanquet and Bradley, ablest of our thinkers who have been influenced by Hegel, and supposed by the public to defend the lore drawn from Berlin, took good care to write philosophies of their own. Bosanquet reduced "reason" to a "nisus to unity";[1] Bradley regarded it, not as "sovereign of the world," but as "dependent and secondary," so that the fundamental supposition of Hegel has been rejected. Idealists are not a smiling family, but must agree to differ.

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"Conceptual rationalism" and its logic will not solve our riddle. More will be said later on the topic of reason or thought. Let us now fare onward.

A second great mistake made by many idealists is to postulate the Absolute. The Absolute cannot be defined simply as the "whole of reality," since disputes would arise as to the filling of this whole. It is the world-ground as certain idealists, in love with a spiritual re-reading of appearances, conceive it. The Absolute as this spiritual ground of appearances, "complete, perfect, and finished," confronts us in the Vedânta philosophy of India. It may have been first conceived by tired, hot men in the plains, men who liked finished tasks, rest and quiet, not only in their practical lives but also in the thought that matched them. *Brahman* accordingly is above change, but what of the changing world in which we ourselves are changing? The answer is that this world (like the Bradleian "false" and "contradictory" appearances showing change, causation, time, space, evil, etc.), has only "practical reality"; appeal to Mâyâ saves the situation —for not too exacting critics. Professor Deussen of Kiel, it is true, welcomed this Absolute, would not allow that it belongs to the past. But he defends it as a student of Kant, asserting that space, time, causation, etc., are merely features of our phenomenal world. The Absolute is above space and time, changeless, complete, finished; it is veiled by the forms of finite perception and judgment. I reply

[1] Letter to the writer.

that a truly objective idealism accepts and stresses a real space-time world of change, and affirms therefore that the world-principle is manifest therein. A different hypothesis about the world-principle is required.

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The Absolute, again, as it confronts us in Greek thought, responds to what Dewey has called the Greek "joy in what is finished." And this whole is the forerunner of the German and British Absolutes. Hegel's Absolute, for instance, is the rounded-off spiritual whole of Reason, *said* to be both "accomplished" and "accomplishing itself," but as "accomplished" clearly hostile to real novelty. This exclusion of real novelty takes shape also in McTaggart's elaborate denial of the reality of time. It is well illustrated, too, in the thought of Bradley, whose Absolute is revealed in appearances which remind one of Vedântist lore. He tells us plainly in *Appearance and Reality* that, if time is not unreal, the Absolute is a delusion. A very notable saying. It is not easy, after all, to demolish time. Meanwhile we note that Italian idealists are not trying to. They at least are accenting history, while even idealistic descendants of the Hegelian Left, like Belfort Bax, have substituted for the "accomplished" Absolute an "eternal principle of change." Professor Whitehead, again, has restored "process" to full reality. The rounded-off spiritual whole, "complete, perfect, and finished," clashes needlessly in fact with our experience; and a principle of change, never complete, never finally perfect, never finished, and always manifest in *additive* creation, is, perhaps, to reign in its stead.

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I am now able to state the basic hypothesis of Imaginism mediated conveniently by what has gone before. This is the adventure of thought into which I am forced.

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Imaginism is the view that God, the world-ground or world-principle, that from which directly or indirectly all phenomena proceed, resembles most closely, not that aspect of the mind orientated towards abstractions, which we call *reason*, but that veritable outlaw of the philosophers, CONCRETE IMAGINING. The history of Imaginism, on which space considerations forbid me to dwell,[1] begins with a suggestion or *obiter dictum* of Kant: "we have to inquire whether imagination combined with consciousness may not be the same thing as memory, wit, power of discrimination, and perhaps identical with understanding and reason. Though logic

[1] *Zermatt Dialogues*, Foreword, pp. xix–xxv.

is not capable of deciding whether a *fundamental power* actually exists, the idea of such a power is the problem involved in a systematic representation of such a multiplicity of powers."[1] This fundamental power, once recognized, will be held to underlie imagination narrowly so-called, namely, memory, expectation, and the pure imagination of our day-dreams, etc. (empirical imagination), one of its aspects. But it underlies all the phases of the surface-mind alike. This productive power, which for Kant works in the *soul*, becomes for Fichte of *cosmic* standing as well, constructing the objects of Nature. The suggestion has passed since into the domain of world-hypothesis. It has been developed into the philosophy of Imaginism, for which Divine Imagining is the fontal power of the universe from which all finite activities of whatever sort ultimately derive. Imaginism is before us here in the rough. Complications await those who develop and test it, complications into most of which we cannot go now. But I find that the initial statement is readily understood by plain men, thanks in part to some poets who are imaginists, and thanks also to the view that it is, after all, their own idea of God which, amended and expanded, is also the idea of Divine Imagining.

Many years ago I cited Kant's suggestion in an earlier work, annexing for the philosophy of finite mind a contention of one tissue with that which works so well in general metaphysics. In 1931 in this quarterly Dr. Wildon Carr too stressed it forcibly, affirming incidentally the subordinate standing of thinking or reasoning in respect of the productive power.[2] He urged that "imagination is more original, more fundamental, and more essential a factor in the mental life than sensation or understanding or reason. Were there no imagining, sensing would be meaningless, and thinking would be impossible, for there would be nothing to think about."[3] It creates, he contends, among other products *Gestalten*. In the language of Imaginism it is both conservative and additively creative in a variety of domains. I shall be told that in the case of finite mind there is a "given" sense-content which seems to feed imagination with something other than itself. But the "given" is always modified, and thus subjected to creative stress; is, further, influx from that imaginal world that surrounds body. Nature, which penetrates organism in the form of sense-content, revealing its psychical character as it does so, is, as the poet Blake declared, imagination too, a fragment of complex contents established on God.

Imaginism sets limits to the mathematical pragmatism which has driven charm from reality, science writing perforce "with the cold finger of the star-fish" (L. Stevenson). Romance is restored to the

[1] Cited from Professor Norman Kemp Smith's *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 474.

[2] "Imagining and Reasoning," *Philosophy*, April, 1931. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 194.

universe; the Platonic dissension between poetry and philosophy disappears. And, above all, the hypothesis is not falsely selective; in Dr. Schiller's words, which I have often cited, it "can really afford to be what other metaphysical principles falsely claim to be, viz. all-embracing. It can be represented as including not only all reality but all unreality." Recognize that the world-ground is spiritual, and you have at once the common source of all phases of appearance whatever. McTaggart dreamt of a new synthesis which should reconcile the oppositions of thought, will, and feeling, which should bridge "the rift in discursive knowledge," and for which the immediate should no longer be the alien; "as direct as art."[1] The synthesis required is found in Divine Imagining. Nature-philosophy acquires a new interest, and can be linked up closely with science. But before glancing at topics of cosmic scope, let us return for a moment to reason as illustrated in ourselves.

Reason left unexplained would hamper the imaginist. Our reason, however, as Dr. Wildon Carr agreed, does not sound such depths as the "fundamental power"; reason indeed may be a name only for certain results and processes that occur on the surface of the finite mind. And, as far as anything in creative evolution is explicable, we may be able to explain why and how it arose. Originally, as Schopenhauer the master pragmatist urged, in the service of practical need in the storms of conflict. Out of what? Well, the phenomena of perceptual inference are suggestive, and others, when I am in contemplative mood, are suggestive too. Imagination, observes Professor Ribot, "*is everywhere,*" as on the lines indeed of Imaginism we must expect it to be. "Underneath all the reasoning, inductions, deductions, calculations, demonstrations, methods, and logical apparatus of every sort there is something animating them that is not understood, that is the work of that complex operation, the constructive imagination." The drive, the novelty in reason, Professor Montague credits, as we saw, to fancy. Again, reason cannot be said to indwell in us and to manifest at intervals. It is generated only as wanted. As Schiller tells us, man needs reason "only in a special situation in which it 'pays' to 'stop to think,' because by so doing it is possible to innovate and improve upon habitual action."[2] Dewey detects reason in a situation of conflict which checks response; a conflict of habit with habit, or habit with surroundings. Thought, experimenting imaginatively with different lines of action, opens the way to adjustment. In *The Psychology of Reasoning* Rignano discusses reason as imaginative experimenting, which on its higher levels deals with general ideas. I should prefer to say that reason is evolved for use in situations of conflict, when experiment must be

[1] *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, 2nd ed., p. 229.
[2] *Problems of Belief*, p. 127.

risked, but that, like all products of additive creation, it displays novelties proper to itself. These concern the "controlling force" which harmonizes rather than creates,[1] "censors fancy" in the interest of correct inference without originating it; "selecting from the wealth of new ideas those which can successfully stand comparison with the old and be made harmonious with them."[2] This process of control is effected by devices minimizing the failures of imagining as it fumbles on the low level of human life. In considering this control we may find room for a logic of abstract form as well as for that "logic for use" championed by Schiller. Reason, like sight, was evolved first for practical ends; but nothing prevents us from studying its "forms" apart from their application. No mere "forms," however, avail to secure the complete validity of reasoning which remains experimental and merely probable.

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In fine, reason or thought seems sufficiently accounted for as a secondary product generated in the time-process in connection with organisms more or less resembling ours. It is not only secondary, fed by content which it does not make, but it does not to our knowledge thrive in the absence of speech. "Rational consciousness" may be only one of James's "potential forms of consciousness entirely different," all of which derive ultimately from the protean fundamental power, but no one of which can claim to be selected as of predominant cosmic range and importance. However, prolonging the discussion perhaps too long, let us consider reason or thought in connection with the world-principle, that is to say, as a hypothetical feature of God. A "Censor of fancy," such as is needed on the fumbling human level, might be called grotesque in this regard, but we will take the suggestion seriously to condemn it on other grounds.

The first objection is stated shortly thus. Thought or reason, as Bradley saw so clearly, is not sufficiently *inclusive* to constitute the substance of God.[3] The fontal world-principle, interpret its character as we may, comprises at any rate more than men class under the head of thought. Further, thought is orientated to abstractions and, as it develops, moves away from that richly concrete fullness which characterizes the fontal power. It is pale, compact of shadows; suggests a makeshift.

The second objection protests that thought or reason is "of" or "about" reality other than itself. Truth, which is the goal of thought,

[1] On the "controlling force," cf. Earl (Bertrand) Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 21.

[2] Professor Montague, *Ways of Knowing*, p. 65.

[3] Hegel describes reason in the *Philosophy of History* as "substance as well as Infinite Power."

concerns this other and is controlled by it. Reality is too wide to be identified with the mere statements which we make "about" it. Lakes, stars, and rivers are not truths but realities, respecting which truths need not be stated at all. The fontal power or God is not truth "about" something else, but immediate, all-inclusive reality shining in its own light.[1]

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God interpreted as Divine Imagining is above truth and thought. God's reality, as Whitehead puts it, is the "ultimate irrationality."[2]

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We are still only at the beginning of our adventure, and I am unable, of course, to pursue it in the manner recorded elsewhere. But I will indicate some developments of our main hypothesis which are open to the experimenter in metaphysics, parts of the adventure which anyone of liberal interests can repeat for himself. He will find that Divine Imagining has, from the human point of view, two aspects: the active or dynamic aspect *consciring*, God veiled and "ineffable," the positing spiritual creativity, Fichte's "infinite activity"; and the aspect of *conscita*, a name for objects in general, for the posited creata or contents whose conservation and additive production constitute the "works of God." The world-systems, perhaps infinitely many, dance on the jets of consciring; nothing akin to the agents born in the instrumental concepts of the classical mechanics is needed to account for them. Our student will speak of imagining when he has the conscita, the "works of God," *e.g.* the star-set heavens, clearly or vaguely in view; he will prefer the term consciring, if he is thinking of the creativity rather than of what is sustained or called into being.[3]

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The experimenter will be in earnest with additive creation, not rejecting with Bosanquet "a bona-fide addition to the universe of what was not in it before";[4] for the universe is never complete, but has frontiers of reality sprouting. He will regard God not as the perfect but as the perficient Power, which has to destroy as well as add. He will want to ask in what ways, if any, God is " infinite" and what is His significance for religion. He will go further into "consciring" and infer that God, *pace* all philosophies of the Unconscious, enjoys fully reflective consciring, conscires, as we may say, using a convenient metaphor, "radiantly." He will consider

[1] On these two objections cf. *Zermatt Dialogues*, pp. 103–5.
[2] *Science and the Modern World*, p. 249.
[3] *Zermatt Dialogues*, pp. 88-9. [4] *Logic*, 2nd ed., p. 249.

further the levels of consciring, irreflective and reflective, of which what psychologists call conscious life names only a few phases. He will deal with the problems of activity, cosmic feeling, values, and the sorts of conscita, discovering *inter alia* that more than Bradley's mere "balance of pleasure" constitutes the bliss-aspect of God! He will continue by taking thought of the "Initial Situation," *i.e.* the conditions presupposed by our particular world-system, conditions which pre-existed in the imagining of God; the archetypal divine work of art as yet uncorrupted by the Metaphysical Fall, that is to say, by the conflicts, uglinesses, and defects incidental to creative evolution in space-time. He will be thinking hard about conservation, "law," and additive creation; also about the Imaginals which resemble most closely the IDEAS of Schopenhauer. Next, he may try to solve the riddle of causation and to conceive an Imaginal Dynamic which can be substituted as "universal power" for the dialectic of Hegel. At this point a preliminary rethinking of space-time problems imposes itself, after which comes the enigma of evil. Imaginism can furnish the adequate solutions which he desires.

Lastly, applying the knowledge he has gained, he may give some not unplausible account of the birth of this particular world-system in which his lot is cast, starting with the dawn of creative evolution and connecting his results with those of science. An interesting, if venturesome, way of continuing his task! Nevertheless, if Imaginism is true, it seems probable that he will not be sent quite empty away.

Sir James Jeans, noting that current physics works largely with instrumental concepts, holds that the world-system may be a "thought" in God, in which case "all discussion of material evolution" is futile. The imaginist does not say "thought," since the world-system (*a*) comprises more than is ascribable to thought, and (*b*) is *reality itself*, not ideas "about" it, as was urged before. He suggests that creative evolution takes place in an imaginal field within Divine Imagining, being brought to pass by that "universal power" to which reference was made, and of which the spatial (often discussed even to-day as space) is one of the first products. In what manner? To what end? For the world-process embodies purpose. Answers cannot be made at the close of a brief paper. And, well aware of the slightness of treatment accorded to my subject, I must lay down the pen with an apology. I have been unable to do more than indicate many problems and have left others literally without mention. My end has been gained if I have succeeded in quickening somewhat the interest of those who are curious respecting an adventure of thought. These men are invited to continue inquiry critically or approvingly as they list.

POSTSCRIPT.—Since penning this paper I found the following passage in an exposition by Professor Radhakrishnan of the views

of the Vedântist sage Samkara or Sankara: "Thinking and logic belong to the level of finite life, while ultimate reality transcends thought. The real is present to itself, and has therefore no need to think."[1] Modern philosophy is not always superior to that of the ancients! Let Hegelizers take note.

In view of certain criticisms, I wish to state that the "West" of *Zermatt Dialogues* is not the writer. The name, withal, denotes a real individual; a mystic in the full sense of the term, though one unknown to official philosophy or the world of general literature.

[1] *Indian Philosophy*, ii. 509.

INDETERMINACY AND INDETERMINISM

WITH A SUGGESTION FOR INTERPRETING THE FORMER

F. R. HOARE, B.A.

I

INDETERMINISM is opposed to the philosophic theory of determinism, of which Sir Arthur Eddington, in a recent pronouncement on this subject,[1] quotes three definitions. On the ground that it expresses unequivocally what we all feel to be the gist of the theory, he gives preference to the third, from Omar Khayyám:—

> With Earth's first Clay They did the Last Man knead,
> And there of the Last Harvest sow'd the seed;
> And the First Morning of Creation wrote
> What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read.

We may at least agree with him that it serves very well as a preliminary basis for the discussion of the point at issue.

Indeterminacy in its mathematical sense is a self-explanatory concept. In recent mathematical physics it has been erected into a principle, sometimes known as Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, which asserts, as regards the ultimate phenomena of this science, that there must exist a certain constant element of uncertainty both in the description and in the prediction of them.

The question discussed in Sir Arthur Eddington's address is whether this indeterminacy involves indeterminism, and he answers that it does.

He dwells particularly on the simple case of the unpredictability of the future position of an electron. We may at any given moment know all that there is to be known about an electron as an object of science, and yet we cannot deduce from that knowledge the precise position of the electron at any future moment, but only assign a probability curve. Nevertheless, at the subsequent moment, the electron may be found to be, in fact, in a definite position. The inference is that this subsequent position was not wholly determined by its previous history.

Now, it is obvious that mere unpredictability has not necessarily any philosophical implications; it may be due simply to our ignorance. Even the most rigorous determinist would admit that there are many

[1] *The Decline of Determinism*, a Presidential Address to the Mathematical Association, delivered on January 4, 1932; printed as a supplement to *Nature*, February 13, 1932.

processes of which he cannot predict the future course, and would account for it by the fact that they depend upon other processes of which he happens to be ignorant and perhaps always will be ignorant. Nor is it immediately obvious that this is not the case here. The Indeterminacy Principle itself lays it down that there is a necessary element of uncertainty in the description of the electron at any moment—either its position is known with considerable precision and its velocity with very little, or its velocity with considerable precision and its position with very little—and it seems plain common sense to say that since we know so little we cannot expect to make precise predictions. The indeterminacy in the prediction (it could be argued) is simply the result of ignorance and no proof of indeterminism.

Furthermore, if it were pointed out that the original description of the electron was a complete description in terms of mathematical physics, the reply might be made that that proves nothing, but that mathematical physics is restricted by some inherent difficulty in making observations on the electron with the required precision. For example, the indeterminacy might be due to some reciprocal interference of effects precluding the precise observation of both elements of the effects at the same time. Such interferences are common enough; it is as when two lenses are so adjusted to each other that an image cannot be cast with good definition in two directions at the same time, and we must sacrifice definition in one direction if we are to gain it in the other. And, in point of fact, it is admitted that the very process of making precise observations of the electron in one aspect does frustrate the attempt to make, at the same time, precise observations of it in its other aspect.

To all this Sir Arthur would probably reply that, on the principle underlying the theory of relativity and all modern mathematical physics, we have no right to assume the existence of that which can never be observed—in this case, of the second element in the description of the electron. In other words, when the velocity is precisely specified, the electron really has not a precise position, and *vice versa*—a notion bewildering to the lay mind, but said to cohere with the relativists' abolition of absolute space and motion.

From this point of view he could proceed to assert that, when physicists accept a certain indeterminacy in their description of the electron, they are not admitting ignorance but positively postulating a certain "fuzziness" in the nature of the electron; so that they should not be accused of relying on an accidental obstacle to observation when they speak of their description of the electron as complete. And it is this complete description that fails to give us the knowledge of the future which could be expected from it were determinism true.

Accepting this answer (in so far, at least, as it disposes of the

allegation of "accidental ignorance"), let us consider its effect on Sir Arthur's own argument. That has rested hitherto on the view implied by the words of Omar, that the issue of determinism or indeterminism turns on the answer to the question whether, in a self-contained system, a future state of affairs can or cannot be predicted from a complete account of an original state of affairs. If it cannot, if an element of uncertainty enters into the prediction that did not exist in the original account, then we may reasonably suspect that indeterminism is true.

Now, it is essential to this argument from unpredictability that the element of uncertainty in the prediction should be something not contained in or implied by the original account. If the indeterminateness in the prediction simply reproduces an original indeterminateness, or is wholly derivable from it through the inevitable "spread" which the introduction of the time factor must effect in an original indeterminateness, then this particular argument fails. It may still be possible to argue for indeterminism from the fact that there is a necessary indeterminateness *in the original description*, but to do so will be to fall back on an argument altogether distinct from the argument from unpredictability. And this is just what Sir Arthur seems at times to do.

We may consider this second argument presently, but it is clear that the question has first to be decided whether or no, in the present case, the argument from unpredictability fulfils the conditions necessary to its validity. That there is an element of uncertainty in the prediction of the future position of the electron is admitted. Is it, or is it not, in excess of the uncertainty contained in, or derivable from, what, according to Sir Arthur himself, is a complete description of the original state of the electron?

The answer must surely be that it is not in excess, but is the exact mathematical counterpart of the original uncertainty or "fuzziness," allowance being made for the spread caused by the introduction of the time factor. It is true that the spread has in this case an unusual form, but it is a form precisely corresponding to the unusual feature in the original indeterminateness, namely, the reciprocal relationship between the two elements comprised in it. There was in the original description an uncertainty, small or large, as to the position of the electron, and also an uncertainty, large or small, as to its velocity, and these uncertainties vary inversely to one another in such a way that their product is a constant. Consequently, to each possible position assigned to the electron in the prediction, there will be attached an indeterminate velocity of which the indeterminateness will vary with the degree of precision with which the position is fixed; and to each possible velocity assigned in the prediction there will be attached an indeterminate position holding a similar relation

to the velocity. That is the form which the prediction might be expected to have and which, in fact, it does have.

Furthermore, the prediction in this form proves to be verifiable (by observations on electrons in large quantities) with as much certainty, and in the same sense, as any other well-founded mathematical prediction that, owing to the mathematical indeterminateness of the original data, has a statistical character. Finally, when an individual electron is at length caught, its position and velocity still prove to have jointly the identical constant indeterminateness contained in the original description, no more, and no less.

II

It seems, then, that in the present case the argument from unpredictability takes us no nearer to indeterminism than we were when we contemplated the electron in its original state, and it remains to be considered how near we were then. This constant indeterminateness in even a complete description of the electron—is there anything in its nature to suggest that there is a real freedom underlying it?

At the outset we are rendered suspicious by the very fact that it is a measurable mathematical constant; one element of it may vary, and so may the other, but not their product. This suggests, on the face of it, a determinate physical basis for it. At least, it would seem that there could be no insuperable obstacle to constructing a hypothetical electronic structure which, while being wholly of a deterministic type, would give rise to two elements of uncertainty having this reciprocal relationship.

Thus, one might suppose that the energy-carriers in electronic phenomena were wave-trains and the nodes of intersection of wave-trains, and that the particle-phenomena were produced by the selective action of the structure upon which the group of wave-trains falls. Then each group would contain, in respect of any given direction, a number of velocities of propagation and also a group-velocity, and would at the same time have a certain diffusion in space. Consequently, if we regard the electronic phenomena associated with the group as taking place at a single well-defined group-velocity, we shall have to allow a wide margin of position at which the action of the group at group-velocity might be observed; and if we give, mathematically or observationally, a particle aspect to the group by assigning a single well-defined position at which its collective action takes place, we shall have to allow for a wide range of velocities of wave-propagation at which action may take place at that point in the given direction. It would then be a matter merely of adjustment in detail to ensure that the product of the indeterminacies was constant, and we should have obtained a scheme in which the

indeterminateness was real, inasmuch as it was not merely a mathematical fiction, but was, nevertheless, not an ultimate indeterminateness, since it was built up, as it were, out of the interplay of a number of individually determinate elements.

This particular type of model might, of course, fail to give the precise results required, but it seems at least thinkable that some model might; and determinist physicists can hardly be blamed if, in view of the constancy of the total indeterminateness, they continue to look for one. Nevertheless, Sir Arthur also could hardly be blamed if he declined to be side-tracked from his metaphysical course by these descriptive possibilities. He might, for example, point to the indubitable fact that models devised to elucidate mathematical descriptions have a way of doing so by devices that turn out in the end to require as much elucidation as the original phenomena, as the old-fashioned models of the ether of space did, when they built it up out of ingenious mechanical devices involving much the same forces and movements as the original ether had been invented to explain. He might predict with some confidence that, were such a model to be constructed, it would be found in the last analysis to display at some point just that same indeterminateness from which it was intended to deliver us. He might remind us that this constant indeterminateness (Planck's constant h) turns up like a uniform degree of "play" in every nook and cranny of the physical universe, and tell us that to try and explain it away by still more refined models in any particular case is only putting off the determinist's evil day.

But here, as at an earlier stage in the discussion, the answer which we have supposed Sir Arthur to make to a possible objection to his theory can be regarded as inflicting irremediable injury upon his own main line of argument. It exhibits the constant of indeterminateness in the description of the electron as not only a mathematical constant, but a natural one, discoverable everywhere, and rooted in the quantum.

It is true that, to some, this may seem tantamount to establishing the case for indeterminism; for it is precisely the quantum-theory which has been used (rather vaguely) as a support for it by certain philosophers. But to many others the reduction of the indeterminateness in the description of the electron to a natural physical constant will seem the last nail in physical indeterminism's coffin. It suggests that, if we are looking for an ultimate working-model to help our imaginations, we could do worse than borrow, and extend the sense of, Sir James Jeans's analogy of the magic-lantern slide. We might suppose the slide to have a uniform thickness representing the quantum, and to carry the ultimate physical phenomena pictured on its two sides in such a way that the constant thickness manifested

itself at one time as an indivisible unit in physical measurements, at another as a discontinuity in physical action, at another in the reciprocal uncertainties in two elements of a physical description, varying inversely as would the blurs in the two images thrown on the screen by the two sides of the slide, both of which could never be in focus at the same time.

Nor can it be successfully maintained that in this last analogy we are only resurrecting the already slain argument that the indeterminateness may be due to an accidental mutual interference of two effects. It is not disputed that the uncertainty belongs to the truly complete description of the electron (at least in the form at present given to it), and what is suggested is that this uncertainty represents, or, rather, the two related uncertainties taken together represent a perfectly determinate natural constant analysed by being regarded from a particular angle.

This suggestion stands in obvious need of elucidation. But before developing this positive solution of the nature of the indeterminateness, it may be well to conclude the negative argument, against the indeterminist interpretation of it, by a brief statement of what seems to be the radical philosophical objection to it. This is nothing less than the common philosophical belief that there cannot in the nature of things be such a thing as real non-determination. Is it really thinkable that anything can be determined by nothing? A negative answer, be it noted, would not mean that determinism holds good universally. It would simply mean that freedom, to be real, must be founded, not upon non-determination, but upon self-determination. And, from this, two consequences would follow.

The first is that real freedom is an attribute only of rational beings, for self-determination to be real must be the act of willing an end, or the means to an end, which one has set before oneself by an act of rational judgment. No other kind of choosing or following a goal can be other than illusory. The second consequence is that, in cases where we are not prepared to allow for the existence of a rational self (and few will be so bold as to credit an electron with that), we cannot escape from determinism since non-determination is unreal.

It is easy to imagine a strong protest being made at this point to the effect that this is an *a priori* argument which is altogether too high-handed, and disregards the fact that the indeterminateness in the electron *is* real, and not merely a mathematical device. And facts are stubborn things.

But if the case against determinism is not to be based upon intelligent self-determination, and if, as in the present instance, it is not strengthened by the argument from unpredictability, the appeal to this indeterminateness in the electron itself raises the very

considerable difficulty to which allusion was made earlier. It seems to ask of us an act of faith, not merely in the mathematical analysis, but in a philosophy that interprets it by making it give answers to questions of being and not being, and to do so at a moment when the answer seems to conflict with the law of contradiction. For it is difficult to attach any other meaning to the assertion that something physical has in actual fact no definite position, or else no definite velocity, than that it neither is, nor is not, at any defined place, or else neither is, nor is not, moving at any defined velocity. Here is no mere ignorance as to present realities, or uncertainty as to the future; what seems to be asserted is real indeterminateness in the matter of being or not being at the present moment. It is certainly a desperate proposition from the point of view of elementary philosophy.

III

Yet since it is ill work supposing anyone to be talking nonsense, least of all Sir Arthur Eddington, it is necessary to continue the search for a tolerable meaning to attach to the indeterminateness of which he speaks and which has neither been dislodged from his equations by what has been said about indeterminism, nor proved to be a mathematical fiction raising no philosophical problem. For this purpose we must return to the point at which we broke off—to the analogy of the magic-lantern slide and to the argument which suggested it. That argument, put into Sir Arthur's mouth, was to the effect that further refinements of working models of the physical universe will do more than put off the day when we shall have to accept the fact that mechanical description has its limit, a limit that meets us everywhere.

Now, it certainly seems to be true that there is a strict sense in which it may be said that there is something even in physical realities which is incapable of physical description. It is only their physical properties that can be measured; when we have come to an end of measuring properties and defining the classes of entities that are respectively the subjects of them, we have come to an end of what we can do in terms of space and time. Indeed, we might say that it is an indication of the completeness of the description in those terms that we come upon something that cannot be described in those terms. We have exhausted the resources of mathematical physics and reached what is, mathematically, the blank wall of real being. Or, to revert to our previous metaphor, we have completely described the pictures on the sides of the lantern-slide, and reached the solid but transparent glass on which they are kept in place.

Now, the glass will not be mathematically analysable, for mathematical analysis can only be applied to the properties of beings in

virtue of which they are physically related to one another in space and time. But it will have a finite thickness, or the beings would not be. In other words, we may expect to find, at the end of the analysis, something that defies analysis or division into parts, but is not nothing, nor even an infinitesimal, for an infinitesimal is only real as an element in a progression, which brings us back to motion and time.

Thus we arrive at the probability that underlying the measureable and analysable physical phenomena there will be found something that has a finite measure, but is not analysable. It is very much the notion of the older atomism; and the underlying fact, if not the philosophical idea, has been introduced into modern physics under the name of the quantum. For, in the quantum-mechanics, every ultimate physical entity and every manifestation of physical energy is, in the last resort, expressed in terms of the indivisible quantum, or of some multiple of it. And, among these ultimates, is the constant formed by the product of the uncertainties in the position and velocity of the electron.

Now, viewed in this light, this product of uncertainties cannot itself properly be called an uncertainty. It simply represents the fact that when the place-time definition of the ultimate physical unit is complete and embraces both its positional and its motor aspect, it will, like every other ultimate element in physical science, have finite magnitude; in other words, that no physically real entity can manifest itself at a point. And this harmonizes very well with the sounder ideas of space now prevailing, according to which there is no such thing as a space-time pre-existent to physical entities and their mutual relations, but space-time, in so far as it is real, is constituted by these entities and relations. What is virtually affirmed here is that there is no real element of space-time, any more than of energy or anything else physical, that is not of finite dimensions. There is no such thing as a point in space, or time or space-time.

The appearance of uncertainty, then, only enters when this irreducible finite space-time element is analysed into two components. At first sight it seems that a contradiction is involved in this analysis of the unanalysable; but there is no contradiction provided that we regard the components, not as separately real, but as standing in much the same relation to reality as the components at right-angles to each other into which motion is analysed by the ordinary methods of Cartesian geometry. The two "axes" here, however, are not two directions in space, or even in space-time, but, respectively, the simple presence and the moving presence of the electron. The finite constant which enters into the expression of the electron's space-time presence *in toto* is real; but when that

presence is considered under either its positional aspect, or its moving aspect, in abstraction from the other, the finite constant is resolved into two unreal elements, each having the appearance of a degree of indeterminateness—an appearance which corresponds very well with their actual unreality in separation.

It would seem to follow immediately from this that what we have called the "axes" in this analysis, namely, the simple presence and the moving presence of the electron, are themselves as unreal, when considered separately, as the degree of uncertainty attaching to them. And, having gone thus far, it seems necessary to go a step farther, and to hold that no description of the complete presence of the electron can be considered final unless it includes under the same expression both its positional and its moving aspects in such a way that either is directly derivable from it and (moreover) immediately convertible into the other one. In other words, the complete spatial description of the electron should include in the same expression both its essential properties and its motion; and the separate descriptions of these should have the same form.

Such an idea has already some sort of footing in mathematical physics in the assertion that the mass of an electron varies directly with its motion. But although this assertion is derived directly from the general theory of relativity, and the direction in which it points seems also to be in harmony with that theory, the development in this direction of the assertion regarding mass seems to have been inhibited by the fact that attempts to describe the structure of the electron are still largely conditioned by pre-relativist ideas, at least in one salient aspect. When absolute motion of translation was dropped, absolute rotation was retained, and forms an integral part even of the latest attempts at describing the electron's structure.

Its retention is defended on the ground that, whereas there is no discoverable effect attributable to absolute motion of translation, there is a real physical effect corresponding to rotation, so that the principle of discarding all that is not observable does not require us to drop absolute rotation. But though it is obviously true that the effect cannot be abolished, it is not so obviously true that this particular interpretation of it cannot be abolished.

Thus, to take a simple case, if a particle is revolving in a circle on the end of a string, and it breaks away, it will maintain its tangential velocity and move uniformly in a path at right-angles to the position held by the piece of string at the moment of the break—that, at least, is our ordinary description of it, taking the rotation to be real. But if we know nothing of the string or the previous motion of the particle, but only of the recession of the particle from another particle stationed at the point which we have previously called the centre, we then find that the particle does not appear to

be moving with a constant velocity, but at a velocity having the acceleration that it would have if the particles were repelling each other inversely with the square of their distance.

But this is a law of repulsion which is the exact converse of the Newtonian law of gravitation, and seeing that Einstein's gravitational formula gives results differing, quantitatively, only minutely from the Newtonian and only rarely detectable even on an astronomical scale, it might be possible, by utilizing the converse of Einstein's formula for the gravitational field, to eliminate the concept of angular momentum from atomic and electronic structures.

This much by way of illustration of what is meant by questioning the necessity of the retention of absolute rotation; and it will hardly be denied that, if unnecessary, it is certainly not desirable from the strictly relativist standpoint. And if absolute rotation goes, there falls the chief obstacle to giving the description of the electron's structure the same form as the description of its motion. For a stable rotating system is self-contained as regards its essential momentum, which is not capable of blending with a momentum of translation of the system as a whole. What is wanted, if the suggested conception is to be fulfilled, is that the *esse* of the electron should be expressed as a mode of its motion and its motion as a mode of its *esse*, or, if we will, that its *esse* should be a kind of omnidirectional motion and its motion a kind of unidirectional *esse*.

In conclusion, it seems reasonable to predict that, if the account of the electron were thus recast, it would be found that when the simple finiteness in the space-time description of the electron's presence was by abstraction distributed between the descriptions of the two components, its original character as a perfectly determinate constant would not disappear from sight, and that even if, as a matter of mathematical form, it was represented by some sort of indeterminateness in the account of the electron's position or velocity, there would be no difficulty in seeing its true character, and recognizing that any mathematical indeterminateness that had entered was a consequence of the essential unreality of either position or velocity considered in abstraction from the other. For indeterminateness in the physical realm is a mark of unreality rather than freedom—indeed, this is true of it in any realm. Freedom, in any true sense of the word, has only one possible basis, which is not indeterminateness, but intelligent self-determination.

PHYSICS AND THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM

G. N. M. TYRRELL, B.Sc.

If there is one question which stands forth pre-eminently from among the many problems with which physical science bristles, it is that of the ontological status of the world which physics is exploring. What is reality in the eyes of science, and what are we to understand the physicist to mean when he refers to the "real world"? Can we agree with him when he assures us that physical science represents a progress towards pure truth? There seems to be a certain reluctance on the part of twentieth-century physicists to face the ontological question which I think their colleagues of the nineteenth century did not share to the same extent.

Sir Arthur Eddington writes: "I am afraid of this word Reality not connoting an ordinarily definable characteristic of the things it is applied to, but used as if it were some kind of celestial halo."[1] I think we may notice in his rather whimsical remarks about reality the pull in one direction of the physicist who would prefer to remain ensconced behind solid facts, and in the other, the pull of the philosopher who realizes that all solid facts are valueless without adequate interpretation.

The word "reality," is, he says, used "*with the intention of invoking sentiment.*" It is a grand word for a peroration. "The right honourable speaker went on to declare that the concord and amity for which he had unceasingly striven had now become a reality (loud cheers)."[2] "The conception which it is so troublesome to apprehend is not 'reality,' but 'reality' (loud cheers)."

Reality, without the "cheers," as the author remarks, does not take us far enough. This latter kind of reality belongs to the world which is based upon the community of human sense-experience. The individual is initially in possession only of the content of his own consciousness, and, if he lived in isolation, there would be no logical need to assume the existence of an external world. "It is true," says Eddington, "that I have a strong impression of an external world apart from any communication with other conscious beings. But apart from such communication I should have no reason to trust the impression. . . . The impression only becomes useful when it is a means of bringing together the worlds of many different view-points. . . . The external world of physics is thus

[1] *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 282.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 283.

a symposium of the worlds presented to different view-points."[1] Again, "Much that is in any one consciousness is individual, much is apparently alterable by volition; but there is a stable element which is common to other consciousnesses. . . . The common element cannot be placed in one man's consciousness rather than another's; it must be in neutral ground—an external world."[2] Thus, the external world which is recognized by science comes into being; but the whole paragraph from which this is quoted should be read.

Such a symposium presupposes, of course, that the individual has escaped from solipsism. "Assuming that the symposium has been correctly carried out, the external world and all that appears in it are called real without further ado."[3]

This definition of existence, Eddington tells us, is accepted throughout science. Let us be clear about it. It includes what is common property both in the world of the senses and in the world of physics, the peculiarities due to individual points of view having been eliminated. But what is the exact status of this world about which all observers are agreed? Upon this point scientists are far from clear, and philosophers far from unanimous; yet it forms the keystone of the metaphysical arch.

The generalization towards which the theory of relativity leads, by the elimination of the individual and the particular, logically reduces the world as actually given by the individual senses to the state of an appearance. This introduces a perfectly clear distinction between the world of the senses and the world of physics, as the latter is defined and conceived by physicists. The distinction between an appearance and that which is known to the percipient by means of the appearance is perfectly definite, although in philosophy it becomes blurred by over-sophistication. Stress comes to be laid on an appearance, conceived as an epistemological object, and in the light thus thrown upon it it gathers in importance until it crystallizes into a self-objectivity, which ends by assigning to it a false ontological status. But surely the kind of difference is simple and clear which exists between a penny, regarded as a physical object, and the perceptual picture of it—the appearance by which it is known. The ontological object is all the time the penny and never the aspect-view by which it is known. It is possible, of course, to build theories out of perceptual elements, themselves objectified into self-existing sensa; but the clear distinction between appearance and reality cannot be disregarded even on the sensum theory. If two groups of sensa, or of inferences directly dependent upon them, stand in mutual contradiction to one another, then to them, just as much as to physical objects or facts, must be denied the status of inde-

[1] *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 284.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 284. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 285.

pendent reality. They are inevitably reduced to the status of appearances.

So long as *some* ontological substratum, common for all, is admitted, this distinction between appearance and reality has a perfectly definite meaning. Granted that there is a reality which exists apart from the percipient, an appearance is not an independently existing symbol, but is the *mode* under which the percipient is aware of the reality. He is not aware of it in its entire completeness; but he is aware of it some*how*. To know by appearance is not to know through the mediation of a *tertium quid*; it is to know reality adverbially qualified.

The way in which the new outlook in physics involves an aspect- or appearance-nature for the sense-perceived world further emerges as Eddington proceeds to illustrate the view-point of relativity. "I hold a certain object before me, and see an outline of the figure of Britannia; another observer on the other side sees a picture of a monarch; a third observer sees only a thin rectangle. Am I to say that the figure of Britannia is the real object; and that the crude impressions of the other observers must be corrected to make allowance for their positions? All the appearances can be accounted for if we are all looking at a three-dimensional object—a penny—and no reasonable person can doubt that the penny is the corresponding physical reality. Similarly, an observer on the earth sees and measures an oblong block; an observer on another star contemplating the same object finds it to be a cube. Shall we say that the oblong block is the real thing, and that the other observer must correct his measures to make allowance for his motion? All the appearances are accounted for if the real object is four-dimensional, and the observers are merely measuring different three-dimensional appearances or sections; and it seems impossible to doubt that this is the true explanation."[1]

This makes it quite clear that both the oblong block and the cube—that is to say the external world as actually given by the senses of either observer—is looked upon by the physicist as a world of appearances, but they are appearances *of the four-dimensional world* of physics which hence must receive the "halo" of the ultimately real.

This constitutes a clear philosophical outlook, the only objection to it being that it precludes the possibility of any further development of the world of physics, since reality with a "halo" means ultimate reality, and that must be the status of the four-dimensional world.

At this point, however, the outlook becomes hazy. We read that: "Just as matter must shed its conception of substantiality, so

[1] *Space, Time and Gravitation*, p. 181.

existence must shed its halo, before we can admit it into physical science."[1] By "shedding its halo" is clearly meant reduction from the status of a self-existent world to that of an appearance; the world of relativity-physics seems to lose its halo again and to be reduced, in common with the world of sense, to the status of an appearance. But, in that case, of what are these two worlds the appearances? The situation would seem to admit of only three possibilities. (1) The world of physics may be an appearance of the world of sense; or (2) the world of sense may be an appearance of the world of physics; or (3) both the world of sense and the world of physics may be appearances of some reality which is not identical with either of them.

Before discussing these three alternatives, it will, however, be as well to say a few words about a view of the situation which common sense strongly suggests to us, and which is pretty certain to be in the reader's mind. This view maintains that there is no contradiction between the world of sense and the world as disclosed by physics. It tells us that the senses give us a kind of impressionist picture of the real world, omitting all minute details as well as those attributes which it is unnecessary for practical purposes that we should be aware of. Physics, it says, merely expands the picture of the senses by filling in all the details which can be reached by metrical methods of research, so that we can take the two worlds of sense and science as together representing true external reality.

The world which our senses present to us is like a colour-wash sketch, giving a rough, general impression of the whole. The world which physicists present to us is like a minute pen-and-ink drawing, filling in the details.

As against this view, it may be noted that it is not uncommon for both scientists and philosophers to state, as a *result* of scientific discoveries, that certain aspects of the common-sense world have been found to be "illusory," the word being used, not in a merely relative sense, but without qualification. Thus, to quote a scientist, Eddington says, "Most of our common impressions of substance, world-wide instants, and so on, have turned out to be illusory";[2] and to quote a philosopher, N. Kemp Smith says: "All this is secured through those various illusions which constitute perspective . . . and by those still more deep-rooted illusions whereby objects appear to possess as an inherent property some specific shade of colour or light."[3] Now, if we allow that unqualified illusion enters into our world-picture, we cannot accord it a "halo" without admitting that reality is self-contradictory.

[1] *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 286.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 284.
[3] *Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 35.

This leads on to the important conclusion which lies hidden in this common-sense view of the two worlds of physics and of sense. On this view these two worlds are related to each other in the same kind of way as an impressionist sketch of a natural scene, say a tree, is related to a detailed pen-and-ink picture of the same tree. One picture will consist of a wash of green colour, and the other of a mass of fine, black lines. Now, to take the view that the latter fills in truly existing spatial detail which the former omits, it is necessary to *know independently* that there is a real tree, existing apart from both the pictures, and which is serving as a model for the two artists. If the pictures *alone* were given, and there was no knowledge of any independently existing tree, one would have to accept them at their face values as *themselves* constituting the only reality known; and in the face of their obvious and undeniable differences, one would be obliged to admit that reality contains self-contradiction. The only possible way of escape from a reality which contradicts itself would be to regard one, or both, of the pictures as *appearances.*

There would then be three courses open: (1) To identify the green wash with reality and to regard the mass of lines as a peculiar appearance of it. (2) To identify the mass of lines with reality and to regard the green wash as a peculiar appearance of it. (3) To regard both the green wash and the mass of lines as appearances of some reality existing independently of both. This last is the course which we adopt in the case of real pictures; and I suggest that it is also the only course which brings coherence into the world pictures of sense and of physics. Which of these courses do physicists themselves seem inclined to adopt?

(1) There is, I think, little tendency on the part of physicists to adopt the first of these courses and to accept the world of the senses as ultimately real existence, endowed with the halo of reality, and to regard the world of physics as merely an appearance of it. I have quoted Eddington above in a passage which refers to the world of sense as illusory; and there is an evident tendency on the part of all physicists to regard their quantitative descriptions of the world as in some way truer and more real than the sensuous version of it. Also, the subjectivism towards which physicists are inclined is at least partly traceable to the fact that they regard a good part of the world of sense as unreal. The secondary qualities, which form so large a part of it, are not, as a rule, regarded by physicists as possessing any objective existence.

(2) On the other hand, the claim of reality is made with considerable emphasis for the quantitative, physical world-pictures themselves. We find Eddington saying in one place: "I venture to say that the division of the external world into a material world

and a spiritual world is superficial and that the deep line of cleavage lies between the metrical and the non-metrical aspects of the world."[1] Many passages from Jeans could be quoted to the same effect. "The mathematical explanation," he says, "has the greatest chance of being the explanation which lies nearest to the truth."[2] "The same concept implies, of course, that the final truth about a phenomenon resides in the mathematical description of it; so long as there is no imperfection in this, our knowledge of the phenomenon is complete."[3] "It is true in a sense somewhat different from that intended by Galileo, that 'Nature's great book is written in mathematical language.' So true is it that no one except a mathematician need ever hope fully to understand those branches of science which try to unravel the fundamental nature of the universe."[4] "It would now seem to be beyond dispute that in some way Nature is more closely allied to the concepts of pure mathematics than to those of biology or engineering."[5]

Such words cannot be taken merely to uphold the pragmatic value of the quantitative method in research; they definitely accord an ontological status of fundamental importance to those characteristics of the external world which are peculiarly quantitative. But, clearly as Jeans appears to uphold view (2), I do not think that he, or any of the three physicists whose works are here quoted, consistently maintains the position that the "halo" of reality resides in the world of physics, and that the world of the senses is an appearance of it.

Such a claim certainly seems to be made by Eddington in the following words: "Just what kind of justification the scientist would claim for his quest is not very clear because it is not within the province of science to formulate such a claim. . . . He [the scientist] would not allow his subject to be shoved aside in a symposium on truth. We can scarcely say anything more definite than that science claims a 'halo' for its world."[6]

If the halo is seriously claimed, it means quite definitely that view (2) is adopted. It means, to quote Eddington again, that "the atoms and electrons of the external world are not merely a conventional reality, but 'reality' (loud cheers)."[7]

Such a position is particularly difficult to maintain in face of the fact that the world of physics is always changing. If the halo of reality inheres in it, the world-pictures which it has produced at various stages of its progress are contradictory to one another. There is emphatic and complete contradiction, for example, between Dalton's atom and Schrödinger's atom, and there is no possibility of

[1] *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 191. [2] *The Mysterious Universe*, p. 146.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 140. [4] *Ibid.*, pp. 127–8.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 133. [6] *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 287. [7] *Ibid.*

escaping from this contradiction without relegating one or both of these atomic pictures to the status of an appearance.

I think one may say that on this point physicists show a strong tendency to wobble.

(3) But in another passage we find Sir Arthur Eddington speaking in a way which involves the removal of the halo from the world of physics and the placing of it in an unknown world beyond. "For my part I hold that the continual advance of science is not a mere utilitarian progress; it is a progress towards ever purer truth."[1] This makes the halo a distant objective situated beyond the world of physics and the world of sense alike; by implication it accords to *both* these worlds the status of appearances. This is the only view which, to return to our analogy, allows us to interpret the green, impressionist picture of the tree, and the detailed pen-and-ink drawing of it in the normal manner, viz. as *appearances* of an independently real object taken from two different mental viewpoints.

After all his emphasis on the reality of the metrical world, we find that Sir James Jeans swings over to a position which takes "haloed" reality outside the world of the senses and the world of physics alike, and places it in a world of pure thought. "In brief," he says, "a mathematical formula can never tell us what a thing is, but only how it behaves; it can only specify an object through its properties."[2] Here the reality is beginning to fade out of the world of physics; it is beginning to lose its halo, although the reality of the metrical properties still remains. But, we read further, "On this view we need find no mystery in the nature of the rolling contact of our consciousness with the empty soap-bubble we call space-time, for it reduces merely to a contact between mind and a creation of mind";[3] and, finally, "If the universe is a universe of thought, then its creation must have been an act of thought. Indeed, the finiteness of time and space almost compel us, of themselves, to picture the creation as an act of thought."[4] The "halo" has now disappeared from the metrical world of physics and has been transferred to a world of pure thought. What other status, then, can the world of sense and the world of physics occupy than that of *appearances* of this ultimately real, mental world?

Professor Max Planck sets out initially with the view that there are three worlds which he calls, respectively: (1) the world of sense, (2) the world of physics, and (3) the real world.

The world of physics, according to Planck, is a hypothetical world, occupying an intermediate position between the world of sense on

[1] *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 285.
[2] *The Mysterious Universe*, p. 142.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 143. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

the one hand and the real world on the other. To quote his own words: "It is a deliberate hypothesis put forward by a finite, human mind."[1] It performs a double function, (*a*) a "metaphysical" function of apprehending the real world as completely as possible, and (*b*) a "positivist" function of describing the world of the senses in the simplest possible terms. "The essential point, therefore, is that these two formulations of the problem, when practically applied, shall be complementary to each other and not contradictory."

On the view that there is a third world carrying the halo of reality, and that the world of physics is an appearance of it which is mediating between it and another appearance which is the world of sense, there is no need for these two formulations to contradict each other. Two appearances may be quite different from one another without involving any contradiction, but *reality* cannot contradict itself. Planck does not specifically say that he regards these two latter worlds of sense and of physics as *appearances* of his "real world," but, in speaking of the world of the senses, he says: "It is considerations of this kind, and not any logical argument, that compel us to assume the existence of another world of reality behind the world of the senses; a world which has existence independent of man, and which can only be perceived indirectly through the medium of the world of the senses, and by means of certain symbols which our senses allow us to apprehend."[2] This seems almost tantamount to calling the world of sense an appearance; and, again, his definition of the world of physics as a "deliberate hypothesis" reduces it to practically the same status, so that it is difficult to see what other interpretation can be placed upon his outlook than that of view (3) above.

The whole trend of the history of physical science (which I may here illustrate very briefly by quotations from Jeans and Planck) emphasizes the growing inconsistency between the world of sense and the world of physics—an inconsistency which can only be redeemed from hopeless incompatibility and contradiction by assigning to both these two worlds the status of appearances. It strongly suggests also that the changing panorama of physics is the result of a number of aspects of reality seen from different points of view, for there are certain features beginning in the sense-world which run through the physical pictures for a certain distance and gradually fade away, like mountain ranges which die down and disappear in the view of the traveller who journeys across a continent. The earlier physics, for example, was couched in terms of mechanical ideas borrowed in the first instance from the world of common sense. "A mechanical conception of nature fits the events of everyday life in which we do not go far from home exceedingly well, as also

[1] *The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics*, pp. 9–10. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

does a conception of a flat earth. But, as science has extended the scope of its operations, viewing the farthest depths of space and even the cosmos as a whole, and penetrating into the hidden recesses of the atom, this mechanical concept has failed. It left off bringing law and order into the phenomena of nature, and brought contradictions and nonsense instead."[1] Mechanism lasted through a certain series of these appearance-pictures, but dropped out of them as the physicist continued to move on and to see the real world from more distant standpoints.

In the same way, the Galilean picture rested on the sense-perceived fact of Motion; the fundamental base of the Newtonian picture lay in the more abstract conception of Force; while the modern conception is the still more abstract one of Potential. Again, the idea of substance, drawn from the world of sense, entered under different disguises into the earlier conceptions of physics. There was first a substantial "caloric" in the primitive theory of heat; there was later a substantial "electric fluid"; and finally a substantial ether. After running through the world of physics for a certain distance, like a range of mountains crossing a landscape, this sense-conceived substance finally disappeared. Substantial matter turned into electricity.

The hiatus which has recently appeared between Classical and Quantum physics is much more abrupt than the transitions of former times. The former pictures were more like views joined end to end, whereas the modern pictures overlap. These two modern views appear as mutually interdependent and yet seemingly incompatible pictures of the world. "Wave-mechanics, which is in itself a complete contradiction to classical mechanics, nevertheless makes use of concepts drawn from the classical theory."[2] But, perhaps, the thing which forces upon us most strongly the conviction that physics is presenting us with a succession of appearances rather than with a single, consistently developing picture of the world is the fact that there are questions which are relevant for some of its world-views, but meaningless for others. Such a question as that of the velocity of the earth through the ether has a perfectly definite meaning for the Newtonian picture of physics, but none for the world-picture of relativity.

It is obviously impossible to regard any one of the various editions of the world which physics has issued as reality with a "halo." Were such a status assigned to it, all these pictures would flatly contradict one another—unless, indeed, one had the temerity to maintain that the latest world-picture of physics is the ultimate and

[1] Jeans, "The Mathematical Aspect of the Universe" (*Philosophy*, January 1932, p. 6).

[2] Planck, *The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics*, p. 44.

final picture. But, in view of the recent rate of progress in physics, I think that this view is likely to lack defenders.

If the physicist's pictures are "unhaloed" reality, what can they be but *appearances* of Planck's "real world"? The view that all the physical discoveries are a series of appearances seen progressively from shifting standpoints thus seems to be forced upon us by statements made by the physicists themselves. They are like the different views of a house which a person sees as he walks round it. They are obviously different from one another, and it may be said that they are all equally true; that together they form an accumulation of knowledge which is additive like that of a picture-gallery—a collection of aspect-views which is no doubt useful and valuable; but can it be said that an accumulation of knowledge is the same thing as a "progress towards ever purer truth," or that there is any sense in which the latest scientific picture is truer than the earliest?

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL SYSTEM OF ETHICS (I)

MARY EVELYN CLARKE, PH.D.

SINCE the appearance, nearly twenty years ago, of the first volume of Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, philosophers have been watching the development of a movement in Germany that has claimed attention through its opposition on the one side to the still powerful Kantian tradition, on the other to the trend of thought arising under the influence of biological science, aptly named by Meinong *Psychologismus*. The subtlety and originality of this new line of speculation and the exactness of its method have attracted to it some of the most powerful intellects of the country, whose contributions would repay a more detailed study than they have yet received from English or American scholars.

It is not, however, the present writer's aim to offer an analysis of the doctrines of Phenomenology, as formulated chiefly in their logical relations by Husserl, or as the basis of a metaphysical system by his disciple, Heidegger, but rather, assuming an acquaintance with the most general features of the former, to trace some of its consequences in the field of ethics, as these are presented in the work of its most distinguished representative in this department, the late Max Scheler.

I

Scheler does not apparently consider it necessary to explain in any detail the relation of the theory he develops in his principal ethical treatise, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, to that of Husserl, though it must be confessed that the application of the latter's abstract method to his exceedingly concrete system is not always obvious. It may therefore be worth while to consider for a few moments how he is able to justify his claim to be adhering throughout to a phenomenological method.

The most direct clue to this will be found in the introduction to an essay entitled *Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen*,[1] written shortly before the work in question. There are, he states here, two methods of investigating the contents of experience: (*a*) the psychological method, which analyses them into their elements and dis-

[1] Included in a collection of essays and addresses entiled *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, vol. i, third edition, Leipzig, 1923. See pp. 49–50.

covers the causes and effects of these by artificially varying them in observational or experimental tests. In this method factors that form no unity in experience, but belong to quite different phases of it, are isolated and related to each other, *e.g.* the various sensations involved in being in a room, being seated in a chair, perceiving a piece of writing-paper, writing words upon it, and so on. It also includes within its scope many factors that are genetically related to those under investigation but do not enter into experience, *e.g.* the conditions of the inner ear, which determine the maintenance of equilibrium. This is the method of natural science. (*b*) The method of describing and seeking to grasp the full meaning of the contents of experience itself—a method for which the most complex psychological data—sensations, judgments, inferences, feelings, emotions—may be "simple," if included in one act of awareness, even though they have different time references, and are interrupted by other events. This is the method of phenomenology. A friendship, an injury received, the outlook of a phase of childhood, are suggested as examples of "phenomena," forming unities of experience, and thus determining actions or attitudes. They can, of course, be analysed into simpler elements: a situation or event, the look or smile of a friend, but these have meaning only as factors in such wholes; they do not themselves constitute significant experiences. What is elementary and what is complex in the two methods is thus entirely different, and their analyses can never coincide.

If taken by itself, however, this account would be open to serious misinterpretation. It needs to be read in conjunction with the numerous references to phenomenological procedure that occur in the course of Scheler's larger work.

It is Husserl's claim to have undertaken a non-empirical investigation of knowledge, specifically of the structure of the act of knowing with its content, exclusive of all reference either to the subject or to the *object* of knowledge as real existents, both of which are, in his well-known phrase, "bracketed." The "phenomenon," which is the object of the investigation, is not an existent but an essence (*Wesen*), his concern being with the *a priori* character of act and content. This, Scheler declares, is also his aim in the investigation of ethical problems. It is his purpose to exhibit *the phenomenological basis* of ethics, not to develop a complete system of ethical science as applied to concrete existence, and he claims not to have transcended the range of strictly *a priori* concepts and relations. If he seems to have given his doctrine a wide application to concrete facts, this is because the phenomenological significance of these *a priori* concepts is much more than formal.[1] To deny the formal character of a principle is

[1] *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, Third Edition, Halle, 1927. Preface to the First Edition, p. i.

not to declare it empirical. The opposition of *a priori* and empirical, so far from coinciding with that of formal and material, as Kant held, cuts right across it, for the latter is a relative distinction—what is form in one relation is matter in another—the former is an absolute one. *A priori* truths that have a restricted application are relatively material, *e.g.* those of arithmetic as opposed to those of pure logic; on the other hand, even *a posteriori* statements must have some propositional and grammatical form. Material *a priori* truths are of paramount importance in ethics. It was his failure to recognize them that rendered Kant's ethical theory barren.

Scheler develops this doctrine of a material *a priori* in some detail,[1] and it is in this discussion that the phenomenological basis of his theory is most clearly exhibited.

He defines as *a priori* "those general meanings and propositions that can be directly apprehended without any assumptions as to the apprehending subject or its nature as a living being, or as to the objects to which they may be applicable, thus without any presuppositions concerning existence."[2] The opposition of real (in the sense of existing) and unreal is thus not applicable to them, and if we call such objects of thought "phenomena," we must understand that the word has no connection here with "appearance," as opposed to "reality." The apprehension of such objects is an "intuition of essence"; we may call it "phenomenological experience." Essences as such are neither universal nor particular. Only as applied to existents does their general or individual significance become apparent. An identical essence may be embodied in a number of objects, but there are also individual essences, *i.e.* the character of an object—*what* it is—may be unique. *A priori* knowledge, then, is derived from experience. It is based on facts and *only* facts; it is not a product of arbitrary intellectual construction. But the experience in question is "pure perception" (or intuition) of the self-evident; it is not experience in the ordinary sense of what is conditioned and mediated by a psycho-physical organism, and it cannot, therefore, be substantiated or discredited by observation or inductive proof—indeed, such processes always presuppose it. In other words, experience is no chaos of sensuous material upon which a structure is imposed by the ordering activity of pure reason, nature being a Humean stream of discrete sensations, man a Hobbean bundle of appetites. Such notions as thinghood, power, equality, motion, space, time, number, are no more products of thought than data of sense. This view of them is the outcome of a puritanical opposition of flesh and spirit, which the philosopher is called upon to reconcile. As a matter of fact pure sensations are never given, whereas essence and relations of essence are as much given as things or goods. They are not

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 43–78. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 43.

"created by thought out of nothing." Neither, then, is the *a priori* "transcendental," in the sense that the laws of the objects of experience and knowledge are determined by the laws of experiencing and knowing. Rather, *a priori* essences are first discovered in things, which may even be said to be determined by them, so long as this is not taken in the sense of Kant's Copernican Revolution.

The *a priori* is thus purged of the taint of subjectivism that clings to it in the Kantian system for all Kant's efforts to vindicate its objectivity through its claims to universality and necessity. Necessity, as a character of propositions resting on non-contradiction, is a negative criterion, presupposing positive insight into the truths that condition them, and an *a priori* judgment may, as we have just seen, be singular rather than universal in import, and need certainly not be recognized as valid by all minds. One mind alone, or one race and not another, may be capable of reaching such insight—though clearly we are drifting very far from the Kantian meaning of universality in even considering such a pragmatic test.

If, however, the identification of the *a priori* with the synthetic activity of thought be rejected, we should, Scheler thinks, go the whole way, and deny that there is *any* necessary relation between the *a priori* and the rational such that, if given, it must be given *to reason.* If this prejudice is overcome, we perceive that our whole mental activity, and not merely its rational aspect, is subject to laws that are independent of, and logically prior to, its psychophysical organization and milieu. Feeling, emotion, volition, have an *a priori* content that is not derived from thought. Values are as much essences as the objects of mathematical thinking, and exhibit a structure that can be intuited as a phenomenon as directly as the *a priori* of logic, but the *a priori* of value is given not to thought but to feeling, *i.e.* in preference, in love, or hate. The organ of valuing is not judgment, which follows later. A purely intellectual mind would be blind to value.[1]

An ethic of feeling is not, then, necessarily an empirical system. It is the task of phenomenological ethics to lay bare its *a priori* basis by abstracting from all reference to agents as living subjects and to their objects as real existents in order to trace the essential structure of moral acts and their contents.

[1] It must be confessed that the poverty of language is a source of some confusion here, both in the original German and in any attempt to translate it. The medium of *a priori* experience is always referred to by Scheler as intuition (*Anschauung*), or insight (*Einsicht*), terms which are both associated rather with the perception of a truth than with the emotional apprehension of a good. Had a different word been available, to describe the mode of givenness of the "emotional *a priori*," the rationalist prejudice of which he complains might have been more easily overcome.

II

It will be clear from what has been said that Scheler's own system is an attempt to resolve the dilemma into which ethical science seems to him to have fallen, viz. that the theories which claim the absolute validity of ethical principles are formal and rationalistic; emotionalist theories, which discover moral value in the material content and not in the empty form of the will, are relative and subjective, deriving the value of the act from the end to be attained, which is always in the last resort a state of feeling, so that no external objects have value except in relation to sentient organisms. He considers the phenomenologist's discovery of a material *a priori* particularly well adapted to overcome this opposition, inasmuch as it furnishes a theory of objective value which is at the same time material, thus yielding an ethic of content and not of mere form.[1]

As stated, he believes the source of the dilemma to be the false opposition of thought and sense, presented in an extreme form by Kant, but actually originating with the Greeks. As a result of this dualism perception, feeling and volition have been traditionally ascribed to sense, and thus made dependent upon the psycho-physical organism.[2] That these a-logical aspects of consciousness may exhibit an order of relations which is presupposed by any inductively established order, yet is not borrowed from logical thought, is a notion that has scarcely been entertained in the history of a science dominated by this prejudice. Among the very few philosophers who have envisaged the supposedly contradictory idea of an ethic of feeling, that is nevertheless absolute and *a priori*, Scheler mentions Augustine and Pascal. It is to such an order of feeling, sentiment, and emotion that Pascal's much abused phrases, *la logique du cœur*, *l'ordre du cœur*, refer. The extraordinary misinterpretation of these as a demand that reason should at times give way to the wholly irrational promptings of an opposing factor in mental life, or that it is the task of philosophy to furnish a view satisfying to the claims of both emotion and reason, give an ironical significance to his words that he was certainly far from intending. *Le cœur a ses raisons* does *not* mean that "reasons" may be swept aside by the claims of "blind feeling." What he is insisting is rather that other modes of experience reveal realms of being to which pure intellect is as blind as the ear is to colour. The order of value is such an objective order, constituting a realm of law as absolute as that of mathematics or logic, and apprehensible with the same clarity and intuitive certainty. To explore this realm is the task of

[1] For a further discussion of these distinctions, see Hilda D. Oakeley: *The Philosophy of Personality*, London, 1928, pp. 97–8; Julius Seelye Bixler: *Religious Realism*, edited by D. C. Macintosh, New York, 1931, Essay III, pp. 71–6.

[2] *Der Formalismus in der Ethik*, pp. 260 ff.

ethics, broadly conceived as a general science of value—a task which neither Augustine nor Pascal, for all their insight into the general character of the problem, nor any other thinker, has ever undertaken. It is this investigation that Scheler claims as his special contribution to the field.

It is natural, starting as he does from a dilemma in current theory, that he should develop his position in the first instance by destructive criticism, on the one hand of formalistic theories in general, involving, however, constant reference to Kant, whose system he regards as outstandingly the most important of this type, and as open, by implication if not explicitly, to all his general objections, on the other hand of hedonism, to which, he claims with questionable accuracy, all empirical theories of ethics inevitably tend. It is out of these two opposite lines of criticism that his positive theory finally emerges.

The grounds of Scheler's criticism of rationalistic ethics are the familiar ones of its barrenness and empty formalism.[1] The emendations or alternatives which he suggests are, however, so original that it may be worth while to reproduce his argument very briefly.

He points out that a formal law of right or duty presupposes the recognition of a value content, which, moreover, is not discovered by an inductive investigation of the states and causal relations of the psycho-physical organism, which similarly presuppose it, and, if taken in abstraction from such presuppositions (as scientific psychology and biology take them), are ethically neutral. It must, therefore, be matter of direct apprehension or insight. The content thus apprehended has, it is true, a formal as well as a material aspect, *i.e.* there are formal principles inherent in the nature of value itself which may be known independently of all reference to its species or the objects of which it is predicated, and thus form a pure axiology of value. Such are Brentano's axioms of value,[2] to which derivative principles of valuing correspond. Kant's imperatives are partly applications of these latter. He is right in distinguishing them from logical principles, but errs in restricting them to the moral sphere and representing them as principles of *willing*, instead of as principles of valuing on which the moral will is based. Moreover, he ignores the *a priori* laws of being from which the laws of thinking and feeling, and therefore of willing, are derived. We cannot *think* two contradictory propositions, because reality excludes contradiction; we cannot be attracted and repelled by the same quality, because value cannot *be* positive and negative at the same time.

[1] *Op. cit.*, Part II, § IV.

[2] Viz. the existence of a positive value is itself a positive value; the existence of a negative value is itself a negative value; the non-existence of a positive value is a negative value; value cannot be positive and negative at the same time, etc.

In acknowledging *only* these formal principles of valuing and ignoring all material ones Kant, moreover, leaves his ethical theory empty, and therefore arbitrary in application. Moral experience consists for him in a sense of obligation to obey a law or norm, *i.e.* in the experience of an "ought." Obviously, then, the ought is not derived from the inner sense of obligation, which is simply the recognition of its binding force, but must result from insight into objective good. Its relation to value is thus asymmetrical. An ought presupposes a value and not a value an ought, for an ought relates to existence, *i.e.* it is the obligation to realize a non-existent value or to destroy an existing negative value. Its reference is thus always in the first instance negative; hence every ethic of imperatives or duties is critical and repressive. A theory, however, which overlooks the value content that it presupposes, presents this negative aspect unsupported; hence its commands appear the decrees of an arbitrary authority. "Whence comes the norm?" we are constrained to ask, and if such sources as social suggestion or hereditary inhibitions are declared irrelevant to value, its origin remains completely mysterious. This arbitrary, almost magical, character, attaches to all formalistic accounts of the "law of duty," and an attempt like Kant's to rid it of this character by representing it as a duty freely undertaken, *i.e.* a duty towards nobody and imposed by no authority, simply renders it meaningless. It follows, moreover, that any spontaneous realization of value from an impulse of generosity or natural affection will be devoid of moral worth. Autonomy based on insight conflicts with the idea of duty, for duty is a compulsion away from natural impulse and personal volition; hence the rigorist's depreciation of the "glad hearts without reproach or blot" who perform dutiful acts spontaneously, and therefore *not* dutifully, and his tendency to command acts that would have been carried out from natural desire and need no compulsion. To use the medicine of commands as the daily bread of morals is an offence to virtue, and the issuing of such commands is actually an evil act, and exposes normative ethics as pragmatically unworkable.

Scheler's criticisms of hedonism also imply an indirect criticism of formalistic ethics,[1] for he is here again attacking the treatment of human nature as a duality of reason and sense, as a result of which our whole instinctive and emotional life is traced to the "chaos of sensations." On such a view, as Kant saw, an ethic that finds good in the content rather than the form of the will must be hedonistic, for this content is always an end to be attained, and the natural tendency of human action, if unrestrained by reason, is towards pleasure. For the effects of an action originally undirected, or reflex, tend to be recalled, and, if pleasurable, serve as a motive

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 245–8.

to its repetition, which means, subjectively stated, that pleasure becomes the aim of action, man becomes a slave to his own states. Such a theory must also be egoistic, for any desire a man may evince for the pleasure of others can be shown to be derived from his natural striving for his own, and, since such actions are dictated by expediency rather than by genuinely moral considerations, it must be heteronomous. Nor can there be any distinction between different types of hedonism. Since all feelings except the feeling of respect for the moral law are treated as sensory feelings, the eudæmonism of Aristotle falls under the same condemnation as the sensualism of Aristippus.

The error of such a position, Scheler argues, lies not in its logic, which is irrefutable, but in the premises on which it is based. The division of ethical systems into formalistic and utilitarian ethics (*Erfolgsethik*) is not exhaustive. Kant was right in denying that the concern of ethics was with *the promotion of ends*, or *the realization of goods*, and in ascribing moral good to the will itself.[1] To make morality dependent on the empirical nature of the end is to make it relative to the historical development of society, in short, to admit the claims of naturalism. But in order to make it independent of external goods or ends it is not necessary to make it independent of concrete value altogether and to refer it to the mere form of law. Value may be distinguished from the things having it. There is an objective order of values as independent of the goods in which they are realized as the number series is independent of this or that unit, or couple, or score. Moral goodness is the value of *the act of realization* of the highest value in a discoverable scale, moral badness deliberate preference of a lower value.[2] Though ascribable to acts, they do not therefore constitute the content of such acts, for they are, as it were, "on their backs," and presuppose another content, viz. the (non-moral) value chosen. Clearly, then, the impulses and tendencies through which moral value is realized, so far from presenting a chaotic manifold until ordered by the rational will, must already embody the order that gives the will its content. The chaos of sensational and impulsive material, related only by chance associations, which Kant believes to be the basis of the naïve hedonism of the natural man, is actually discovered only in pathological cases.

Nor should moral value be restricted to acts; it rather pertains in the first instance to their authors. Only a person is in the original sense good or bad, though his specifically personal qualities and the acts which issue from and express such qualities, or dispositions, come to be derivatively so regarded. If this is the case, however, it is clearly inaccurate to confine such predicates to voluntary acts,

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 4. [2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 20–1.

for many others, which are not expressions of will, issue similarly from the qualities and inherent tendencies of the personality. The moral worth of a personality thus depends primarily upon the range of material it presents, *i.e.* on the level of value this reaches and the fineness of the distinctions it manifests, and only secondarily on the *order* of preference that the will exhibits in its choices; indeed, in a highly developed character, where there is a considerable degree of system among the tendencies, such choice is frequently automatic.[1]

III

Scheler's more direct arguments against the hedonistic alternative[2] are as familiar as his criticisms of formalism. It is incorrect, he holds, to treat pleasure as the necessary aim of voluntary action; indeed, the more clear-sighted hedonists have always rejected psychological hedonism. It was because he perceived that the fool sought external goods rather than pleasure as a state of the soul, that Aristippus counselled the wise man to make this his end, not, however, simply as pleasurable but as valuable. Pleasure, that is to say, is to be sought not as the essence of value, but as that which *has* value *in the highest degree.* The hedonist's error lies in mistaking its place in the scale of value, ranking it above the values of persons and their qualities and acts, which are actually conditions both of its existence and of its kind and degree.

From such rather trite discussions, however, he passes to a detailed examination of relativist theories in general,[3] some of his criticisms of which are unusually trenchant, and reveal, moreover, significant aspects of his own theory.

Value, he argues, is not a relation any more than red or blue are relations. Where an object seems to be of special value to a person, as is notably the case with exchange value, some value is ascribed to the relation itself. The relation, then, *is* not the value; it rather *has* a value which is additional to the value that attaches to the object itself. The confusion of value with the affective relation is undoubtedly due to the fact that it is given *through feeling,* but this does not mean that it consists in feeling. The transitory feelings that things excite in us are quite irrelevant not only to the objects but to our valuings, except in so far as they inhibit or divert these, as is the case in hypochondria and other forms of egotism, where emotional states are externalized and imputed as values to objects, thus concealing from us, and deceiving us concerning, their real worth. Value need not be felt in order to be real. The feeling is phenomenologically distinct from the value, as knowing is distinct from its object, and, just as we are aware of knowing much that is

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 23–4. [2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 248–60. [3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 260–340.

not immediately before our minds, and recognize that much more still is knowable that we do not yet know, and probably never shall, so we are aware of valuing much towards which we feel no immediate attraction, and believe that there are undoubtedly realms of good that we have never experienced and perhaps never shall experience; indeed, it seems probable that the reverence we feel for the universe in its vastness is inspired by the inexhaustible riches of unexplored value that it suggests. Most of the confusions that beset the historical treatment of this subject can be avoided if we maintain this distinction between *feelings* as contents, *i.e.* affective states, and *feeling* as activity of apprehension through which something is given.[1] In the latter connotation it has precisely the same relation to its object as any cognitive act, but a different class of objects, viz. values. Scheler, following Husserl, names this class of acts "intentional functions," *i.e.* activities which intend objects, or which have objective reference. Upon these affective functions are built up the more complex activities that form the superstructure of the emotional life, viz. preference, and the sentiments of love and hate, which latter are more than mere responses to felt preference, being rather spontaneous activities through which the realm of value is enlarged or diminished for the sentient subject. They have the rôle of discoverers of new and higher values, and thus determine the range and limits of appreciation.

He distinguishes two periods in the historical treatment of intentional functions, each of which has fallen into an opposite error.[2] The period covering the work of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, and ending at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was aware of the presentational and referential character of such feeling, and none of these thinkers made the mistake of reducing it to a mere affective state. All of them, however, overlooked its elemental character and treated it as confused cognition, the good and evil that it apprehended being accordingly described as "degrees of perfection," in the sense of completeness, degree of value meaning degree of reality. Since Tetens and Kant the irreducible character of feeling has seldom been denied, but a lingering intellectualist prejudice has led to its reduction to a mere inner state. Thus in avoiding the error of the earlier view the later has lost its grasp of the truth it contained, viz. that feeling may be an "intentional act." A more thorough psychological analysis, however, reveals that the only feeling *states* are the sensuous feelings, the immediate affective

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 262 ff. For a detailed treatment of the latter, cf. A. Meinong: *Über Emotionale Präsentation*, Sitzungsberichte der kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, phil. hist. Klasse, Bd. CLXXXIII, 1917. It is not certain, however, that Scheler is indebted to this for his own account.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 269–72.

responses to stimuli. Vital feelings *may*, and the higher (spiritual) feelings and emotions *must*, have objective reference. The historical error has consisted in treating the higher feelings after the analogy of the lower, sensory ones, thus overlooking, or misinterpreting, the values of which they are the medium.

Now, as stated, the very general belief in the subjectivity of value seems to be due to just such a misinterpretation. Value, being affectively experienced, it is inferred that it must be either a quality of, or relative to, the most subjective moment of experience. Moreover, there are a number of facts which, if loosely construed, seem to furnish an inescapable proof of this relativity. A very thorough phenomenological analysis is required, Scheler thinks, to expose the fallacy in this argument, and he undertakes one which is certainly sufficiently searching to throw the balance of probability upon the other side.

The appearance of relativity may be traced, he thinks, to several rather subtle confusions, together with one or two false assumptions, notably the assumption that underlies the work of Spencer and some of his associates that modern European civilization is the standard, by which other races and cultures are to be evaluated.[1] If these sources of error are avoided, there emerges from the mass of historical valuations, at first sight resembling the confusion of colours on a palette from a row of overturned pots, the picture of a humanity coming gradually into possession of a realm of values as independent of its emotions and desires as the stars in their courses, once believed to have a direct relation to human fate, are now known to be independent of man and his destiny.[2]

(*a*) It is frequently assumed that the restriction of value, positive or negative, to some objects only, the remainder being treated as indifferent, points to its relativity to the interests and purposes of man. But, Scheler argues, may this not rather be evidence of human incapacity to appreciate some values? Clearly both individuals and races differ enormously in this capacity. The inhabitants of Sumatra have only two words to express what they find agreeable or enjoyable and the reverse. Does not this suggest a poverty of experience? Such limitations are partly inherent in the attitude of the natural man, but the outlook of modern civilization imposes a limitation of its own. Human beings are likely to be most keenly aware of the values that fulfil their instinctive tendencies and needs, but those living in a modern society will also value objects that are rare and need labour and skill for their attainment, particularly if they are such as cannot be widely shared. All this tends to restrict attention to a very narrow range of goods. But to the man who is able to break through the walls of this common structure of experience and let in

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 300–1. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 306.

the clear light of day, a vast new realm of value is revealed. The richer the personality, the wider is the range of values accessible to it, the deeper its capacity to appreciate the so-called indifferent things of the environment: air, sky, water, one's own life and limbs, till, as the Franciscan saying has it, *Omnia habemus nil possidentes.*[1]

(*b*) It is, however, the further observation that men's valuations conflict, that there is so commonly opposite judgment upon the same situations, even considered quite abstractly, and therefore presumably under the same aspect, that gives most force to the relativist argument. One man admires as brave what another deems fool-hardy, one commends as becomingly modest what to another appears poor-spirited and servile, and it seems obvious that it is difference of interest that explains this diversity of opinions. But Scheler maintains that this again is really evidence on the other side. For why do men disguise their interests in value terms instead of expressing them directly? Why, for example, do strikers condemn as a traitor the non-union man who refuses to lay down his tools, instead of describing him as a man pursuing a different interest from their own? Surely because there is an objective moral good that claims universal recognition, hence to ascribe moral predicates to what serves one's own interest is serviceable to that interest. However deeply rooted in our nature this Pharisaism may be, it is traceable ultimately to the knowledge of the independent validity of moral value. Hypocrisy expresses a certain reverence for real virtue. Not all value can, then, be reduced to interest, but only spurious value. The Utilitarian is the *enfant terrible* of social morality who babbles the secret that society is struggling to keep, that it estimates actions primarily by their utility in serving human interests, but finds it useful to call such useful actions good. He is performing a moral act at the expense of the non-moral principle that he himself professes.[2]

(*c*) In any case the relativist can hardly find grounds for restricting the range of value to what is relative to the interests and feelings of humanity. Clearly animals, too, experience some values; moreover, it is by no means as certain as biologists of the last generation believed, where the line of demarcation between man and the animals is to be drawn. Ethnologists claim that some races are devoid of the capacity to recognize moral value, and if, as some of the evidence now at disposal suggests, the whole human race has not a common ancestry, it may well be that different peoples differ fundamentally in their powers of apprehension and appreciation. The alternatives that demand serious consideration seem thus to be:

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 274–8.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 175–82. See also the discussion of subjectivity in *Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen*, referred to in Part II of this article.

either that values are relative to life as such, and not merely to man, or that human beings—it matters not when nor where; it may be, in some cases, through the insight of one individual—become aware of a stratum of value revealing qualities and relations that are independent of, and superior to, the values and laws of life.[1] Biologically considered, man, the animal of the greatest fixity and complexity of organization, is not the most valuable of nature's creatures. Civilization, which gives birth to more needs than it can fulfil, breeds more diseases than its increase in knowledge can cure, maintains the weak at the expense of the strong, is the device of a "sick animal."[2] Only if a new function in man, representing biologically a superfluity of mental activity, is discovered to be the medium through which a new stratum of being—that of moral, æsthetic, and religious value—is revealed, and if a system of activities is developed to which biological categories are wholly irrelevant—only then can man be regarded as supreme among living creatures.[3]

As stated, however, there are, in addition to the above false assumptions, two or three more obscure sources of confusion which lend force to the naturalist's contention that these "higher values" too are biologically relative.

(i) A large proportion, though not quite all, of the cases that seem at first sight to imply ethical relativism will be found on analysis to be cases of variation in the intellectual beliefs about the environment, and thus about the locus of value, and not of variation in the value itself.[4] How far moral estimates of such practices as murder, theft, or adultery actually vary cannot be determined until we know what for the society in question constitutes a person, property, or sexual union. The deliberate killing of a human being with the intent to destroy his personality, which seems to be the exact meaning of the word "murder," is probably condemned by mankind at every stage and in every type of civilization. But a group which is incapable of distinguishing human personality from animal nature, or which does not ascribe it to strangers, or to women, or infants, or slaves, is not guilty of murder in infanticide, or in the burning of widows, or the killing of captives or slaves. As soon as the concept of personality is extended, as it was under the Roman Empire, such practices become criminal. War is not murder so long as it is directed against a collective, impersonally conceived enemy and not against individuals in personal hate; nor is human sacrifice, as the offering of a personality to a god, either in love or in response to his just demand, ever a denial of its personal claims. On the other

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 282–3, quoted by Miss H. D. Oakeley: *A Philosophy of Personality*, p. 105.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 293–4.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 298, referred to by J. S. Bixler, *Religious Realism*, pp. 83–4.
[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 307–8.

hand, the sacrifice of human life to pleasure, or to utility, is recognized as murder in every moral code. In short, the relation in question between deliberate act and clearly defined negative value seems to be condemned in every morality, but the circumstances in which such an act is discovered vary with men's beliefs, and these are clearly the pragmatic criteria of its occurrence. It is the confusion between the identical core and the variable husk that gives relativism its plausibility in these cases.[1]

(ii) The error of identifying values with norms or laws has already been exposed. It should be obvious that the fallacy of inferring the relativity of value from varieties in ethical codes is a case in point. A norm, whether in the sense of a theoretical expression of what ought to be or of a direct moral imperative, which is an application of the "ideal ought" to concrete situations, must always be based on a value, *i.e.* it must be derived from a prior insight into good, and implies the demand for its realization under the conditions of existence. Not every value, however, will give rise to such a demand, for many of the objects perceived to be good are in harmony with men's natural propensities and desires, and there is no need to *demand* the pursuit of what is spontaneously sought. It is only *ex contrario*, if at all, that we can discover the native tendencies and needs of a community, and hence the values that accord with these, from its ethical rules. The imperatives imposed upon a people will afford a clue only to such values as it has a natural tendency to neglect. The Israelites, being prone to polytheism, were commanded to serve only one God. Most men are slower to recognize the claims of others than their own interests, hence the widely recognized authority of the Golden Rule. If Nietzsche, on the other hand, exhorted men to "be hard," to care for their own development first, this was doubtless because he had a morbid tendency to self-immolation. The late Roman Empire tended to sterility; hence its laws in respect to the propagation of the race contrast curiously with modern precepts to birth-control, but this does not imply any variation in the values of vital function on which these prescriptions are based, but merely in the social and biological conditions through which they are realized, and which directly influence human desires. It is the very stability of the value under varying conditions of life that necessitates changes in moral imperatives.[2]

(iii) there is, however, an error of quite a different kind that lends support to the relativity argument from another side. The fact that the man of to-day claims "freedom of conscience," *i.e.* the right to follow his own insight in defiance, if necessary, of ethical rules, is regarded as sufficient disproof of the universality of moral judgments, and this is believed to be equivalent to denial of the objectivity

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 320–7. [2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 214 ff. See especially pp. 219–21.

of value. Scheler again ingeniously turns the flank of this argument, and is able, by considerably enlarging the perspective in which the whole question is viewed, to show that even the most radical conflicts in the dictates of individual consciences are not necessarily evidence of variation in the values involved.[1]

Although our theoretical views vary almost as much as our moral systems, ethical scepticism is far commoner than logical scepticism. This may be explained by the exaggerated importance we attach to the community in ethical questions. We are less able to stand alone in practical matters than in questions of theory or belief. Even the child will justify himself on the ground that others do as he is doing. It is our disappointment at failing to find social support for our actions that leads us to conclude cynically that all values are subjective. But, though it is desirable that maxims should, where possible, be universalized, such universality does not *constitute* their objective worth; it is not even its criterion. The fact that something appeared good for one group and not for another, even perhaps for one individual alone, would be a proof of subjectivity *if tested by this criterion*, but it is the criterion itself that is sceptical. That the power of insight into value varies enormously with individuals is no proof that value itself varies. If there be in truth an order of value accessible to human experience, and discoverable by it as the natural order is discoverable, it is to be expected that races and individuals will vary enormously in their capacity to grasp it. It is likely, moreover, that, just as discoveries in physical science are made by men of supernormal mental gifts, so, too, occasional extensions in the recognized range of value will take place through the vision of men of moral, religious, or artistic genius.

Furthermore, the good thus intuited may *refer to* one individual only. It may be the call of such a person to a particular act which is appropriate to him alone, and could not therefore be made a universal demand. In such a case something is good in itself, yet at the same time good for him and not for another. This is not a logical contradiction, for it is "good for him" not in the sense of good merely as he subjectively experiences it, but as relating to his particular situation in the moral universe and not to any other. Evidently, then, only the essential minimum of moral good is realized in the pursuit of values that can be generalized, and on which universally binding norms can be based. Every individual ought also to undertake the culture of the values accessible, or applicable, to him alone, and this applies also to groups—families, nations, races, or civilizations. To every phase and every moment of development belongs a specific relation to value that will never recur, involving facts and

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 329–40.

duties that belong in the nexus of the objective order to just this moment, and, if unfulfilled now, are lost for ever.[1] Conscience, in the proper sense of the term, is the totality of what such individual experience and effort yield in the way of moral insight, as contrasted with the accumulated products of authority and tradition, and it requires mutual criticism from all these sources in order that the maximum of personal achievement may be reached. Conscience itself is independent of norms, and begins where their authority ends, *i.e.* where they are so far obeyed, but situations arise to which they do not apply. It protects individuals from the misapplication of such norms, giving different guidance to each. Rightly understood, however, it implies no denial of objective good, but is rather the individual's organ of insight into such good so far as it has reference to him alone. Only where it is exploited against these norms is it a principle of anarchy.[2]

(iv) If we apply this doctrine to the ethical achievement of mankind as a whole, we see that there must similarly be vast differences in ethical notions and practices among different races and civilizations.[3]

Scheler calls racial or cultural differences in feeling and preference differences in *ethos*, as distinguished from differences in *ethic*, i.e. in judgments and principles of evaluation. The ethos of the ancient Hindu religion and caste system, for instance, is entirely different from the ethos of Greek or Christian civilization. Nor can such differences be ascribed wholly to the changes in belief already referred to that accompany the growth of knowledge, or to varying degrees of adaptation to the conditions of life. The instinctive and emotional differences in question are more fundamental. It is the ethos of a people that largely determines the character of such beliefs and the manner of such adaptations; it is not determined by them. Rather, just as we now recognize that basic differences in the art of different periods may be due to differences in their actual vision of the perceptual world, and not merely in their materials, technique, and selection of objects, or in their knowledge and application of rules, so we must realize that changes in the ethos of a people are fundamental changes of feeling and outlook and not matters of secondary adaptation. Nevertheless, even so apparently radical a relativism as this does not point to the relativity of value to living beings any more than the discovery of alternative systems of postulates implies the relativity of mathematical science to the human mind. Paradoxical though it may appear, it is the attempt, or rather our failure in the attempt, to evaluate the ethos of other races or ages by an absolute standard such as promotion of social welfare, or tendency to increase the abundance of life, that gives rise to the belief in

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 508–14. [2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 334–8. [3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 311–18.

relativity. If we view the situation in a broader perspective, with more humility and a deeper reverence for true values, this very richness and variety of valuations may suggest to us the reality of an order of value the different strata of which are discovered through the application of different principles of choice, so that only through the co-ordination of different types of ethos can the whole objective realm of good and its relations be fully apprehended.

The changes in ethos exhibited in the course of social evolution are of varying dimensions. One of the most striking examples that history affords is the claim made in the Sermon on the Mount on behalf of a new value, which is set in opposition to the old morality of the Law by the phrases "Moses saith unto you . . ." "but I say unto you. . . ." Such discoveries of moral or religious genius do not as a rule create a new *order* of preference, but simply extend the *range* of preference. The duty of avenging a wrong, as the Greek tragedians conceived it, is still morally preferable to the condoning of it from self-interest or even from public expediency, though it should now give way to the duty of forgiveness. In addition to such major developments there are, however, many smaller changes, such as the clearer demarcation of one type of value from another, *e.g.* of virtue from mere efficiency, or of the values of life from moral values. Also falsifications of value arise through errors of preference. The moral judgments (*i.e.* the ethics) of a whole civilization may be based on such a falsification;[1] moreover, the standards of such a civilization may be adopted by peoples whose own ethos has not been thus perverted; hence it is always important to investigate the ethnological sources of a moral theory in attempting to estimate its significance.

It remains to inquire what is the structure of the order of value, which is revealed to intelligent appreciation when the grounds of such falsification are exposed and the various sources of confusion avoided.

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 317.

(To be continued)

HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY[1]

Professor MORRIS GINSBERG

In actual practice the relation between history and sociology is very close. The sociologist of necessity derives his material from the data furnished by anthropology and history. On his side the historian, however eager he may be to confine himself to detailed and close narration of actual fact, cannot avoid reference to problems of causation or assumptions regarding human nature or the general course of human evolution, and so is a sociologist *malgré lui*. Again, though there are still not wanting some historians, such as v. Below, who deny sociology any status,[2] most writers on the theory and methodology of history have come to regard the two disciplines as *Hilfwissenschaften* to each other.[3] Closer examination, however, reveals considerable uncertainty and hesitation. This is due, firstly to widely prevalent doubts as to the scope of sociology, with regard to which it is said, not without some exaggeration, the sociologists themselves are not in agreement. It is due, secondly, to the fact that the issues raised involve reference to difficult problems in the theory of knowledge generally, in regard to which, in the present position of epistemology, agreement is hardly to be expected. In this paper I shall attempt firstly to define briefly the scope of sociology and discuss the bearing of my definition upon some recent representative views of the nature of historical investigation. Secondly, in the light of this discussion, I will endeavour to restate the fundamental points of our problem in the hope of bringing out more clearly the main issues involved.

Sociology in the broadest sense is the study of human interactions and interrelations, their conditions and consequences. In practice it soon becomes clear that if sociology were really to attempt to deal with the whole tissue of human relationships in their infinite complexity, it would make but little headway. Accordingly it confines itself by common consensus to the study of such social relationships as have been embodied or defined in recognized forms or institutions. Thus another definition of sociology is that it is the science of social institutions, that is, the forms or modes of social relationships exhibited in culture or the activities of men as members of society.

[1] A paper read at the Anglo-American Conference of Historians, London, 1931.

[2] Georg von Below, *Probleme der Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, p. 4.

[3] E. Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*, p. 97.

Sociology is also sometimes defined as the science of society. This latter term is then intended to cover not merely forms of grouping, but the whole tissue of human relationships in so far as it possesses any definiteness of pattern. In the further elaboration of these definitions two tendencies may be broadly distinguished. According to the formal school of Simmel and his disciples the function of general sociology is to disentangle the fundamental forms of social relationship and to study them independently of their specific content. Such relationships as leadership and obedience, subordination and superordination, competition, division of labour, may, it is said, be traced in all societies, and can therefore be studied simply as relationships. It appears that Simmel himself in his later work came to regard this type of inquiry as only a part of general sociology. In any event most other sociologists are impressed with the difficulty and the danger of separating form from matter, and regard sociology rather as the effort to interpret social life as a concrete whole. An examination of the work of outstanding sociologists such as Hobhouse, Westermarck, Max Weber, Sombart, Tröltsch, will, I think, show that the functions of sociology may be thus stated: (i) It seeks to elaborate what may be called a social morphology or a classification of the types and forms of social relationships. (ii) It tries to determine the relations between the different aspects or factors of social life, for example, between the economic and the political, the moral and the religious, the intellectual and the social elements. (iii) It endeavours to disentangle the fundamental conditions of social change and persistence, whether these be biological, psychological, or distinctively sociological, and to relate its empirical generalizations to the more ultimate laws of life and mind. Anyone who doubts the reality of sociology may be invited to read some of these works. He will find that, despite an obvious immaturity of which the sociologists themselves are quite sufficiently keenly aware, sociology may claim that its foundations have been well laid, and that a great deal has already been achieved not merely in the matter of methodology, but in the work of classification and even in the study of causes.

Sociology must be distinguished from social philosophy. As I understand it, the latter is concerned essentially with two sets of problems. On its critical side it seeks to provide what may be called an epistemology of the social sciences, that is to say, an account of the methods, categories, and assumptions used in these sciences. There is, in other words, a philosophy of the social sciences just as there is a philosophy of the physical sciences. On its more constructive side social philosophy is concerned with the problem of values, that is, with the application of ethical principles to the phenomena of social life and social evolution. Sociology, on the other hand, is not concerned with values except in so far as beliefs

relating to values may have causal efficacy in determining or influencing social change. Sociology may, in other words, deal with what may be called the natural history of morals or religion, but it is not, as such, concerned with the problem of their truth or validity. Its procedure is thus *naturwissenschaftlich* even when it deals, as it must, with mental factors. Similarly, like other sciences, it is not as such concerned with epistemology or the ultimate validity of the categories which it employs. This also it leaves to social philosophy.

We may now turn to a consideration of the scope of history and of the views held by some representative and important writers of its relation to sociology. I take first the views of Professor Bury, who has discussed this question in a well-known address on the "Place of Modern History in the Perspective of Knowledge."[1] Bury is, above all, anxious to defend the independence of history, the principle, as he calls it, of "history for its own sake." He shows first of all that history cannot be regarded as subordinate to political science. For, unlike the latter, history deals not merely with the political aspects of society, but with "all its various activities, all the manifestations of its intellectual, emotional, and material life." At this point, however, Bury recognizes that a more serious danger threatening the independence of history presents itself. If history differs from political science merely in inclusiveness, the conclusion seems difficult to resist that it is subordinate or ancillary to what pretends to be the most inclusive of the social sciences, sociology. "Political science," it will be said, "is a branch of social science, just as political history is part of general history; and the object of studying general history is simply and solely to collect and furnish material for sociological science."[2] Bury thinks that this question can only be resolved by an appeal to more ultimate philosophical considerations, "by the view we entertain of the *moles et machina mundi* as a whole." "If human development can be entirely explained on the general lines of a system such as Saint-Simon's or Comte's or Spencer's, then I think we must conclude that the place of history, within the frame of such a system, is subordinate to sociology and anthropology. There is no separate or independent precinct in which she can preside supreme. But on an idealistic interpretation of knowledge, it is otherwise. History then assumes a different meaning from that of a higher zoology, and is not merely a continuation of the process of evolution in nature. If thought is not the result, but the presupposition of the process of nature, it follows that history, in which thought is the characteristic and guiding force, belongs to a different order of ideas from the kingdom of nature and demands a different interpretation." This method of argument seems to me very unsatisfactory. In the first place, we are not, I think, entitled

[1] J. B. Bury, *Selected Essays* (ed. Temperley), pp. 43–59. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

to assume at the outset that the guiding force of history is thought. Such a vast generalization could only be established, if at all, as a result of a study of the relation between mental development and social development. Even if such a view could be justified on purely philosophical grounds, I doubt whether it ought to be allowed to dominate historical theory or prescribe its postulates and assumptions. A philosophy of history ought, on the contrary, to stand the test of historical inquiry in relation to the results achieved by other sciences and by metaphysics. In the second place, I fail to see the relevance of Bury's argument to the special problem of the relation between sociology and history. For an idealistic interpretation of the nature of human development must affect sociology in exactly the same sense in which it affects history. His arguments on his showing are only valid if sociology is regarded as a sort of "higher zoology." But for such a restriction of the nature of sociology there appears to be no ground whatever. The problem of the relation between history and sociology thus remains completely unresolved.

A more ambitious attempt to subordinate sociology to history is made by M. Berr, the editor of the series of works entitled *L'Évolution de l'Humanité.*[1] Sociology, in his view, deals only with the social element in history. The *synthèse historique*, which he conceives to be the ultimate aim of a scientific history, would be more inclusive. According to his theory, three sorts of factors can be traced in the historical process which he designates contingence, necessity, and inner or immanent logic. The contingent includes sheer successions, chance events, the rôle of the individual *qua* individual, temporary collective moods, ethnic and geographical conditions. The necessary factors include what are ordinarily called institutions, necessary in the sense that the same fundamental institutions are found everywhere. The logical factor is apparently an expression of the fundamental tendency in all life to maintain itself and to develop. "Et le principe d'où procède toute logique, le moteur veritable de l'histoire, —comme de la vie—on ne saurait le trouver, semble-t-il, que dans la tendance à être, à maintenir et à amplifier. La vie n'est pas quelque chose de passif et, pour ainsi dire, de vide! elle est tendance et elle est mémoire. Quand elle réussit, elle retient les moyens de sa réussite. La logique, dans le sens étroit du mot, c'est le bon usage de l'esprit; au sens large, c'est l'activité conforme aux tendances fondamentales de l'être, qui use des moyens appropriés. Emanée donc du trefonds de la vie, l'activité logique aboutit à l'entre'aide aussi bien qu'à la lutte, s'epanouit dans l'instinct social plus que dans l'égoisme—crée, en définitive, la société elle-même."[2] Historical synthesis must deal

[1] Henri Berr, *La synthèse en histoire.* Introduction générale in *La Terre avant l'histoire*, by E. Perrier (first volume of the *L'Évolution de l'Humanité*).

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. vi *et seq.*

with all these elements. It should cover the whole range of culture, "les modalités et le progrès de la vie sous la forme humaine, dans les sociétés." Sociology, on the other hand, is partial and must restrict itself to the social elements in culture. It would seem that according to him this term covers the juridico-political and the economic functions of society, but not the strictly intellectual, æsthetic or religious activities of men. Mental development is "human," but not strictly social. Religion, again, though strongly socialized, is yet *d'essence humaine*, and it is through the reaction of individuals against institutionalized religion that there arise art, philosophy, and science. Historical synthesis in opposition to sociology must take account of the rôle of creative and inventive individuals, and, above all, must seek to bring together the contingent or merely given, the elements involved in society as such, that is to say, institutions, and the inner drive expressed in wants, needs, and reflective volition which constitutes the logic of historical evolution.

M. Berr's philosophy of history seems to have been worked out in order to provide a plan for the very important series of historical works to which I have referred. It is difficult to say to what extent, if at all, it has affected its contributors. Here we are only concerned with the problem of the relation between sociology and history. In this connection M. Berr's arguments seem to me open to the objection that when he speaks of sociology he has really in mind only the teaching of Durkheim and his school. M. Berr is, no doubt, right in stressing the importance of individual volition and thought. Society, as he says, does not think. It may be important to insist on this as against theories of a group mind or collective representations, though it is doubtful whether even Durkheim thought of these collective representations as inhering anywhere save in individual minds. But once the theory of a collective mind is disposed of, the validity of M. Berr's distinction between the social and the human disappears. It must be urged that intellectual, religious, and artistic development are just as much social products as are juridico-economic institutions. Like the latter, they depend on interactions and interrelations between minds in society and on the cumulative processes of tradition. In both the precise contribution of individual initiative is difficult to determine, and remains in any case a problem to be investigated by the sociologist rather than a dogma with which we can safely start on our inquiries. In short, M. Berr seems to me to be taking too narrow a view of sociology, and what is, perhaps, more important, he starts with a most ambitious theory of social causation, which to my mind should be the crowning achievement, and not the starting-point, of historical and sociological investigation.

Less *a priori*, and more in harmony with the actual procedure of historians and sociologists, appear to me to be the views of some

other very distinguished French historians who have discussed this question. According to Professor Pirenne,[1] the relation between sociology and history is akin to that, say, between economic history and economic theory, or between the history of law and jurisprudence. Professor Sée[2] thinks sociology deals with social facts *in abstracto*, that is without reference to any particular space or time. It seeks to ascertain the general conditions of social life and change, while history is concrete and deals with particular events. This view is also shared by Professor Mantoux.[3] All insist on the close interconnection of the two disciplines. Sée and Pirenne both emphasize the importance for history of comparative studies, and that in this respect, at any rate, it comes very close to the work of the sociologist, for whom the use of the comparative method is essential. Professor Mantoux points out that the distinction between the study of institutions, which is supposed to be the proper object of sociology, and the study of *évenements*, which belongs to the historian, must not be drawn too closely, since we cannot understand institutions without taking into consideration the *évenements* from which they start and which accompany the changes they undergo. It would seem that we are dealing rather with a difference in emphasis or stress than with one of fundamental difference of aim. The sociologist is concerned primarily with the discovery of general laws or tendencies of social life, the historian is concerned primarily with the interpretation of concrete or individual occurrences. The business of history, says Professor Monod,[4] is not to be satisfied with the discovery of general conditions, but to show them in operation in specific historical situations. Particularization and generalization cannot, however, be fruitfully dissevered.

With the view here indicated I strongly sympathize. I turn now to a school of thought which wishes to emphasize the contrast or antithesis between the individual and universal, and who regard history as concerned with unique, unrepeatable individual wholes which cannot be studied by the methods of abstraction, comparison, or generalization employed in the social sciences. In Germany this tendency goes back to Windelband and his successor, Rickert, with whom I cannot here deal. I shall confine myself to one form of this attitude expounded with great force and learning by Tröltsch.[5]

Tröltsch does not in any way wish to minimize the importance of sociology. His conception of it does not differ materially from that

[1] H. Pirenne, *La méthode comparative en histoire*. Congrès des sciences historiques des Bruxelles, 1923.

[2] Henri Sée, *Science et philosophie de l'histoire*, p. 130.

[3] P. Mantoux, "Histoire et Sociologie," *Rév. de synthèse historique*, 1903, t. VII.

[4] G. Monod, "Histoire," in *De la méthode dans les sciences* (Première Serie), 1920.

[5] E. Tröltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*.

expounded at the beginning of this paper. Sociology, he thinks, may be said to consist of the following subdivisions. In the first place, and in its most general and formal aspect, it deals with the nature and laws of social relationships as such irrespective of content. In the second place, these social relationships are embodied in specific manner in each of the great spheres of culture, for example, religion, art, the state. There is, accordingly, a sociological treatment of each such sphere. Thirdly, we may deal with societies as concrete entities, after the manner of Comte, Spencer, Schäffle. Fourthly, comparative studies of the life of societies and the phases or stages of their development may be made, as, for example, in the work of Schmoller, Breysig, Sombart. Fifthly, there are the problems of *Kultursoziologie*, by which, I take it, he understands an inquiry into the relation between the higher cultural elements and the more massive substructure consisting of the economic and political factors or elements. To this subdivision belongs the work of Max Weber on the sociology of religion and Tröltsch's own studies in the *Soziallehren*. In all these subdivisions conceptual schemata are arrived at as the result of inductive and comparative studies. From the point of the historian they are *Hilfswissenschaften*, which may suggest questions and interpretations to him, but cannot do his proper work.

History, in Tröltsch's view, is the concrete and intuitive representation of individual wholes. These are not capable of interpretation in terms of separable elements in interaction. The individual is "etwas in lezter Linie lediglich Gesetztes und Tatsächliches, das unauflösliche Geheimnis des Lebens." The individual is unique, original, and unrepeatable, a sort of emergent not deducible from the nature of its elements in composition. The term is used not in contrast with groups or complexes, but with the abstractness of general laws. It can be applied not only to persons but also to collective entities, such as classes, peoples, epochs, events like the Renaissance, anything that can be grasped as a whole by the historian. Each such whole—for example, the Israelite people, the Hellenic culture—is a new formation whose nature cannot be explained by reference to psychology, the influence of the environment or heredity and the like, but can only be intuitively *nachgefühlt*. Each such whole, again, has its own *Wesen* or *Sinn, Wert oder Sinneinheit*, which the historian must intuit. To understand a period is to look at it from the point of view of its own ideals and standards. Tröltsch upholds the doctrine of historical relativism. Each period has its own system of values. The business of the historian is to feel himself into his period by a sort of immanent criticism and penetration. His procedure in dealing with a given period or with evolution in history is different from that employed

in the natural sciences. It is an effort to obtain an intuitive grasp or apprehension of countless particular processes fused and synthesized into a unique and unanalysable whole. What is to be regarded as such a whole can only be determined by the selective intuition of the historian, and here again he needs a power of sympathetic penetration differing in kind from the power of analysis and construction requisite in the domain of the natural sciences.

It is difficult in a short survey to do justice to Tröltsch's arguments. There can be no doubt that he is right in insisting that history must of necessity start with concrete entities and not with supposed primary atomic elements. There can also be no doubt of the value of the notion of individual wholes, which to my mind, as actually used by historians, are extremely complex concepts summing up the historian's vision of the concrete life of a period or of a group of events. But it may be doubted whether the cognitive processes by which such concepts are constructed really differ in kind from those which are involved in the work of the natural sciences. There is in any event no magical potency in such concepts as the Renaissance, and their explanatory value depends upon the extent to which they embody detailed and painstaking analysis of the forces involved and the possibility of their being ultimately related to the fundamental laws of life and mind. When historians, such as Sée, Pirenne, Tawney,[1] examine the value of such concepts as, for example, "modern capitalism," as used, let us say, by Sombart, or wish to test the accuracy of Tröltsch's or Max Weber's views about the relation between Puritanism and the capitalist mentality, they do not appeal to mysterious intuitions, but to evidence derived from a comparative study of the growth of capitalism in the different European countries. They seek to ascertain the composition of the social classes that contributed most to it, or, again, they appeal to supposed psychological laws of the way in which urban life affects the mentality of its inhabitants. In the absence of such detailed analytic studies, the concept of individual wholes, which Tröltsch takes to be the essential instrument of historical explanation, may lead to interesting subjective impressions, but hardly to a rational understanding of the phenomena of history. In Tröltsch's own case it has led to one particular conclusion of great significance, to which I should like to draw special attention. It has led him, namely, to deny the historical validity of the concept of humanity or of human evolution. Nothing in his view can be treated as a proper subject of history which cannot be grasped as a cultural unity; nothing can

[1] Cf. Sée, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, ch. iii; Pirenne, "Les periodes de L'histoire sociale du capitalisme" (*Bull. de l'Académie de Belgique*, 1914), and *Histoire de Belgique*, t. I and II; Tawney, Foreword to Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.

properly be said to evolve which does not reveal an underlying unity of culture or spiritual identity throughout the changes which it undergoes. Humanity has no such unity, and we cannot legitimately deal with it as a whole. The historian can only deal with definite *Kulturkreise*, each of which, in his opinion, has its own *Sinn und Wesen*, unique and not comparable with the *Sinn* and *Wesen* of other culture complexes. I have on another occasion dealt with the problem of evolution in sociology, and have shown that the use of the concept of evolution as applied to humanity can be made perfectly intelligible without appeal to mysterious underlying unities.[1] Here I would only urge that Tröltsch vastly exaggerates the uniqueness and independence of these *Kulturkreise*, and that the methods whereby each can be studied are essentially alike and appear to reveal agencies in operation in their nature akin throughout the whole of humanity. The notion of the "individual," as used by Tröltsch, is, in any event, far too vague to bear the weight of a conclusion of such vast moment in the discussion of historical evolution. If the concept of humanity does not constitute a unitary notion, neither, I will venture to say, does the concept, say, of the European or American *Kulturkreis*, and for the understanding of either intuition is not enough.

Out of the brief review I have given two problems suggest themselves which require further discussion. There is, first, the question of the relation between our knowledge of particulars or, rather, individuals, and our knowledge of general laws. There is, second, the problem of standards of valuation in historical and sociological interpretation.

It seems widely held that the proper business of history is to describe individual occurrences or, rather, complexes of occurrences, while the duty of the social theorist is to discover, if he can, general laws or tendencies, or in any case to construct interpretative conceptual schemata. But there appear to be differences of opinion as to whether we are dealing here with a convenient division of labour or whether there is implied a radical difference of aim and method. A crucial test in this connection is, I think, found in the attitude adopted to the use of the comparative method. Professor Sée and Professor Pirenne certainly advocate its use in history and have themselves employed it with effect, though they point out that its extensive use belongs rather to sociology than history. According to them, therefore, no hard and fast line can here be drawn. The sociologist is primarily interested in the discovery of general laws; the historian in the interpretation and description of concrete situations and actual sequences. On the other hand, Professor Berr

[1] M. Ginsberg, "The Concept of Evolution in Sociology," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1930–31.

seeks to make history the more inclusive of two disciplines. But his view, as we have seen, rests upon a doubtful distinction between the generically human and the distinctively social. Tröltsch and many other German writers interpret the distinction between sociology and history as resting upon, and as implying, a radical difference in the type of knowledge involved in the two cases, the one being an intuitive apprehension of unique totalities, the other utilizing methods of analysis and synthesis akin to those which are familiar in the natural sciences. Is there, then, any real difference between our knowledge of an individual and our knowledge through general laws? Let us consider a simple example. If I say I know a person X, I mean, so it seems to me, that he has been presented to me frequently in direct sense-perception, and that from my experience of him I have gathered a cumulative impression which gives me insight into his character. It is extremely likely that if I were to write an account of him I should not be helped much by what I have read in the text-books of psychology. I may, nevertheless, claim to have psychological insight into his make-up, though the word "psychological" would be here used in a sense which would not satisfy the scientific psychologist. Nevertheless, the business of the psychologist is, it seems to me, ultimately to enable us to understand concrete individuals, X and others, and the failure to achieve this purpose is evidence of the immaturity and imperfection of psychological science. If psychology were more advanced it would help me in knowing X, and I should then possess a knowledge of him on a higher level than I have at present when I have to rely on intuitive impressions unchecked by any rigid method. I cannot accept the view so often put forward now by methodologists that the ultimate object of science is not the knowledge of the concrete individual, but the framing of general laws. Generality and individuality are not, in fact, mutually exclusive. In using general terms or general laws to describe an individual I bring out the points in which he resembles other individuals, but a thing does not lose individuality by possessing characteristics in common with others or entering into relations with them. There may, indeed, be something peculiar to each individual. In any event, individuals differ from one another in countless ways. But that what remains after we have exhausted our analysis of an individual in general terms is a residuum immune from the methods of reason, and requiring a mystical intuition is an assumption for which no satisfactory evidence has been offered. Ultimately, it seems to me, it is in and through particulars that we discern the universal, and in this sense there is an empirical element in all science, however abstract. Sciences, of course, vary considerably in the degree of their generality and abstractness. It is even possible and indeed desirable in some

cases to work out deductive schemes, bringing out the implications of certain assumptions without reference for the time being to the truth of these assumptions. This is the case of some branches of mathematics and, according to some authorities, even of physics. In the social sciences, too, such procedure is important. It is done, for example, in pure economic theory, though here the assumptions as I understand are of the nature of psychological generalizations regarding human motives. Conceivably economic theories might be worked out, starting from different assumptions and their consequences deduced simply as a study in possibilities. In linguistics students distinguish between general linguistics which investigates the general possibilities of speech, and special or historical linguistics which is concerned with the specific ways in which these possibilities are realized under varying historical conditions. I take it that the assumptions made in general linguistics are based on generalizations derived from anatomy, physiology, and psychology. On the other, special linguistics is in part a sociological study, since there appears to be a close relation between the development of language and the forms of social structure, as has been pointed out, especially by Meillet.[1] In sociology, again, we have seen the attempt has been made to build up a pure science of social forms, though the method has not so far proved very fruitful. It is arguable that purely deductive studies in the social sciences are richer in possibilities than we are accustomed to think, especially if use can be made of the more accurate methods of analysis provided by modern logic. If the social sciences could be content with such purely deductive studies, their relation to history would, of course, be very remote. But without disputing the value of such theoretical studies in any way, I should like to urge that in sociology in particular it is vitally important not to separate too sharply the study of forms from the concrete study of contents. The assumptions that are used in the social sciences are rarely of the nature of axioms, but are really in most cases unconscious generalizations capable of and requiring verification. But this we are apt to forget. The result is that we tend to accept the conclusions based on them as true, whereas in fact they are merely consistent deductions validly drawn, perhaps, but not necessarily applicable to real fact. It is thus of the greatest importance to revise our assumptions in the light of verifiable fact. Moreover, in sociology the material we have to deal with is in its very nature historical, that is, dependent on tradition and the cumulative action of past events. Further, if there is any one well substantiated generalization in the study of culture, it is that cultural development is stimulated by contact and depends on the opportunities available for borrowing and diffusion. To trace diffusion

[1] A. Meillet, *Linguistique historique et linguistique générale*, pp. 44 *et seq.*

is the work of the historian. This was very clearly brought out by Maitland, who showed its importance to anthropology and is a matter upon which great emphasis is laid by the so-called historical school of anthropology. It is sometimes thought that history and sociology are in the last resort nothing but applied psychology. If there is any truth in this we should have to regard psychology not as a science which deals with a supposedly constant human nature, but with a human nature that undergoes change in the course of human development. It will then be seen that the causes which affect the varying expression of human nature are to be found in conditions which are not themselves of a psychological character and cannot be studied by the method of the psychologist. It is clear, for instance, that however intimate our knowledge may be of the psychology of sex and of the parental-filial relation, it will not of itself suffice to explain the varied forms of family structure, or the laws and customs regulating the relations between the sexes. The variations in the rules forbidding marriage between near kin cannot be explained by reference to a uniform human nature. They depend upon conditions which must be traced historically in each case. Neglect of this consideration will undoubtedly lead us often to assume that a particular attitude is based upon an inborn or instinctive tendency in human nature, which in fact is the product of development and is susceptible of modification in a new environment. In short, the functional analysis of human institutions, their physiology and psychology, so to speak, must be in its nature historical and evolutionary. Purely deductive studies of the possibilities of human nature may have their value, but at some point they must be brought to the test of inductive and comparative study and related to the actual course of social evolution.

If social theory cannot fruitfully be divorced from social history, the converse proposition is equally true. In actual practice historians do not confine themselves to narration or detailed description, but inquire into causes, and not infrequently, indulge in generalizations of vast extent and import. The importance of theory is often consciously recognized and even stressed by historians. In a recent article Sombart has made a powerful plea for the need of co-operation between economic theory and economic history. He claims that his own work, which seeks to ascertain the common elements in the various forms of European capitalism, is both history and theory. Max Weber's use of the notion of "types" may be similarly so regarded. Vinogradoff's work in historical jurisprudence is partly historical, partly sociological. He deals not only with the origins of legal forms but also with the value-judgments which they embody and the compromises and adjustments which they express.[1] I may

[1] Paul Vinogradoff, *Custom and Right, Historical Jurisprudence.*

also refer to Professor Sée's work on agrarian conditions in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and much other recent work on European capitalism, which is essentially comparative and sociological. Even v. Below, who attacks the use of the comparative method in history very fiercely,[1] in the end admits its usefulness, at any rate as likely to stimulate inquiry and suggest new hypotheses. The very cautious Langlois and Seignobos concede that the method is useful negatively, in the disproof, *e.g.*, of alleged connections, such as between Christianity and the favourable position of women.[2] But the use of the comparative method implies, I think, a theory of social causation, at least in the sense that it postulates the possibility of disentangling identical or similar relevant conditions from among complex situations which as wholes differ vastly from each other. History and sociology are thus intrinsically related to each other.

Before further defining their relationship I will say a few words with regard to the second problem to which reference was made above, namely, that of the relation between history and standards of value. Two things appear to me pretty clear. In the first place, the historian and the sociologist cannot exclude from their domain all reference to values. There is such a thing as the historical and comparative study, for example, of moral and religious ideas, and the conditions of their evolution can be studied by the same methods as those which are employed in the investigation of social institutions generally. Moreover, in so far as beliefs in values are possibly agents which influence human behaviour, their causal efficacy in relation to other factors involved in the historical process forms a legitimate and necessary part of historical synthesis and sociological generalization. In the second place, it is frequently pointed out that the historian cannot and perhaps ought not to avoid judgments of valuation either in the selection of his data or in estimating the relative importance of the varying processes which he investigates. In this connection it should be realized that the historian's value judgments are themselves historically conditioned, and are subject to what has been called "historical relativity" (Bury).[3] Yet the history and sociology of values cannot take the place of ethics, æsthetics, or social philosophy. These disciplines must, of course, start with the actual judgments that men make of the beautiful, the good, and the true. But their methods for testing the validity of these judgments are not as such psychological or historical, but follow a procedure directed at the discovery of fundamental principles which would make our actual judgments coherent and consistent. Ethics cannot be reduced to the comparative study of

[1] Below, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
[2] Langlois and Seignobos, *Introduction to the Study of History*, p. 291.
[3] Bury, *Selected Essays, Ancient Greek Historians, Idea of Progress.*

moral ideas any more than logic can be reduced to psychology and sociology. Social philosophy has thus a field of its own which cannot be identified either with history or sociology.

To sum up. The view that sociology and history differ in the kind of knowledge they seek to attain does not appear to be well substantiated. The knowledge of the universal and the knowledge of the particular are inseparably intertwined. The claim that history deals only with individual and unrepeatable occurrences is not really in harmony with the actual procedure of historians. In economic and social history especially, events are studied which recur quite frequently and which exhibit sufficient similarity of structure to render possible generalized study. Comparative and typological studies are, indeed, becoming very frequent in economic history. The notion of the individual is in any event very vaguely used in this connection. In a sense everything that happens is singular or unique, but this does not prevent us from studying individuals in the points in which they exhibit resemblance. The lover, it has been well said,[1] believes that his experience is unique, and unlike the experience of anyone else. But is his *unio mystica* really beyond the reach of science? On the other hand, the sociologist cannot admit that he must confine himself to generalities or abandon the study of societies in the concrete. The difference between the sociologist and the historian is thus one merely of emphasis. The primary interest of the one is the discovery of general laws, of the other the reconstruction of the way in which events have actually occurred. In respect of the problem of valuation, sociology and history appear to me to be in the same position *vis-à-vis* social philosophy. They are not concerned with the truth or validity of value judgments. They are of service to the social philosopher in supplying him with data and in encouraging an active and healthy scepticism, but they cannot do his work for him.

I should like, in conclusion, to make a practical suggestion. Sociology has been, as it seems to me, somewhat too much preoccupied with the study of primitive peoples and has not made adequate use of the vast stores of historical knowledge. There is great need at present to widen the scope of the comparative study of institutions. It is of especial importance that use should be made of the scientific technique elaborated by modern historians, so that perchance the somewhat too ready generalizations of some of the earlier sociologists may be avoided. To this end I should like to suggest that historians and sociologists co-operate in the preparation of a programme of work which might perhaps be called "Notes and Queries in the Comparative Study of Institutions." This should

[1] Franz Eulenberg, "Sind historische Gesetze möglich?" in *Hauptprobleme der Soziologie, Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber*, p. 31.

provide a list of sources, a classification of social institutions and a discussion of the main problems that arise in connection with them, so far as they lend themselves to comparative study. Perhaps this Congress, which has given us the opportunity for ventilating the whole question of the relation between sociology and history, will increase our indebtedness to it by initiating or encouraging such an enterprise.

PROFESSOR STOUT'S REALISM: A CRITICISM

J. E. TURNER, Ph.D.

Among the many outstanding features of Professor Stout's Gifford Lectures, *Mind and Matter*, there are two which possess special interest to readers of *Philosophy*: the author's exposition of a more definite Realism than has been presented in his earlier works, and a renewed defence of the much-maligned faculty, Common Sense, here regarded as "a social product maintained and transmitted from generation to generation through the co-operation and conflict of many minds in thinking and willing" (p. 8).

I shall attempt to show, however, that from the premises adopted in the present volume, the Realism that is ultimately advanced is actually a mere variant of Noumenalism, and that the arguments put forward are inadequate to establish the desired conclusions. These may themselves be summarized as follows:—

(1) As for the Common-Sense viewpoint itself, "the philosopher ought to start by regarding it as having a presumptive claim to acceptance. Common Sense is superior because the ultimate decision must rest with it, however indirectly. Thus Common Sense finally decides the question" (pp. 10, 137).

(2) "The percipient is cognisant, in the perceptual process itself, of the physical factors. We are somehow primarily aware of physical existence, in and through sense-experience . . . primary and immediate knowledge of physical existence" (pp. 233, 242, 250).

(3) This knowledge "must be founded on what we actually or immediately experience. This assumption I accept. The immediate content of sense-experience is not mental but material" (pp. 161, 254).

(4) These principles hold good not only for primary qualities, but also for secondary: "The severance of the secondary qualities as mere subjective appearance from the primary qualities as physically real does violence to Common Sense, and is philosophically indefensible. For Common Sense, the independent existence of physical objects includes the independent existence of shape, size . . . to say nothing of secondary qualities" (pp. 129, 290).

(5) In accordance with all this is Dr. Stout's categorical rejection of "the assumption that actual existence which is not actually experienced can only be known by inference, and not immediately" (p. 161); in contrast with this our knowledge of other minds than our own is not immediate, but inferential, and "arises only through interpretation" (p. 236).

(6) Such is the positive aspect of the position; I shall now summarize its negative side. "Physical existence is never actually experienced. Physical factors are not actually sensated at all" (pp. 202, 251). In other words, in spite of the contention that we have "immediate knowledge of physical existence," there subsists the fundamental contrast that "the sensum does and the physical factor does not enter into actual experience"; and this is associated with an equally "fundamental difference in the way in which we know them" (p. 256). Strictly, of course, knowledge itself is one form of "experience," so that this term must here be taken to denote sense-experience or perception.[1]

The Realism thus outlined is still further supported by Dr. Stout's treatment of Materialism as being fully justified within the sphere of investigation pursued by the physical sciences, although as a philosophy it must be repudiated, since "materialism in undermining Common Sense undermines itself" (p. 115). Viewing his theory in its entirety then, the first essential feature to be observed is his insistence on the specific distinction between physical objects and factors, as such, and the "immediate content of sense-experience," based on the ground that the former are "never actually experienced," do "not enter into actual experience." This contrast must be kept constantly in mind, because it is associated with the further, and equally fundamental, principle that immediate knowledge can be and is obtained of existence which is never actually experienced —that is, once again, sense-experienced. In my opinion, it is precisely this combination of these two principles in this manner that fatally vitiates Dr. Stout's final conclusion, since they make it altogether impossible to obtain that "immediate knowledge of physical existence" for which he contends as the very essence of his Realism.

But in order to show that his theory thus fails to establish his conclusions, several alternative suggestions must first of all be excluded. As my quotations prove, knowledge of physical existence is not only immediate, but is at the same time primary. In other words, it is not preceded by, nor dependent upon, any other type of mental process or activity, except in so far as it is "founded on immediate experience." This implies that although cognition develops gradually, it does so in such a way that the progressive differentiation of sense-experience and perception proceeds simultaneously with knowledge of physical existence, since under any different conditions this knowledge cannot possibly be primary. But to assert this basal principle in this manner is, obviously, to beg the very question at issue. For Professor Stout offers no arguments for this aspect of

[1] "I perceive the pen . . . the pen is for me a physical object" (p. 225); cf. p. 240.

his Realism. The statement that knowledge of physical existence is primary is simply repeated without any explicit reasons being offered in its support. It can have no value, therefore, beyond that of a dogmatic insistence on an important principle; and it contributes nothing that has logical weight to the solution of the long vexed contest between Realism on the one hand and Mentalism and Subjectivism on the other.

Nor can we accept a second alternative—that our knowledge of physical existence is obtained as the result of Thought; for this is clearly excluded by its being at once primary and perceptual. This does not mean, however, that Thought can contribute nothing to this kind of knowledge; it means simply that *all* such knowledge is not the outcome of Thought. If we wish to be quite precise in our terminology, it may certainly be urged that since "existence" is an idea, it must therefore be a product of Thought alone. But even if this be granted, it will be quite sufficient to substitute "existents" for "existence," so that while we think of existence, still we primarily and immediately perceive existents; and this is really all that is essential to Dr. Stout's position. Finally, in this respect, it is patent that if either, or both, existents and existence are revealed by Thought, then we obtain a Noumenalism closely akin to that of Kant with its unperceivable, but thinkable, Things-in-themselves. This, indeed, appears to be admitted; for not only is our knowledge of physical existence seriously and permanently defective (p. 251), but the pure "conception of physical existence, with all that it implies, leads to an extreme subjective idealism of the sensationalist type" (p. 201).

All these considerations enable us to dispense with a final alternative, in itself quite justifiable—that is, the view that physical existents of all kinds, by initial definition, can never be sensated; in other terms, the standpoint that the very meaning of "physical" must preclude inclusion within sense-contents. For it is never, with Dr. Stout, a matter of merely verbal definition; it is rather a question of the facts of the situation and of the implications of those facts; and it is, once more, the implications which he himself draws that I regard as wholly unfounded, so far as his own arguments are concerned.

And the radical difficulty attending his theory should now be somewhat clearer. For since knowledge of physical existence cannot be entirely and exclusively due to Thought, although it is so partially, and can still less be due to some other type of experience such as intuition (in its usual loose sense), or emotion or mystical experience, while at the same time physical factors are *never* actually sensated and *never* actually experienced, then the problem recurs—How are these factors ever presented to the knowing mind at all? How do

we come to know of their existence and their qualities? But this issue remains, not merely unsolved by Dr. Stout's theory, but quite insoluble, because his method of argument itself prevents his attaining any satisfactory solution. For he provides no pathway whereby the intellect can advance, from its initial experience of the contents of sense and of perception, to any veridical knowledge of physical existence (or, if we prefer the term, existents) as physical. As I have already observed, he simply repeats that such knowledge is actual, primary, and immediate, while at the same moment he rigorously excludes physical factors and qualities from the content of sense.

This drastic distinction becomes the more remarkable, and also, I venture to think, the more questionable, in the light of the assertions that "the immediate content of sense-experience is not mental but material" (p. 254), and is still further "continuous in existence and fundamentally akin in general nature" with physical phenomena (p. 251). In other words, "actual sensa form an indispensable part of what we ordinarily mean by the material world" (p. 202). In the light of all these qualifications, the rigid distinction which the author elsewhere draws between sensa and strictly physical factors appears to approach perilously near the vanishing point. We are thus brought to the verge, to say the least, of that more self-consistent and satisfactory form of Realism which regards the actual elements of sense-experience as being, at the same moment, the existential factors and qualities of the physical world—a Realism, as is well known, advocated by Dr. Alexander, and which it is somewhat surprising to find described as "perhaps becoming obsolete" (p. 208). On the contrary, it constitutes the sole realistic theory that can show our knowledge of the physical world to be—what Dr. Stout desires and maintains it to be—immediate and primary.[1] It does not, of course, imply that sensation is ever, except perhaps at the very outset of life, an independent and separate mental activity; rather is it always included within the more complex processes of perception. Nor is it suggested that sensed contents, purely as such, are anything more than the indispensable raw material wherefrom the intellect derives its fuller knowledge of the real universe. It is impossible to discuss detailed considerations here; it is sufficient to point out that what I have myself called "Direct" Realism enables us to avoid the fatal dilemma which attends Dr. Stout's arguments—that is, either the relegation of the real physical world to the limbo of the noumenal, or acquiescence in mere subjectivism.

This impression is confirmed by considering the further arguments advanced by Dr. Stout in support of his main contention. At first

[1] I may refer to my own treatment, together with a criticism of Dr. Stout's earlier position, in the opening chapters of *A Theory of Direct Realism.*

sight, in fact, many of his statements seem to be in complete accordance with Professor Alexander's Realism. For example, "In dealing with what appears to us as red colour, we have no means of defining its objective value except by reference to some standard perceptual appearance, which depends directly or indirectly on the *nature of the sensum.*" Similarly, "Physical objects are *primarily* perceived as characterized by characters derived from the immediate *content of sense-experience.* It is only through material characters derived from sense-experience that we know bodies as such."[1] Finally, we must recall that sensa are material; so that the only logical conclusion which these facts necessitate, I believe, is that what is sensated is, under normal conditions, the real physical world. If it be further asked, What are normal conditions? it will here be sufficient to cite Professor Stout's own discussion of illusions and hallucinations, where the basis of the requisite distinction is clearly laid down.

It should be needless to add that this world is not sensated in its completeness nor in its natural order, as is sufficiently obvious from the very existence of such illusions. But simply because the complete order of Nature can be apprehended only by the still higher functions of co-ordinated perception and thought, it is fallacious to conclude, as is far too frequently done, that the content of sense is absolutely void of *all* order, so that this can be furnished solely from some other and higher source. This fallacy may be traced to the long-standing influence of Kant's theory that sense-content is essentially amorphous, even space and time being impressed thereon by the mind's native "forms." So long as this view is accepted in any of its multifarious variants we are compelled, with Dr. Stout in the present instance, to set up the rigid distinction between physical factors and what is sensated, and then to seek for some means of escaping our self-made dilemmas. But as the quotations just cited sufficiently prove, both perception and thought depend for their indispensable "raw material" on what is initially presented to sense. Deprived of this, they would either never arise at all, or if they did develop they could yield no veridical knowledge whatever of the physical universe.

For this more complete and systematic knowledge demands the discovery of definite standards of reference which, in their entirety, constitute an increasingly coherent order; or, in Dr. Stout's own terms, "relatively fixed or objective values for the qualities of physical objects independent of their shifting perceptual appearances" (p. 273). It is, undeniably, these "shifting appearances" which form so serious an obstacle to man's attainment of scientific knowledge, misleading him into acceptance of the erroneous beliefs of primitive mythology, followed in due course by the crude philo-

[1] Pp. 279, 281, 302; the italics are mine.

sophemes of the naïve mind. On the other hand, Dr. Stout's whole treatment of the situation is governed by the implicit assumption that sense-content is a mass of "shifting appearances" and of nought else—a plain expansion of the initial Kantian fallacy already alluded to. The result is that his own position threatens to become self-contradictory. For while he maintains that the fixed order and coherence of Nature pertain solely to those "physical factors which are not actually sensated," yet it is equally necessary that we "actually experience in the way of sensation something *fundamentally akin* to physical characteristics" (p. 268).

What type of Realism we accept, therefore, clearly depends on the character we attribute to this fundamental kinship. Now it cannot be any mere resemblance between sensa and physical factors, since this can be discovered, on Dr. Stout's own grounds, in only one of two ways—either by comparing these contrasted entities directly with each other, which at once implies that physical factors are immediately sensated, but which Professor Stout denies: or by comparing different aspects or features of sense-content among themselves, in which case we can never pass beyond that content, so that "physical objects" become nothing more than a special type included within the entire mass, quite apart from that essential distinction upon which he insists. Any other supposition raises the fallacy which vitiates Locke's theory of Representative Perception.

But neither can the kinship in question subsist between sense-content, on the one hand, and on the other some entity revealed solely by Thought. For this, as I have already argued, commits us to some kind of Kantian Noumenalism. A third, but equally impossible alternative, is to regard physical objects and qualities as unknown and unknowable, in blunt contradiction to Dr. Stout's whole theory. But when these suggestions have thus been excluded, the sole logical conclusion is that we are compelled to look on physical characters as *identical* with sensa, and not simply as akin to these; and this is the essence of "Direct Realism."

Here we must revert to the fallacy already mentioned—that is, the belief that sensa are totally devoid of the order and system which are characteristic of Nature. That this is a fallacy seems to me to be established by the facts of experience. I mean that sensa, and to a still greater degree perceptual features, themselves possess sufficient permanence and coherence to supply the foundation of our later and more systematic knowledge of the physical world. In the first place, Professor Stout himself insists, as an indispensable condition, on "The Persistence of the Changing in Change"—"the continued existence of that which changes" (pp. 101, 125). In perhaps simpler terms, "there cannot be changes without something which is changing" (p. 285). Again the crucial problem arises, What is

the primal origin of our consciousness of change and of permanence? There can, I think, be only one answer—we must sensate both characteristics, or otherwise we can never know anything whatever about them. Of this principle there are innumerable instances, but a quite elementary one will suffice. In watching a traffic signal, we *sensate* both the persisting red and green, and also the change from one to the other. It is equally true, of course, that we perceive these events, and know and think about them. But the essential point is that not one of these higher activities would be for a moment possible unless permanence and change were originally sensated. This contention has been advanced by Dr. Broad with respect to the shape of such objects as coins. "When I look straight down on a penny," he observes, "both the physical object *and* the visual appearance are round; in the case of two-dimensional (objects) there are positions from which the true shape *can be seen.*"[1] It is true that in his later theory he has either modified, ignored or abandoned this standpoint—he leaves this aspect of the situation in uncertainty; but only his earlier view accords with the facts of experience.

The instance of the traffic signal, or of coins, is extremely simple; nevertheless it is foundational, since the express driver's more careful observations of his guiding lights, the savage hunter's watch on his quarry, the navigator's observation of sun and stars, with all their innumerable analogies, are plainly the stepping-stones whereby the intellect has advanced to the scientific examination of the characteristic colours of precipitates and spectra, the yellow flame of sodium and the phenomena of Crookes tubes. In every such case alike we must note that the basis of the entire complicated process is the exact *sensating* of the colour, shape, size, relation, persistence, change, order, as in themselves being what are recognized and described as the actual factors and qualities of the real physical world. This remains incontrovertible even if we accept the marked tendency in some scientific circles to reduce the physical universe to a system of mathematical symbols; for apart from the sensated features in the first instance, not one of these symbols can ever be obtained, just as they can be criticized solely by an appeal to sensa of the same general type. On this vital issue we must, in my opinion, endorse Professor Whitehead's protest: "I do not understand how a common world of thought can be established in the absence of a common world of sense."[2] It may bear repeating that sensating and its content is only the foundation, not the superstructure, only the raw material, not the finished product, of thought and knowledge. But without this raw material and foundation, no logically sound Realism is at all possible, any more than a huge modern building

[1] *Scientific Thought*, p. 244; *Perception, Physics and Reality*, p. 234; my italics.

[2] *Science and the Modern World*, p. 126.

can be erected without its unseen and comparatively structureless foundation.

Dr. Stout endeavours to escape these difficulties attending his theory by maintaining the real existence of "a world-continuum known to the individual as physical phenomena" (p. 251). This, however, merely revives all the foregoing objections in a new form. We are given no explicit reasons for connecting the sensa of the individual mind, in this way, with any wider sphere of *physical* objects; the transition from one to the other is simply postulated as the sole way of avoiding the dilemma. But quite clearly the same questions must be asked in different terms. If physical factors, as physical, are never sensated, then we have no ground whatever, except the appeal to pure Thought, for regarding the constituents of the "world-continuum" as being physical at all. But such an appeal to Thought, as we have seen, inescapably involves Noumenalism, or perhaps even a still more hopeless agnosticism as to the real nature of the physical universe, akin to that confessed by Sir Arthur Eddington. In either event a satisfactorily logical Realism is rendered wholly impossible.

HOW TO TEACH PHILOSOPHY

JOHN LEWIS, B.Sc., PH.D.

MR. H. G. WELLS once suggested that there should be three professors for every subject: one for research, one to write the textbooks, and one to lecture. There is a good deal of truth in the contention that the best philosopher is seldom the best teacher of philosophy. Although most teachers of philosophy are well aware of the fact that they are not great philosophers, and they are genuinely interested in the teaching of their subject, nevertheless there is a tendency for too much emphasis to rest upon their own researches. In consequence, too little attention has been paid to the technique of teaching philosophy.

Everything depends in the last resort upon whether we regard philosophy as a systematic account of transcendental reality which can be reached by pure thought, or whether we take a thoroughly empiricist view, which should mean that we not only defend empiricism against rationalism, but that our philosophy directs a positive grappling with current life and its problems, and an endeavour to discover what are the right questions to ask.

Too many of our students regard philosophy as a "subject," like mathematics, which can be set forth in a series of "propositions" and "books" like Euclid and mastered step by step. Being as a rule quick-witted, disciplined in examination passing, and industrious, our students find no particular difficulty in learning the game of logic as they would learn chess, and mastering the history of philosophy as they would master the history of Rome. They settle down with their loose-leaf notebooks, and, writing with incredible rapidity, they manage to transcribe a remarkably accurate summary of the daily lectures. They seem to find no difficulty in memorizing these and eventually reproducing any part of them in their examination papers. Nor is this by any means a purely mechanical process. The minds of our students are clear, alert, and vigorous, and quite capable of mastering an abstract system and defending it. Facility in abstract thought is indeed characteristic of the immature and inexperienced mind. Imagination and thought are driven to busy themselves in a world of their own, because there is little necessity for the mind to be preoccupied by the exacting demands of the hard world. Thus the detachment of the student and his interest in dialectic and debate as such fits in a little too closely with the preoccupation of the philosopher with abstract theories. The con-

sequence of this is that most of our students learn a great deal about philosophy in a rather facile manner, so that it quickly fades from their minds, making no impression upon their general attitude to life. Thus they never learn to philosophize in the real sense at all. They have never seen that the great philosophers were supremely interested in life itself, and that each man's system was the framework of his actual world. The disadvantage of learning about a whole series of such frameworks is that we never get on to the same level as any one of the philosophers themselves, because it is impossible at one and the same time to conceive the world itself from a point of view and run through a whole series of points of view in a critical fashion, comparing, contrasting, discarding. In contrast to this rather abstract and academic approach we could adopt one of these systems for ourselves and look out on life from its point of view. We should be very much better philosophers if we did this, but we realize that it savours too much of dogmatism and finality, and very few of us could honestly recommend any one system as watertight at the present day.

But would it not be possible to persuade our students that even if we have no system to offer them, there can be no virtue in their study except in so far as they develop their own point of view of the world and its happenings. I say of the world and its happenings, because I do not myself believe that any tenable philosophy can be based on *a priori* reasoning.

The teaching of Adult Classes, particularly of working-class students, should be a corrective of the speculative tendency. Unless intimidated by learning, such a class will insist on relating philosophy to life, an insistence which is thoroughly healthy. These students have not the facility of undergraduates, but they may be better philosophers in steadfastly refusing to allow reason to make nonsense of brute fact.

A philosophy ought to clear up the intellectual tangles of our age and recommend itself by its suggestiveness and appositeness in the modern situation. Its immediate relevance to the concrete should be manifest at every point. In its light we should be the better able to see through what Professor MacMurray calls "The Modern Dilemma." The novel, the drama, verse, politics, ethics, sex, as these things confront us to-day, should take on a new significance and prove less baffling if philosophy has given us a sound attitude to life and its problems, some sort of framework for the facts of existence.

The upshot of this preliminary discussion is that philosophy must keep its pot a-boiling with fuel from common experience. From first to last its questions must matter. There must be an urgency about its discussions, its conclusions must be relevant to

issues we feel keenly about. Nor must our conclusions always be "safe" on the one hand or sceptical on the other. If philosophy is to be more than logic chopping, there must be a sense of the forced option, the necessity of some decision. This means that we shall begin with philosophical questions having a distinct and immediately seen connection with urgent problems of everyday life, and we shall maintain that paralellism and interrelation through our whole discussion. Only thus shall we succeed in keeping philosophy *alive* and the thinking of our students vital.

William James succeeded in showing that there are two kinds of thinking—thinking that demands a point of view from which action can ultimately proceed and mere thinking. The latter will speedily bore the best type of Adult Student and encourage the mere arguer and guesser, the speculative type. This is not *live* thinking. A very great deal of textbook and lecture-room philosophy is not alive, and the minds of our students are not, in such circumstances, working at full stretch and with maximum zest and speed.

The successful teacher is he who can make his subject exciting and urgent, who can make his students feel that important issues hang upon every point discussed. Both as a mental discipline and as securing a true appreciation of what the great philosophers were really after, teaching that keeps thought *alive* is to be preferred.

The function of the teacher of philosophy, therefore, will be to show the relation of certain typical problems of current interest to philosophy. Let him begin with any question of sufficient interest, ethical, religious, political, or popularly philosophical. Among our best-sellers to-day are well-written books of general interest raising philosophical problems; Shaw, Eddington, J. B. S. Haldane, the Huxleys, Bertrand Russell, Middleton Murry, Lancelot Hogben, Jeans, have all been sufficiently provocative to give us such a start. Then there are current controversies, crude enough as popularly debated, but leading easily to more exact treatment: materialism, Christian Science, immortality, evolution, relativity in morals—here are perennial questions which suitably presented can be shown to raise philosophical issues.

The second step will be to narrow down the discussion and formulate in precise terms the fundamental issues raised. This will be a dialectical process which will be good exercise for the teacher as well as for the students. When formulated, these problems must be set down on paper by each student.

The third step will be the clearing up of certain well-known fallacies which will be bound to arise. It should be possible at this stage, for instance, to show why naïve realism will not do, to discuss what is the matter with the correspondence theory of truth, or

whether we have anything other than "sensations in the mind" as primary data, and, perhaps, what are and what are not axioms or postulates. In this part of the subject the students should be well drilled. Each student should be able to stand up to a hot fire and give a good account of himself. There should be frequent repetition of certain important arguments.

Fourthly, we can open up certain suggestions towards solutions, based perhaps on selections from the classical philosophers. The students will only put down in their notebooks at this, and indeed at every stage, that which really grips and illuminates. If each student's notes are quite different from other people's, that is all to the good.

These suggestions towards solutions will purposely not be exhaustive; that would certainly be to travel too fast and too far and to be too complex. We must hasten slowly and be content with small gains. After all, one small feather from the wing of the bird of truth, if it is really our own discovery, is a valuable and satisfying thing. Let us not be down-hearted at not getting the bird itself properly caged.

Parallel with this course the systematic reading of certain textbooks will proceed, care being taken to make notes of any points of value to the general discussions and to embody them in the material which is being accumulated.

Finally, the time may well come when some teachers at any rate should set forth their own philosophy. Not all will want to go so far; in that case why not some provisional formulation, some negative propositions and warnings, some indications of where the matter stands?

Such lectures should form a short course at the end of the session, and should be prepared rather in the manner of a broadcasting course; they should be popular and well written, but should aim at getting somewhere and setting forth a position. After all, a philosophy that is entirely beyond pithy formulation and exposition is not worth much. Exhaustive treatment is another matter, since it must take in historical antecedents and deal with all possible objections and refute various alternatives. Leaving all this out, it should be possible to put a point of view across in a manner which is illuminating to the average student or well-read individual. He who cannot do as much is a bad philosopher or a bad teacher, or both.

Such an enterprise cannot be carried through without a certain cost in comprehensiveness and thoroughness of treatment, and this must be weighed.

> We shall have to abandon the method of working through a *complete history* of modern philosophy, and we shall no longer teach the *complete system* of any philosopher.

About 80 per cent. of the history of philosophy has become of purely academic interest. In many cases what were, centuries ago, live issues, closely related to life and history, are now but links in an abstract history of philosophy. Are we doing justice to such once live questions to consider them only as desiccated propositions? Should we not be nearer the spirit of the great philosophers if we concerned ourselves with the issues of our own time, going back to history for whatever light past discussions throw on present questions?

Therefore we shall not attempt to expound the whole of Kant, but only so much of him as from time to time becomes relevant. Nor shall we sit down to read through the *Critique of Pure Reason*, a proceeding which positively obscures the significance of Kant to all but the elect. We shall, however, make the most of suitable extracts selected to illuminate current problems.

But so far from this leading to an inadequate apprehension of Kant, it may well, in the course of two or three years' study, lead to an accumulation of illuminating Kantian positions, which will spontaneously fuse into a partial representation of Kant's whole position. Apprehended with keenness, and with the mind not laboriously ploughing through the whole *Critique*, but working at the top of its powers at live issues, such an appreciation of Kant will, in spite of its partiality, be a greater philosophical achievement than a merely academic attempt to comprehend the whole position.

The vital apprehension of one essential point in a great philosopher has a way of taking one into the heart of his philosophy. So closely woven is the whole system, that to comprehend but a flower plucked from its crannied wall is to know what the philosophy makes of God and man.

There are a few of the great classics that, against a background of inquiring concerned with live issues, can be read with profit, because on almost every page a definite relevance to current problems will be manifest. But apart from a prior approach, which quickens the power to apprehend such points, such reading will be barren.

Very few students will profit much by the classics by their own unaided reading, at any rate at first. What is needed is class-reading, every student with a copy, accompanied by illuminating exposition. Plato, Berkeley, Locke, Hume, Hobbes, Descartes, and selections from Kant and Hegel, make excellent reading. Here we pursue the opposite course to that previously suggested. We take pains to read a compassable book, or a well-put-together group of selections, right through.

Finally, there should be periods of what I propose to call "free philosophizing." Both students and teachers are usually afraid of

giving themselves away; it is safer to avoid expressions of personal opinion and to stick to well-worn paths. But "safety first" is a bad motto for one who would be a philosopher. While, therefore, there must be a large place for severe classical training, there must be periods for the freest and most adventurous speculation and discussion. The teacher, too, has his responsibility in this field; he must be coaxed into showing his hand and telling us something of what he really feels. We must be prepared to make fools of ourselves, to advance and defend any position we care to. Perhaps the students' philosophical society is the place for this, but some such opportunity is important, and must be provided for. Needless to say, free and frank expression of opinion will not occur if we are too severe and crushing on such occasions; we must allow latitude, we must be encouraging, and criticism should be humorous rather than heavy.

Acting on these principles, it might be well to suggest that students grouped their loose-leaf notes under four main headings.

1. *Problems.*—The student is to set down, as he is brought to see them, the problems which require solution. It is no use setting down problems he is not interested in; therefore there must be considerable preliminary discussion to crystallize out one or two important issues. It does not matter much what these are, or whether they come on page 1 of the textbooks; only let them be real problems.

It is a good way of beginning to learn and to write philosophy to write down in clear terms just what it is we want to find out.

2. *Solutions.*—The second set of notes will be attempts towards solutions. The student will put down whatever partial light his reading, his thinking, the discussions and lectures, afford in clearing up his problems. He is not to write down somebody else's solution. He is not to expect a complete solution. He is to try to get hold of one or two points which help; these he must really see for himself and feel to be valuable.

In the course of a session this set of notes will slowly grow and change. Added points will dovetail in, or, on the other hand, modify or even contradict previous points. At last sufficient data and illumination will have accumulated to warrant a provisional formulation of the state of the argument. Students should be discouraged from attempting premature finality; higher marks should be given to cautious and original work that honestly has not got far, than to slick and comprehensive essays composed of second-hand opinions.

3. *Refutations.*—A third set of notes may deal with the

refutation of common fallacies, as these arise in the course of our inquiries. Students should be well drilled in the opening gambits of leading games. While philosophy can offer us no perfect system, it can, I think, offer us definite and permanent achievements in the way of clearing up once and for all certain muddles. We have already instanced "representative perception," others will readily occur.

4. *Philosophers.*—A special notebook or loose-leaf section should be kept for each philosopher. But complete summaries of the philosopher's system should not be attempted. Nothing should be put down but what is luminously clear and relevant to some urgently felt problem. It does not matter that at first very little goes down; as time goes on the range of extracts will widen and there will be deeper penetration into the heart of the system.

The student will thus come to write his own textbook on Berkeley, Kant, and Hume, one-sided perhaps, but what it lacks will be more than compensated for by its quality of being alive.

It would be interesting to compare the quality of the discussion in what we have previously described as "free philosophizing," *i.e.* frank and unguarded speculation and debate, in a group trained in this way and in the more usual methods. I do not think the former would show up to disadvantage.

I am not sure about examinations. It would depend entirely on the examiner. But most examiners would be only too willing to co-operate with an experiment in this direction, and would probably be grateful for papers bearing fewer marks of verbatim reproductions of lecture notes and more signs of genuine and individual thinking. Nor should it be difficult to design an examination paper adequately testing a year's philosophizing and giving a record of what progress has been made in covering the field of historical philosophy.

DISCUSSION

SOME ASPECTS OF THE "NEW LOGIC"

MISS STEBBING'S *Modern Introduction to Logic* is a test, as well as an exposition, of the theories that compose what, for lack of a better term, I call "the new logic." No writer is better qualified to show that these theories are clear, coherent, and convincing—if that is what they are. The fact (assuming it is a fact) that she has failed to make out her case suggests, therefore, that the case is a bad one, or at any rate that the difficulties of presenting it in a textbook—or even in a glorified textbook—are insurmountable. Something of this sort is hinted at by a not unsympathetic reviewer, who says that "the middle section of the book ought not to be beyond the grasp of fairly advanced and intelligent students, but that the first and last parts raise some of the most obscure and baffling problems of philosophy."[1]

Most of the criticisms in this article are confined to points on which, even in a few pages, it seems possible to reach a definite conclusion. Thus if the criticisms are in error, it will be all the easier to show where the error lies. (The passages quoted are a small selection of those I have copied in order that I might have a synoptic view of the arguments bearing on any special subject; if they are one-sided, the passages supplementing or modifying them have not been easy to find.) If, on the other hand, the criticisms are valid, they will prove that in some at any rate of its aspects the new logic does not exhibit the mathematical precision which its disciples sometimes claim for it.

Here I wish to anticipate an objection. The article, it may be said, deals overmuch with technicalities, to the neglect of the broad principles which give logic its general interest.

I feel myself a good deal of sympathy with the objection, but I think the answer is fairly clear.

First, the new logic makes a special point of setting out its doctrines and arguments in a highly technical way, on semi-mathematical lines, with mathematical precision. By doing so it claims to give results which, like results in pure mathematics, must be accepted by everyone whose opinion is worth taking into account. (I do not suggest that it claims this certainty for *all* its results, but it seems to do so for many of them.)

Now we are not accustomed in philosophy to absolute proofs, and if the new logic can substantiate its claim, it has done something as revolutionary as the mathematics of relativity, and its achievement is a matter of general interest.

Again, the new logic wishes, quite naturally, to bring down its technicalities from Olympus to the market-place—to get them accepted by the elementary textbooks. And so to people who have, or may have, anything to do with the subject it is a matter of interest to have some notion what these technicalities are.

I. TRADITIONAL LOGIC (vii–xi, and *passim*).—Miss Stebbing's account is as follows:

[1] *The Times Literary Supplement.*

(*a*) "The phrase 'traditional Logicians' is here used to describe those writers . . . who have not sought to go beyond the logical doctrines of Aristotle, but have contented themselves with the elaboration of technical details" (viii). "Common to these Logicians is the acceptance of the subject-predicate doctrine, of the traditional schedule of propositions, and the restriction of deduction to the syllogistic form" (viii). Logicians of three other main schools are specified: the "Metaphysical [or 'Idealist'] logicians," represented by Bradley and Bosanquet—whose logic ends in "shipwreck"; secondly, the Pragmatists; thirdly, the "Mathematical logicians," of whom Miss Stebbing is one. On their view "The ideal of logic is to exhibit form." Now "mathematics is the science of pure form [it has no essential connection with quantity (456)]." Hence "the achievement of the ideal of logic makes it indistinguishable from pure mathematics." In working on these lines "the mathematical logicians are carrying on the work which Aristotle himself initiated."

(*b*) We get further light on the traditional logic from the Bibliography (494 ff.). It mentions five representative books—by Carveth Read, Creighton, Mellone, Joseph, and Wolf. All these are "elementary," except Joseph's (which is "by far the best systematic exposition of the traditional logic," is "on Aristotelian lines," and is also "the best introduction to philosophic logic"). J. N. Keynes's *Formal Logic* ("Aristotelian") is also mentioned. We should, I think, add Welton's two-volume *Manual*, also the *Intermediate Logic* based on it by Welton and Monahan (the third edition of which is revised on "mathematical logic" lines). All these books are in current use and are by recent or contemporary writers.

Criticism.—I suggest that the description of "traditional logic" in (*a*) does not fit the logicians said to represent it in (*b*).

First: Creighton, according to Mellone, follows Bosanquet throughout. Also all these books deal with *induction*; and here Welton, as he says himself, follows Bosanquet, while Carveth Read follows Mill. And Miss Stebbing reckons neither Bosanquet nor Mill as a traditionalist. Mellone claims to be Aristotelian as regards deductive logic. He adds, however, as Welton does, that about induction Aristotle has comparatively little to say. Now he and Mellone have a good deal to say about it; it appears, therefore, that they must go beyond Aristotle's doctrines. So, perhaps, as regards induction, does Joseph; at any rate, in discussing it, as his index shows, his references to Aristotle are scarcely five per cent. of those found in other parts of his book. And I think one could say the same of Wolf.

Secondly: The accusation [see (*a*) above], about the traditionalists' "restriction of deduction to the syllogistic form," is repeated frequently, but is in one place disposed of by Miss Stebbing herself. For after saying, "It is impossible to maintain that all deduction is syllogistic," she immediately adds, "Perhaps no contemporary logicians would wish to maintain that it is" (217). Now contemporary logicians include most of the traditionalists we have named. All of them devote special chapters or sections to relative, conditional, and disjunctive arguments; and all or most (Mellone is an exception) deny (Joseph and Keynes emphatically, and at length) that the reduction of such arguments to syllogistic form is possible. Joseph, again, in the case of hypothetical and relative arguments, while not denying that the premisses are in "subject-predicate form," explains that it is not on this relation that the argument rests; and he holds that "syllogism does not belong to the level of complete insight into the connection of facts," and that "when Aristotle taught that syllogism is the form of demonstrative thinking, he failed to realize this" (311).

Thirdly: Miss Stebbing has an odd way of using the past tense when referring to the traditionalists, as in the sentence "Relational arguments were very awkwardly dealt with" by them (111), and in "Joseph's treatment of [so-and-so] illustrates the confusions into which [they] fell" (111, 43, n.; cf. 165, 166). The tense certainly suggests that traditionalists are extinct. Seeing, however, that many survive, and that "every elementary textbook in logic now in use in this country" represents their views (see viii), it probably expresses not an assertion about the present, but a pious aspiration about the future.

I select three points for special consideration.

II. The Relation of Transitivity (112, 113).—Traditional logicians have long recognized the existence of "relational arguments"; and that while some of them (*e.g.* "$x = y$, $y = z$, therefore $x = z$," or "x is greater than y, y is," etc.) are *valid*, others (*e.g.* "x is next to y, y," etc.) are *invalid*. The new logic claims to have made an advance in their treatment: it says: "The validity of [such inferences] depends upon the logical properties of the relations involved." And: "Important though the properties of relations are, it is only quite recently that these properties have been carefully studied and defined" (111).

Presumably we have been provided by the new logic with a clear principle by which we can see exactly why some of these arguments are valid and others are not. The principle can be formulated in two sentences (in my own words):

(i) A relational argument is valid if the relations between the terms are *transitive* relations.

(ii) Transitive relations are relations between the terms such that they make a relational argument valid.

Stated thus, the principle is manifestly circular, or tautologous. It amounts to saying that the relations which make relational arguments valid are to be *named* "transitive relations." But giving them a name gives no information about their nature.

To show that this formulation is not a caricature I add quotations: [Transitive] "relations are such that, if they hold between x and y, and between y and z, then they hold between x and z" (112, 113). . . . "We see, then, that [the relation of] transitivity is sufficient to secure a valid inference" (113). . . . [In all relational arguments] "the validity of the arguments depends upon the fact that the relating relation is transitive" (114).

Certainly transitivity will give a valid argument if the definition of transitivity is that it should do so.

No doubt the analysis in this section of various forms of relations is interesting and important, but its application to relational arguments contains, as far as I can see, nothing that is either. Miss Stebbing accuses certain methods employed by traditionalists of being "awkward," or, again, of being "as futile as they were ridiculous." Perhaps they were; but is this treatment of relational arguments any better?

III. Similarity and Structure (204–206).—[In one sense] "structure is . . . hardly distinguishable from system" (discussed in preceding sections). "But when we speak of two systems *having the same structure*, we are attempting to use 'structure' in a sense that requires further definition" (203). . . . "Structure is a notion of fundamental importance. . . . It is to Mr. Russell that logicians owe [its] precise definition . . ." (204).

The explanation can be summarized thus:

1. "Structure [applies] only to relations, or rather, to systems of relations" (204).

2. The examples provided are "examples of systems of relations that have the same structure." Thus "a *map* [*e.g.* of England] has the same structure as that of which it is a map" (205). The map in one sense is quite unlike the country, yet in another sense there is a "similarity" or "relation-likeness" between the spatial relations of the marks on the map and the spatial relations of the places in the mapped country. Similarly, if *A* is a genealogical tree and *B* the clan corresponding, they have "similarity" of structure, though in another sense there is even less likeness between them than there is between the map and the country.

3. Then comes a final description and a definition. (In accordance with Miss Stebbing's own remark, quoted in section 1 above, for her "relations' I substitute ["systems of] relations.") The passage runs thus: "Two [systems of] relations that have the same map, or of which one could be the map for the other, have the same structure. Thus two [systems of] relations which have relation-likeness, *i.e.* which are *similar*, have the same structure. Hence, "structure means similarity of [systems of] relations. . . . Enough has been said to make the notion of structure precise" (206).

4. *Criticisms.*—In one way this account has real importance. It shows, what one might not have thought of, that two things, *e.g.* a family and its pedigree, have a correspondence which to the senses is not observable. It explains how structures are similar. But that is a very different thing from explaining what structures are.

I suggest that the account taken as a description of structure quite plainly contradicts itself. It begins with what promises to be the first part of a definition—"structure [applies to, *i.e.* is] a system of relations." Then it says that structure is "similarity of [systems] of relations." Well, it cannot possibly be both. How, recurring to the examples, can the *structure* of a map of England be at the same time the *similarity* of its structure to the structure of the mapped country? *Structure is similarity of structures* is what the definition amounts to.

One more test. A definition is substitutable for the definiendum without change of sense. Try the substitution in the second sentence of paragraph 3 above. It becomes: "Thus two relations which have relation-likeness, *i.e.* which are similar, have the same similarity of relations." Is that illuminative?

IV. The Analysis of Descriptions (139–142, and *passim*).—"Insufficient analysis of propositions . . . is the radical defect of the traditional logic." We consider here the new analysis so far as it concerns propositions containing "descriptive phrases": *e.g.* "The author of Waverley is Scotch"; "The author of Waverley ch. 77 is Scotch." (I have substituted the second example—for the sake of its contrast with the first—for Miss Stebbing's, and I abbreviate "Waverley" throughout into "Wav."

1. The point of the new method is this. The old logic took descriptive phrases such as "the author of Wav.," "the author of Wav. ch. 77," as "*names* for the objects which these phrases describe. That, however, is a mistake. There is no object which is ['the author of Wav. ch. 77']; so it could not possibly be named. The proposition ['The author of Wav. ch. 77 is Scotch'] is false; the proposition 'The author of Waverley is Scotch' is true. Yet these propositions are of the *same* form; hence it must be possible to give some account of *both* phrases . . . without bringing in some object which they name" (141). "Propositions in [which] such phrases occur must be analysed so that the description disappears" (140). The new analysis shows "how it is *possible* to use phrases . . . *significantly* even though there is nothing to which such descriptions apply" (141).

Now we come to the analysis of "The author of Wav. is Scotch." This "is to be analysed into the conjoint assertion of

(*a*) One man wrote Wav.;
(*b*) Only one man wrote Wav.;
(*c*) That man is Scotch" (142).

2. *Criticisms.*—First: I think that (*a*) is plainly redundant; "only one man" includes "one man."

Secondly: In (*c*), "that man is Scotch," "that man" only makes sense if we know the answer to the question "To whom does 'that man' refer?" The answer is, "The only man who wrote Wav." Thus to give meaning to (*c*), it must read, "The only man who wrote Wav. is Scotch," and this is practically the same as the unanalysed proposition with which we started. Notice, further, that "The only man who wrote Wav." is a descriptive phrase; *i.e.* the descriptive phrase has not been analysed away.

Thirdly, on Miss Stebbing's own showing, the analysis seems to break down. The word "that" is a demonstrative symbol. Now "a demonstrative symbol would be meaningless were there nothing for which it stood"; it "stands for an object with which we are directly acquainted" (25), or "of which I am directly aware" (24). But in (*c*) "That man" (who wrote Wav.) is *not* a man with whom I am directly acquainted, or of whom I am directly aware. Next, take the *false* proposition "The author of Wav. ch. 77," etc. It analyses, like the true proposition, into a triad, the third member of which is "That man is Scotch." This, on Miss Stebbing's views, cannot make sense. No one wrote Wav. ch. 77; hence there is nothing for which "that" stands; and, as before, there is nothing with which I am directly acquainted, nothing of which I am directly aware, nothing which "that" serves to name. Consequently the application of the new analysis to propositions in which the subject stands for a nonentity seems to offer no special advantage over the account given by the old logic.

Fourthly: I add a few notes, not in themselves important, except to suggest how complex and dubious the new method is.

While I feel sure that (*b*) makes (*a*) redundant, I think really that (*a*) does the same for (*b*). True, "One man is eight feet high" is compatible with fifty men being as tall; hence to make things clear I ought to say "One man at least." But "One man wrote Wav." means one man wrote the *whole* of it; if several men had collaborated, to say *one* man wrote it would be false. Here, then, the word "only" is redundant.

Judging from an example (140), (*c*) is itself in need of analysing. "That church is very large" becomes "that is a church and it is very large." By analogy (*c*) should read "That is a man and he is Scotch."

I suppose the answer to the charge of undue complexity would be that the new method of analysis is usable, in actual use, and found useful. However that may be, the explanations of it seem to be particularly difficult and to lack plausibility.

Miss Stebbing, in a review of Professor Whitehead's book, *Process and Reality*, has said what with some modification seems to sum up my feelings about her own: "That it is obscure no one can doubt. That it is worth pondering I am convinced. Whether it is the product of thinking that is essentially unclear, but capable of brief flashes of penetrating insight, or whether it is too profound . . . to be judged by this generation, I do not know. Reluctantly I am inclined to accept the first alternative" (*Mind*, October 1930). I say "with modifications." I have a respect for authority, and I know that the new logic has provided a technique which is widely

used. Therefore there must be a great deal in it that I do not see. Still, the authorities are not all on one side. The judgment is with the high gods, and if it goes against the new logic, I do not think I shall be reluctant to concur.

A. D. KELLY.

REPLY TO THE ABOVE

Owing to the courtesy of the Editor, I have been permitted to see Mr. Kelly's criticism of my *A Modern Introduction to Logic* before publication in order that my reply may appear in the same number of the *Journal*. I shall make my reply as brief as possible.

Mr. Kelly does me too much honour in supposing that what he calls "the case" for the "New Logic" stands or falls with the adequacy of my exposition of some of the doctrines of modern symbolic logicians. It is as though he had set out to show the unsatisfactoriness of the Christian ideal of life by pointing to those who have failed to live up to it.

I am glad to take this opportunity of admitting that there are very serious defects in my presentation of logical theory. Some of these defects are being remedied in the second edition of my book; others are so deeply ingrained that their elimination would involve a complete re-writing. No doubt there are still other defects of which I am not myself aware, or which I could not remedy even if I were aware of them. But it is surely foolish to judge a whole school of philosophers by the exposition of a single, and somewhat incompetent, member. In any case I regret that my book should have given occasion to the enemy to blaspheme. It is rather odd that, seeing that Mr. Kelly is obviously anxious to destroy the "New Logic," he should have selected only *one* of the serious defects in my exposition; his other points rest upon misunderstandings on his part.

The one serious mistake upon which Mr. Kelly comments occurs in the analysis of descriptions (see IV above). Of his criticisms, the first is mistaken, since "one man" does not "include" "only one man," which is what his argument requires. His second and third points are well taken. The third proposition given by me (on page 142 of my book) in the analysis of *Scott is the author of Waverley* is utterly wrong. I confess I do not know how I came to make this egregious mistake, since I am accustomed to insist upon the fact that the demonstrative *that* cannot be so used. This third proposition should be *Whoever wrote Waverley was Scotch*; or, as it might be better though more lengthily expressed: *There is nobody who both wrote Waverley and was not identical with Scott*. Had Mr. Kelly looked up the reference I gave to Mr. Russell's *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*, he would have found the correct rendering on page 177 of that book. He would then have seen that his criticism should have been exclusively directed against me and not against the "New Logic." But I am glad that Mr. Kelly has called attention to this point, since it has not been commented upon, so far as I know, by any reviewer of my book, and the mistake may mislead beginners. I could wish that he had corrected other mistakes in this chapter,[1] instead of reserving his energies for his other points.

My comments upon Mr. Kelly's other criticism can be briefer.

I. TRADITIONAL LOGIC.—It should be clear from what I say on page viii that Traditional Logic is concerned only with deduction. Hence, in speaking of a textbook as "traditional" I am clearly referring to its treatment of

[1] The whole of this chapter is being rewritten for the second edition, in which I hope these mistakes will be rectified.

deduction. It is not worth while to take up the space of this *Journal* in going *seriatim* through Mr. Kelly's comments on this point. The remark which he quotes from my page 217—which should be read in its context—is not inconsistent with what I have said elsewhere. Even the writer of a conservative textbook may not wish to maintain its errors on more mature reflection. It is well to know that Mr. Kelly has learnt to avoid this mistake.

II. The Relation of Transitivity.—I assume that Mr. Kelly has written "Relation" here by a slip of the pen for "Property." But this slip seems to have affected his argument. It should be sufficient to refer him to what I say in Chapter X, § 3, especially pages 172 and 173. Mr. Kelly has perhaps forgotten the prolonged controversy about the validity of the *a fortiori* argument, and has failed to see the force of what James called "the axiom of skipped intermediaries."

III. Similarity and Structure.—For the purpose of his criticism here Mr. Kelly has strung together—interspersed with remarks of his own—a number of quotations from my book taken out of their context. I am in no way responsible for the nonsense he talks about "the *structure* of a map of England." There is nothing which he says under this head that calls for a reply.

L. Susan Stebbing.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

Fausto Niccolini is well known in Italy for his painstaking studies of G. B. Vico, the best being his critical edition of Vico's complete works, beginning with the *Scienza Nuova*. He has also written a pregnant volume describing the early period of the philosopher's life.[1] This work, the result of long years of study, is documented down to its least particulars, each costing Niccolini minute and patient research. However, he has thus acquired such mastery over his sources that henceforth he can dispense with all ostentation of learning, and present his study to us in the simplest and readiest form, as though his narrative developed spontaneously out of itself and were not the result of sustained critical stimulus. Croce, the most competent judge in Italy of problems pertaining to Vico, has pronounced the book a little masterpiece of its kind, and considers completely exhaustive the researches of which it is the fruit.

Niccolini's narrative stops at the year 1700, that is, at the moment when Vico, after a long apprenticeship, at last begins to find the way that will lead him, after another twenty years of patient study, to the creation of the *Scienza Nuova*. It might perhaps be thought that this second period of activity must actually be more important than the first for biographical study. The truth is exactly the opposite: on the compiling of the *Scienza Nuova* the purely biographical interest ceases to have a separate *raison d'être*, and becomes identified with the interest of the work itself. The preparatory period, on the contrary, presents greater difficulties, and the clearing up of these leads to a better appreciation of the direction of the philosopher's thought in his maturity. This is a particularly weighty consideration when one takes into account the splendid isolation that tradition has assigned to Vico, emphasizing the existing contrast between the historical character of Vico's work and the illuministic and anti-historical atmosphere of the environment into which it was born. It was necessary to react in some way against this too artificial and conventional view: no work of the human intellect can take form out of all relation to its historical environment. Furthermore, contrast is in its own way a relation that with invisible, but none the less substantial, bonds unites the individual to the world in which he lives. Niccolini understands perfectly this necessity of setting the personality of his author in its historical and geographical environment, and has thus revealed how deeply it is penetrated by the Neapolitan and European culture of the seventeenth century. The city in which Vico was born, the schools he attended, the books he read, the suburb of Cilento where he spent some years of his thoughtful youth as a teacher, his first appearance in the literary, scientific and academic disputes of the time—all this is shown by Niccolini with rare scholarly acumen and with the vivacity and colour that only a love of the subject can inspire. The ordinary reader can follow these vicissitudes with the pleasure he may derive from a novel; the student of the problems of the history of philosophy can add to this enjoyment the satisfaction of the doubts and difficulties that the study of Vico's philosophical works never fails to raise.

[1] F. Niccolini, *La Giovinezza di G. B. Vico* (1668–1700), Bari, Laterza, 1932.

Grassi[1] proposes a "new interpretation of Platonic metaphysics, based essentially on an appreciation of the *Meno* differing from the traditional view." As a matter of principle one cannot but feel a certain diffidence with regard to innovations of that type. That it is possible to shed fresh light on some aspects of Platonic as well as of Aristotelian or Kantian philosophy which have hitherto remained somewhat obscure, and that it is possible to give more vigorous and thoroughgoing expositions of them as compared with the arid schemes of manuals and scholastic traditions, is not only perfectly admissible, but is what one may legitimately expect from every fresh contact of new interpreters with the old texts. On the other hand, it seems to me, on *a priori* grounds, extremely improbable that while the material at our disposal for investigation remains unaltered, those interpretations that have been fixed by hundreds if not thousands of years of tradition can be wholly changed. With regard to Plato, tradition has bound up with his name a doctrine of ideas as fixed and unalterable essences, not proceeding from the human intellect, but primary and objective conditions of the intelligibility of the real. Now it cannot be doubted that anyone who considers Plato's dialogues with an open mind cannot fail to note a certain contrast between the doctrinal scheme of tradition and the extreme mobility and fluidity of Plato's thought. It would, however, be fallacious to try to solve the contradiction by suppressing one of its terms and considering as pure Platonism only that type of thought in action which is continually seeking and never seems to reach its goal and be at peace with itself. The scheme itself is Platonic, and it is just its inevitable presence, together with its unsatisfied and unsatisfying need, that arouses in the dynamic thought of Plato those conflicts and waverings that form the torment and delight of his interpreters. In face of the static representation of the doctrine of ideas, all that can be done by an interpretation adhering more closely to the text of the dialogues and remaining more faithful to the restless spirit of Plato, is to alter and animate the cold framework, to introduce heresy into the dogma, to sink the theme in the symphony that complicates and enriches it. To try to do more even with the laudable intention of reacting against scholastic Platonism is to risk deforming Plato himself.

Grassi could not avoid this risk. While his study of the *Meno* shows great acumen, he has tried to banish from it altogether the traditional interpretation of the doctrine of ideas. For him Socratic doubt is no longer a means of arriving at knowledge, it is actually realization in the act of knowing; truth is not a transcendent object, it is found in the actual process of searching; recollection is not the drawing up from the depths of the soul of a deposit of truth that was already lying there, but coincides with the actual work of digging for it and ferreting it out. All this may be "present-day idealism," or whatever one likes to call it, but it is certainly not a legitimate interpretation of Platonism. I do not deny that Grassi's analysis may yield some right reasoning: he calls attention to the dynamic element in the Platonic conception of memory, which, in spite of Plato's express warning, was placed at the apex of an indolent psychology; he shows how memory is the foundation of the immortality of the soul, and not the immortality of the soul the foundation of memory; nevertheless his correct observations are falsified by the falsity of the thesis they are made to support. The process of remembering will never be a creative process; the recollective force will never be a creative force; remembering will never be an act complete in itself. It will always presuppose something which is remembered. The deepest meaning

[1] E. Grassi, *Il problema della metafisica platonica*, Bari, Laterza, 1932.

that can be given to the Platonic doctrine of cognition is re-cognition: Plato has a kind of presentiment of this truth, expressed in a suggestive but inadequate psychological form.

Grassi's analysis is limited to the *Meno*, but claims to give a hermeneutic canon for the whole of Plato's philosophy. He has not, however, attempted to follow up his judgment in the other dialogues; and I cannot imagine how he could have made it explain the psychological doctrine of the *Phædo*, or the political doctrine of the *Republic*, or the dialectics of the *Sophist*, or of the *Philebus*, or worse still the cosmology of the *Timæus*. The most positive judgment that can be pronounced on his theme is that, by its very exaggeration it serves as a strong stimulus to reconsider Platonic philosophy under the visual angle of immanence and the future, to temper—but certainly not to annul—the too rigid schemes of the traditional doctrine of ideas.

In the Laterza series of *Philosophers ancient and medieval*, Professor Festa has begun the publication of a new collection of fragmentary writing of the ancient Stoics.[1] This work is conducted according to a criterion differing from that of Arnim's classical collection. Indeed, Festa has not limited himself to gathering together the fragments and the bulk of material as a basis for an approximate distinction between the respective arguments. He has tried to reconstruct by their means the works of the Stoics, of which the bare catalogue was given us by Diogenes Laërtius. Starting from certain trustworthy and credible information appertaining to a given work or a given fragment, he traces, with the help of Arnim, other fragments which with some likelihood may belong to the same work. In this way he succeeds in forming an idea of the work itself and of its form and style. Then, having gleaned some characteristic traits of the author studied, he works on, patiently ransacking the mass of material lacking any attribute of paternity—that is to say, the so-called anonymous fragments, which are very numerous, coming from such a school as the Stoics, where the common denomination has partly submerged the personality of the component parts—to see if some fragment could be attributed to a work already characterized in the way described. Naturally, such a redistribution of material is not exempt from the danger of arbitrariness or of attributions that are merely hypothetical. Festa takes this into account and is careful to point out where paternity is certain and where it is only presumed. In this patient work he has acquired such skill that the reader sees unfolding before his eyes at least the more general and elementary traits of the separate works. For the present he has limited his own reconstruction to the writings of Zeno only, very few of whose works have come down to us. But we may be sure that when he undertakes the study of Chrysippus or Cleanthes—of whom we possess fragments far more numerous and extensive—the criterion he follows will give still greater fruit. In this way Festa's work will be incomparably useful to all students of ancient philosophy. Indeed, by this work, the generic investigations on the Stoic school—taken as an anonymous and impersonal whole—may be succeeded by an investigation on separate masters, each in his properly differentiated personality. There is no one indeed who cannot see that much new light may be thrown on the subject to enable this new criterion to bring fresh understanding of that great and stern movement of thought of classical antiquity.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

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[1] *I frammenti degli stoici antichi ordinati, tradotti e annotati da N. Festa, vol. 1, Zenone*, Bari, Laterza, 1932.

(*Translated from the Italian by* CONSTANCE ALLEN).

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN RUSSIA

In the last number of *Put* there is an interesting article by Berdyaev about philosophy in Soviet Russia; it contains much valuable information, and it is worth while to give a summary of it. Berdyaev has been reading modern Soviet literature on philosophical and anti-religious subjects and has made a special study of *Historical Materialism*, a symposium by members of the Institute of Red professorship in philosophy, edited by Raltsevitch—a kind of enclyclopædia of Marxism-Leninism, published in 1931. Berdyaev's general impression is that great importance is attached to philosophy in Soviet Russia, for right thinking is considered essential to right doing. The political errors of men like Trotsky or Buharin, who have deviated from the 'general line' of the Communist party, are said to be due to mistakes in their philosophical conception of the world. This is a curious instance of the Russian's instinctive belief that things of the spirit are of supreme importance—one would naturally have expected the champions of economic materialism to explain Trotsky's treason to Communism by more tangible causes than his wrong understanding of the nature of dialectics. But evidently the racial characteristics remain what they are whatever their outer form may be, and we find the Russian Marxists as much concerned with the ideal realm of abstract thought as though they were the disciples of Plato—whose very name, by the way, is an abomination to them.

About a thousand young Communists are engaged in the study of philosophy, which is to equip them with a true understanding of the principles they ought to follow in building up a socialistic state. But by philosophy they mean something very different from what we mean by it: for them it is not a free and unprejudiced inquiry into the nature of the world as a whole, but a study of truths laid down once for all by Marx and Lenin. To question those truths is unthinkable; any attempt to do so is condemned as 'revisionism' and leads the erring philosopher into trouble. It is really theology and not philosophy. The 'faith once delivered to the saints' admits of no doubts; the proofs adduced in support of this or that view consist in quotations from the Scriptures—from the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, that is. A man's work is judged not for what it is worth, but for being in agreement or disagreement with the orthodox view; the hunt for heresy is the Red philosophers' chief occupation. The 'general line' in philosophy is being worked out under the directions of Stalin, though he has no philosophical education whatever; it was he who denounced Deborin as a 'Menshevik idealist.' A number of writers who had once been regarded as good authorities on Marxism have been proved guilty of various heresies: Plehanov, Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, Deborin, Buharin, and, among the Germans, Kautsky. Lenin is the supreme authority on every subject, including physics, in which his views are opposed to the 'reactionary' theories of Einstein. A Red philosopher who has recently written a book on the origin of religion was blamed for not having said anything about Lenin's view on magic and totemism; the unfortunate man replied in despair that he could not discover a single word on the subject in Lenin's writings—so what was he to do?

The officially-sanctioned philosophy of Soviet Russia is dialectical materialism, which must be kept distinct from 'mechanistic materialism' on the one hand and from 'idealism' on the other. The Marxists' hatred of idealism is natural enough, but their objection to a 'mechanistic' interpretation of the world is not so easy to grasp. It seems to spring from political rather than from philosophical considerations. 'Mechanistic' materialism explains

everything that happens by the influence of external forces which determine man's conduct with necessity; according to it, economic factors rooted in the very nature of things finally decide what form of social organization is to prevail in a given community. Hence the 'kulaks' are to be regarded not as malevolent creatures subject to extermination, but as an inevitable consequence of the interplay of economic forces; hence the dictatorship of the proletariat is not natural in a backward country where the overwhelming majority of the population are peasants. These practical conclusions have been drawn not by the 'mechanistic materialists' themselves, but by their opponents, quick to detect the political heresy concealed in the determinist position. To justify the revolutionary experiment which is being carried out by the Soviets, an *activist* philosophy is needed, a philosophy that would vindicate the collective man's freedom from the laws of nature, and his capacity to order life as he wills, regardless of all external forces. Such a philosophy is supplied by *dialectical* materialism, which regards matter not as something inert and lifeless, but as containing a principle of spontaneity, of movement, a power to rise of its own accord from the lower to the higher forms of being. In fact, matter has all the richness and fullness of spirituality ascribed to it, and is spoken of as though it were the World-Soul of the Neoplatonists. But the words 'soul' and 'spirituality' are taboo to the Red philosophers, who insist that physical matter is the only ultimate reality; they reject the discoveries of modern physics precisely because 'they reduce matter to nothing.' Electrons, the quantum theory, and the theory of relativity are declared to be reactionary inventions of bourgeois scientists.

Dialectical materialism is, in fact, an extraordinary mixture of Hegelianism and the crudest naturalism. The Soviet philosophers are between the devil and the deep sea: if they stress the 'dialectical' element, nothing remains of their materialism but a name; if they emphasize the 'materialistic' aspect of their system, they are led to determinism, which means 'deviation to the right' from the general line of the Communist party. Deborin's students were in earnest about dielectics and studied Hegel's *Logic*—with the fatal result that they abstained from anti-religious propaganda (which is part of the duties of Red philosophers), separated philosophy from politics, became interested in logical problems for their own sake, and showed an obvious tendency towards idealism. They were stopped in time and offered to think their errors over; Deborin was dismissed from his post—but who can tell how long those who succeed them will be able to retain their precarious philosophical balance? One may be quite certain that as soon as there is a chance for the development of critical thought and a free interchange of opinions in Russia, the jumble of contradictions called 'dialectical materialism' will fall to the ground.

Among books published by Russian exiles note should be taken of G. D. Gurvitch's *L'Idée du droit social* (750 pages) and *Le Temps present et l'idée du droit social* (320 pages), for which he was given a doctorate by the Sorbonne. In his first book Gurvitch points out that every social whole (a state, a class, a corporation, a shareholding company, etc.) involves subordination, co-ordination, and integration of its members. Each of these aspects serves as a basis for certain rights: the right to claim obedience, the right to claim one's due, and the 'social right' which determines relations based upon the common interests of the members of the social whole in question. The rights and duties that follow from the 'integration' aspect of social life are for the most part discovered intuitively by the members of a given group and become established without the intervention of the State. In his second book Gurvitch makes a survey of laws and institutions

that regulate economic and international relations, and may in time lead to what he calls 'economic democracy' and to a political organization transcending the limits of the national state.

Father Sergey Bulgakov has brought out a little book, *The Miracles of the Gospel* (*O tchudesah evangelskih*, Paris Y.M.C.A. Press), in which he criticizes the view that miracles are due to Divine intervention with the laws of nature, and maintains that even the miracles of Jesus Christ were worked by His human and not by His divine powers. The normal man, *i.e.* the man who realizes God's idea of what man ought to be, has spiritual power that enables him to dominate nature; in working His miracles Christ has given us an example of what the perfect man can do. This is why He said to His disciples that they could do the works He did "and greater works than these."

NATALIE DUDDINGTON.

NEW BOOKS

Ethics. By Nicolai Hartmann. Translated by Stanton Coit. (Library of Philosophy.) (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1932. Vol. I, *Moral Phenomena*. Pp. 343. Price 12s. 6d. Vol. II, *Moral Values*. Pp. 476. Price 16s. Vol. III, *Moral Freedom*. Pp. 288. Price 12s. 6d.)

The titles of the three volumes into which this work is divided suggest a procedure which starts from the description of ethical fact and passes in the second and third parts to the discussion of the metaphysical implications. The actual course of Professor Hartmann's complicated argument—for in spite of its length the work has a high degree of unity, and is felt to form a single uninterrupted argument—is very different and much more original. Professor Hartmann is a phenomenologist. It is his central aim throughout to define and analyse the ethical fact. He wishes, as he says, to *stand by*, or, as the Greeks used to say, to *save* the phenomena. His quarrel with most ethical theories is not so much their falsity as their one-sidedness. Having seized one element in the situation, they violently push aside the rest, and proceed to hasty metaphysical constructions based upon it alone. He is determined to formulate the many-sided problem in all its complexity. From beginning to end, therefore, his procedure is both analytic and constructive: at different times each thread may be the more prominent for the time being, but neither is ever surrendered, and the last word is always on the side of analysis, that is, with the phenomena. The argument as a whole may be described as a progressive analysis of the ethical situation, with a rising level of concreteness, as more and more material is worked into the argument. Each level has its own problems, and these become more difficult as the level rises. It is only on the lower levels that one can speak confidently of a solution. At the end he offers not another "proof" of that cardinal ethical postulate, the freedom of the will, but a clearer grasp of its meaning and of the obscurities of the resulting metaphysical situation.

In this long argument, in spite of its unity, the three parts, represented by the three volumes, have nevertheless each a character of its own. The first volume, which is the most difficult and the most abstract of the three, has the special task of introducing the reader to the metaphysical conceptions employed in the work. The apriority and objectivity of the judgment of ethical value is represented as implying the reality of an absolute order of values in a realm of essences contrasted with the world of the actual as the Platonic Forms stood over against the world of sense. But the values, for all their reality, have no power over the actual: for their opportunity of affecting the course of the world they are dependent, like Aristotle's unmoved mover, on the initiative of members of that world. Thus, metaphysically, granting this first point, the main task is that of providing a satisfactory hypothesis as to the structure of the actual, with the special aim of defining the mode of entry of ethical values into it. In this task Professor Hartmann makes use of a doctrine of categories, which he has no doubt explained more fully in his *Metaphysic of Knowledge*. Borrowing from the Greeks one of their favourite ideas, he presents to us as a fundamental character of all being the character (as we may call it) of multiple stratification. Any concrete reality or actuality contains within it diverse orders of being, one superimposed

upon another, and necessarily so related that the higher is dependent for its existence on the lower. It will be well to quote one of Professor Hartmann's formulations of this principle. It is, he tells us, a "general categorial law" that "in the gradation of the categories the lower always constitute the presuppositions of the higher. . . . Every higher category unifies the lower ones in a new way and is a higher formation which rises over them as over a material. The novelty in it is this formation itself. But thence it follows that the lower categories are always the more independent, the more unconditioned, and even subsist for themselves without the higher, and that the higher are always conditioned by them, are dependent on them, and exist only under them as their presupposition—indeed, that the new formation can become active only within the range which the lower categories leave undetermined. Against a lower a higher principle cannot enter, it cannot suspend the action of the lower; it can form a higher structure only upon the lower and with it as a building-stone. In short, the lower categories are the stronger, the higher the weaker" (I, 289).

Without going further into the argument of the first volume, it will be evident that Professor Hartmann's belief in values is not a mere belief in ideal essences, but a belief in the general soundness of human attributions of value to actual things and persons. These attributions are the main subject of the second volume, which is the most purely descriptive part of the work. The basis in man of the recognition of values he commonly refers to as a sense, and the attempt to find the basis in Reason is strongly opposed. In common with other phenomenologists, Professor Hartmann insists that values are cognized a priori, but he also insists that there is no cognition of value as such. The ideal essence is not an object of knowledge. It is only in the reactions of actual experience—here is the unescapable element of empiricism—that values are felt or discerned. They are apprehended only in connection with the detail of experience, and in it, in manifold ways, of which the fully developed judgment of ethical value is a partial and occasional distillation. "There is a pure valuational a priori which directly, intuitively, in accordance with feeling, penetrates our practical consciousness, our whole conception of life, and which lends to everything which falls within the range of our vision the mark of value or anti-value. . . . The apriorism of thinking and judging is accompanied by an apriorism of feeling, the intellectual a priori by an emotional a priori which is equally independent and original" (II, 177).

But the really remarkable achievement of the second volume is on a different plane from questions such as this. Professor Hartmann, inspired, as it appears, by a re-reading of Aristotle's *Ethics*, has boldly attempted a systematic survey of those features of character and conduct which are subjects of human admiration and reprobation, and a careful analysis of their implications and mutual interrelation. The risks of such an attempt are obvious. The trite, the banal, the edifying, even the offensive, are not easily avoided. But Professor Hartmann escapes these dangers—first, because of an unfailing tact and delicacy of judgment, and, secondly, because he never drops the theoretical thread or descends to the mere practically descriptive level. He makes his analysis yield a full measure of contribution to the general argument. In this region, that of the ethical values proper—those pertaining directly to character and conduct—his conception of the values as constituting an ideal system, of which man has but an imperfect grasp, is strongly corroborated by the oppositions which he exhibits among the elements which constitute or have constituted the human ideal. Sometimes these oppositions, as in the case of justice and mercy, have their root

only in the situation, giving rise to a practical dilemma, which points to no incoherence in the ideal itself. Sometimes, as in the case of pride and humility, they spring from opposed tendencies, which, nevertheless, on a higher plane even within human experience seem capable of harmonious reconciliation. But on the highest plane there are still unresolved discords which further enlightenment alone can resolve. This volume will appeal to many whom the other two volumes will hardly reach. It is, therefore, as well to say that it is quite capable of standing by itself. By itself, in my opinion, it must be judged to be an ethical classic of the first order.

The general clue to the treatment of freedom, which occupies the third volume, is to be found in the passage already quoted from the first volume, in which it was said that the new, or higher, formation has always the power to become active "within the range which the lower categories leave undetermined." If this "categorial law" is valid, the freedom of the higher stratum in relation to the lower stratum, which it presupposes, is universally guaranteed. Crass materialism is *ab initio* excluded. Thus organic life is necessarily free in the sense that it is not determined by the mechanical processes on which it is built, and so far the vitalists are in the right. Similar relations may be established for conscious life, which is super-organic, and for the mathematical order, which is infra-mechanical. But this freedom of the higher is no mere negation, an absence of determination: it is always the presence of a new and higher determination. Hence the problem of the freedom of the will is not solved by the mere application of this law. For if all that is meant is that man, in virtue of his higher organization, is determined by a moral law, which has no hold on creatures lower in the scale, the categorial law is honoured, but the freedom of the will, as postulated in the moral judgment, is not thereby established. The freedom postulated is that of voluntary self-determination with the open alternative of refusal and rejection of the law; and this kind of freedom has no parallel on other levels. It is a freedom which the categorial law by itself cannot provide.

It would be a mistake to attempt to follow Professor Hartmann through the intricacies of his argument: an indication of its general drift and character is the most that can be attempted. What has been already said is sufficient to suggest that he is led at the end to recognize that the problem of the freedom of the will is evidence of the uniqueness of the human predicament. It is a problem which arises, so far as we know, only and for the first time at the human level. Again and again the argument in its different stages comes back to the conception of personality and its values, as though disposed to seek the solution there; but personality is a specifically humanistic conception, and our grasp of its metaphysical foundations is still in the rudimentary phase. Philosophic thought, since Kant's day, has attained increased clearness on many points connected with this problem, and Professor Hartmann's candid and perspicuous argument throws new light on many dark places: yet at the end the clouds gather and one feels that in essentials thought still halts at the limits which Kant marked for it, confident only that freedom is an essential demand of the moral consciousness, and that no valid refutation of the demand is forthcoming.

Having now passed rapidly in review each of the three volumes of Professor Hartmann's work, I suppose I ought, in time-honoured fashion, to proceed to indicate my main grounds of disagreement with its contentions. But the reading of the volumes leaves me in no mood for such a task. Their atmosphere is disarming. To one brought up at Oxford on T. H. Green, the constant reference of his thought to Kant and Aristotle as twin centres of light creates an intimate domesticity in which controversy does not flourish.

I cannot even find good grounds for a quarrel with the translator, who seems to have done his work admirably. (He might have provided an index, however; and I have noted one damaging slip at Vol. III, p. 209, where "finalistic" makes nonsense and should presumably read "causal.") Besides that, when an author has done so much, it seems churlish to ask for more. In this work Professor Hartmann has covered the ethical field from end to end in a luminous survey which never loses its unity, its proportion, or its philosophic depth. Many, no doubt, who have worked in the field themselves will feel that there are questions which he has not asked or has answered wrong; but they will hardly be disposed to deny the magnitude of his achievement. For my part, I agree so profoundly with his method and his main ethical conceptions, and I am so grateful for the strength and clarity of his exposition, that I can only end by thanking him for what he has done.

J. L. Stocks.

An Idealist View of Life. By S. Radhakrishnan. The Hibbert Lectures for 1929. (London: George Allen & Unwin. 1932. Pp. 351. Price 12s. 6d.)

Mr. Radhakrishnan's Idealism is Platonism seen through Indian spectacles —a very interesting combination. The argument follows much the same lines as Urban's *The Intelligible World*, with which our author does not seem to be acquainted. The book begins with a chapter on the modern challenge to religion, in which (though he has not made this quite clear enough) he states the views which are to be combated in the following chapters. The constructive part of the argument begins with the religious experience and its affirmations, which are the real ground for belief in God and a spiritual world. Intuition is a genuine revelation of truth and reality, but we must distinguish between the immediacy which appears at the sub-intellectual level and the immediacy which appears at the supra-intellectual level, as the crown of discursive thought and the reward of a life's devotion to the highest of quests. This is what Proclus meant when he said that the extremes are simple, the intermediate stages complex. Against Bergson he insists that there is no break of continuity between intuition and intellect. In moving from intellect to intuition we are not moving in the direction of unreason, but towards the deepest rationality of which human nature is capable. Intuitive knowledge is not non-rational, but only non-conceptual. The Archetypal Ideas are the contents of intuitive wisdom and the conditions of human knowledge. They point to the working of a universal Spirit in us.

The next chapter, "The Spirit in Man," seems to me a beautiful piece of work. The absolute values work in us as imagination, intuition, and creatively as artistic achievement. In their creative activity Wisdom, Beauty, and Goodness show their close affinity with one another. But it is in the religious consciousness that they acquire objectivity as part of the Being of God. They cease to be static ideals and become dynamic forces. This is the *amor dei intellectualis* of Spinoza. "The religious man lives in a new world which fills his mind with light, his heart with joy, and his soul with love. God is seen as light, love, and life." This view, which makes the "numinous" the full apprehension of the three absolute values, is, I think, truer than that of Otto, who would make it a fourth intrinsic value beside the others. I entirely agree with our author that the value of the ontological argument lies in the fact (or rather in the reasonable faith) that our deepest convictions give us trustworthy knowledge of reality.

In Chapter VI we come to current controversies. He takes the view that "matter is essentially creative in character, and its processes irreversible. The past cannot account for the present—existence is a continuous miracle. Physical science fails if it attempts to transform a miracle into an equation." This seems to me too much like William James's "wild" universe, which by its unaccountable behaviour administers a series of shocks even to its Creator. Does the author quite realize what havoc this theory would introduce into a mechanical or mathematical universe, which can hardly admit irreversibles, and finds real change an awkward problem? If the Creator is a mathematician, as Jeans says He is, he must find this constant interference with his equations most annoying. Mr. Radhakrishnan is definitely a finalist. But finalism in a mathematical universe could only mean what Lord Balfour called "coercing the operations of reason to a fore-ordained issue." That is how I used to do my sums; but my teachers described my method more curtly and less politely than Lord Balfour. But of course the answer is possible that we are not obliged to fit observed facts into a mathematical or mechanical framework.

Like Meyerson, whose book is not mentioned, our author insists that the world contains several surds or irreducibles (any other name is better than Meyerson's "irrationals") which have to be accepted as brute facts and cannot be brought into any scheme. The existence of these makes pan-mathematicism almost impossible. He also agrees with Meyerson in rejecting the attempt which was made by Eddington and others to find a purely mentalist basis for natural science. To reduce matter to electric energy is not to equate it with mind. Relativity and subjectivism are not at all the same thing. Science, as Meyerson insists, is essentially ontological. It begins with concrete facts accepted as real; and though it departs farther and farther from naïve realism, it can never free itself from dependence on external phenomena. It is also extremely doubtful whether Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy can legitimately be used as a proof of free will. Indeterminacy does not mean irrationality or arbitrariness. To suggest that electrons possess free will is to degrade freedom itself. In a word, as the author says, "the otherness of matter to mind is unaffected, however much it may be etherealized."

As might be expected from an Indian thinker, the author believes in re-incarnation, and does not wholly reject the possibility that men may be reborn as animals. It would certainly be promotion for many men to be reborn as good sheepdogs.

The most dubious part of the argument, in my opinion, is in the concluding chapter, where the old fairy-tale of the "perfectibility of the species" is unexpectedly revived. The author believes that the cosmic process must end in the final perfection of mankind, after which God, His work done, will be reabsorbed in the Absolute, Eckhart's "the Godhead." "The process of the world is an emergence under the guidance of God, who is immanent in the process, though the goal is transcendent to it." This attitude ranks the author as a theist; he strongly insists that the Absolute, the Supreme Being, is not organic with the world, though "God," the world-spirit, is bound up with the time-process. But we should be glad to know on what he bases his evolutionary optimism as a cosmic principle. He is not very clear about the meaning of eternal life, which ought to be quite independent of the realization or frustration of finite purposes in time. The future is a convenient place in which to store our dreams; but the perfectibility of the species belongs neither to Platonism nor (I should have thought) to Indian philosophy, and if any doctrine of the kind can be disproved by what science tells us about the fate of the cosmos, this has been banished from the realm of the possible.

Mr. Radhakrishnan has written an important book, which gains not a little

from the frequent elucidations of his thought which he gives us from Indian sources. Although he does not write as a Christian, he acknowledges his debt to Christian thought, and especially to the teaching of Christ. He is thoroughly conversant with modern European, and especially English, philosophy.

W. R. Inge.

The Open World. Three Lectures on the Metaphysical Implications of Science. By Hermann Weyl. (New Haven, U.S.A.: Yale University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1932. Pp. 84. Price 9s.; $1.50.)

This volume is based upon three lectures given by Professor Weyl as the eighth series of Terry Lectures. The purpose of the Terry Foundation is to promote the development of a broadened and purified religion by means of the interpretation of science. In many respects the Terry Lectures in America resemble the Gifford Lectures in Scotland. The choice of Professor Weyl as the eighth lecturer seems to have been a wise one.

The three lectures deal with "God and the Universe," "Causality," "Infinity." In the Preface Professor Weyl says that they are held together by one common thought. This he states to be that "Modern science, in so far as I am familiar with it through my own scientific work, mathematics and physics make the world appear more and more as an open one, as a world not closed but pointing beyond itself." He attempts to establish this contention by a brief statement of scientific development considered in relation to philosophical thought. In a few pages he sketches the changes that have taken place in cosmological theories from the time of Aristotle to the present day. In this connection he finds the work of Nicolaus of Cusa to be especially significant. In his work, we find, Professor Weyl says, "a strange occurrence, unique in the history of philosophy: the exactness of mathematics is sought not for its own sake, nor as a basis for an explanation of nature, but to serve as a foundation for a more profound conception of God" (p. 9). At the conclusion of the third lecture he says: "The mathematical tendencies which first announced themselves with Nicolaus of Cusa have, as I have tried to explain, been elaborated in the course of the centuries and have reached their fulfilment" (p. 84). The steps by which Professor Weyl has tried to justify this conclusion cannot be detailed here. It must suffice to indicate the line of argument.

In the first lecture Professor Weyl is mainly concerned with the question: "How does the divine manifest itself in Nature?" The answers that he considers are: (1) the ether is the omnipresence of God in things; (2) the mathematical lawfulness of nature is the revelation of divine reason. He seems to suggest that religious and metaphysical questions are intimately connected with the problems of science through the question how "the predominance of the ether in its interaction with matter is to be understood" (p. 21). In the mathematical lawfulness of nature we are said to have a vision of perfection. The difficulty which the present reviewer feels with regard to this line of argument is that the *perfection* of mathematics seems to have nothing in common with the *perfection* of a world in which evil and suffering are overcome. Yet Professor Weyl seems to think that the former is a foretaste of the latter.

In the second lecture Professor Weyl is concerned with the familiar problems of causality, determinism, and Heisenberg's principle. His argument here follows the lines that have now become familiar to everyone.

In the concluding lecture the problem of Infinity is discussed. Here, again,

there is little that is new. A rapid survey of the Greek conceptions of infinity is followed by a brief statement of recent treatments of the problem. The most interesting part of this lecture consists in Professor Weyl's discussions of the views of Brouwer and Hilbert. He summarizes his conclusions in five general theses, the upshot of which is that we must "reject the thesis of the categorical finiteness of man." He urges that "mind is freedom within the limitations of existence; it is open towards the infinite" (p. 84). God, as the completed infinite, cannot be apprehended, nor given by revelation or by mystical perception. "The completed infinite," he concludes, "we can only represent in symbols. From this relationship every creative act of man receives its deep consecration and dignity. But only in mathematics and physics . . . has symbolical-theoretical construction acquired sufficient solidity to be convincing for everyone whose mind is open to these sciences." It is not quite clear whether only mathematicians and physicists are to be convinced. If so, the layman may feel that he has not gained much from the identification of mathematical infinity with God.

L. S. Stebbing.

Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science. By C. E. M. Joad. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1932. Pp. 344. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

Mr. Joad's theme is the implication for philosophy of recent developments in physics. His thesis is that physicists who find in their own methods and results indications pointing to a philosophical Idealism are mistaken, and that their scientific achievements combine more naturally with a pluralistic Realism such as he himself expounds in his closing chapters. His discussion is concentrated round two main issues: the problem of perception and knowledge, and the problem of value and its status in the universe. It is to the second issue that he himself attaches the greater importance.

The scientist's approach to philosophy has changed substantially since thirty years ago, and largely, as Mr. Joad points out, owing to the gradual dissolution of the conception of matter. It is more plausible than formerly in scientific circles to maintain the common Idealist thesis that the objects studied by science are not, in the full sense, real, but are rather "abstractions" or "cross-sections," selected by the special purposes of the mind which is interested in them. Moreover, thus disembarrassed of primary claims of brute matter the scientist can at least speculate concerning Mind as a governing principle of the universe.

In Mr. Joad's opinion, the new outlook in physics does not warrant such conclusions; and he makes his point, firstly, by an examination of the philosophical Idealism of Sir Arthur Eddington and Sir James Jeans, secondly, by means of a general attack on the fundamental positions of Idealism, and, thirdly, by putting forward his own alternative explanation. It should just be mentioned that his detailed refutation includes in its scope the "neutral monism" of Earl Russell, on the ground that this theory, equally with Idealism, flattens out the distinction between apprehension and the object apprehended, which is so vital to Mr. Joad's whole position, and especially to his theory of value.

Much of Mr. Joad's line-for-line criticism is acute and pertinent, and his exposure of loose expressions and minor contradictions of thought are thoroughly convincing, though in the case of Sir Arthur Eddington, in particular, I feel that certain alleged inconsistencies would disappear in the light of a deeper and more sympathetic insight into his general position. But Mr. Joad's case rests finally on his general refutation of Idealism, and this I

find profoundly unconvincing. If this work does him anything like justice, he has never understood Absolute Idealism at all. He pours scorn, rightly enough, on the restricted humanism which can see nothing in the world but man or his shadow; but he never alludes to Hegel's distinction between Subjective and Objective Mind, or to the sceptical deflation of human pretensions with which Bradley introduced his great study of appearance and reality. He openly confesses, with a well-bred regret which barely conceals his satisfaction, that he does not know what is meant by "degrees of reality," and the conception of coherence as the test of truth, which is cardinal to any understanding of the subject, is not so much as mentioned. The Idealist may possibly be wrong, but Mr. Joad's criticism cannot but leave him quite impenitent.

It is pleasanter to turn to Mr. Joad's constructive philosophy, for Mr. Joad, despite his pluralism and his self-enforced intellectual humility, cannot help being a system-builder, and he sets about his task with zest and ingenuity. With regard to the problem of knowledge, he maintains a characteristic though in some respects individual Realist position. In perception, he holds, the mind is acquainted with sense-data, which are not to be identified with physical objects, and in no way resemble the objects of modern science. Each of these three spheres has its own peculiar character, and the intrinsic difference between them is sufficient to account for the difference in our apprehension of them, so that there is no need to attribute this latter difference to different kinds of awareness. Mind does not construct: all it does is to choose the type of object to which it shall turn.

The apparent objection to this view is that these three separate systems are not in practice watertight, that sense-perception leads on to the conception of the physical object, and that both lead on to the conceptions of science. This, however, Mr. Joad is prepared not only to admit, but to emphasize: for it is part of his contention against the idealizing scientist that the constructions of science arise from the contemplation of "brute" fact, which it cannot explain away without throwing down the ladder behind it. As to how the physical object stands to the sense-datum, Mr. Joad is openly puzzled; but he is satisfied that if we did not first know sense-data we would never come to know physical objects, and we may perhaps best take his general meaning if we think of sense-data as somehow "pointing" towards the further plane on which physical objects are to be found. This is certainly his position with regard to the bearing of sense-data on the objects of science. These latter "subsist" in a world of their own: "the material world of sense *directs* the mind to the non-material world of thought." (Why "material"?) On all this the comment which presents itself is that the doctrine of "pointers" is inconsistent with the demands of a rigorous pluralism, and that if the worlds are related at all (as they must be) they must stand with regard to each other in some more or less ascertainable order.

This difficulty is doubly evident when Mr. Joad proceeds to his theory of value. Value, for him, is a kind of "fourth realm," "the objects of which share in common with those belonging to the world of subsistence the property of changelessness, but are distinguished by this further property that the experiences resulting from the apprehension of them by minds at a certain level of development possess the character of 'significance.'" It is so important for him that he alludes to it, though with safeguards against misunderstanding, as "reality." As its outstanding quality must be its own, and not mental, on Mr. Joad's own showing, it surely follows that there must be for him a hierarchy of reality, and not merely a succession. As it happens, he finds it in the shape of a purposive evolutionary order, dominated by the goal which

is presented to us in our intimate experience of value: indirectly, through symbolism, in art, and directly through the mystic's apprehension of what he calls God. This part of Mr. Joad's work seems to me to be far the best thing in the book; nowhere does he write with more insight, earnestness, and power. But surely it knocks the bottom out of his pluralism. Man progresses from the apprehension of one order to that of another in accordance with an authoritative scale of importance. The most that remains after this is a dualism: on the one hand the mind of man, on the other an ascending succession of objects, governed by their approximation to ultimate values. These values, however, are not to be summed up in terms of mind, and our glimpses of them are too obscure or too fitful to enable us to define them.

It is, in fact, such a dualism that Mr. Joad endeavours to defend in his closing chapter, in which he takes the Idealists to task for demeaning value to the dimensions of the human intellect. Any sort of Monism, he urges, obscures the total otherness of value, and especially a Monism which discovers in reality an affinity to the apprehending subject. If this is so, it seems to me an important reason for being a Monist. If value is not to be an integral element in people's lives, it is meaningless; and if it *is* an integral element in people's lives, it cannot be wholly other. Much of the difficulty would have been avoided if Mr. Joad had studied Hegel's conception of Objective Mind. He would have found there a conception of otherness none the less emphatic, and far more significant, for not being ultimate. He might also have come to think more profoundly about personality, which he dismisses as a mere hindrance in the disinterested search for value.

It is a matter for regret that Mr. Joad should attribute the Idealist's conclusions to a desire to escape from reality. I confess I cannot understand the general modern assumption in art and philosophy that a congenial view of life must be *ipso facto* disingenuous. Mr. Joad would doubtless accuse me of "parochialism." But perhaps the universe is more like a parish than emancipated people like Mr. Joad are disposed to believe.

I do not, however, wish to allow my fundamental disagreement with Mr. Joad to obscure my quite genuine recognition of the merits of his book. He writes with his usual verve and clarity, and is enviably successful in the difficult task of placing the complicated questions at issue before the ordinary reader. He is singularly honest in his admission of difficulties where he sees them, and he is sincere, reverent, and often moving in his attitude towards art and religion. And he displays, especially in the latter half of the book, a maturity of treatment and purpose which promises to yield still more in the future.

A. Boyce Gibson.

The Philosophy of Descartes. By A. Boyce Gibson. (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1932. Pp. xii + 382. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

Though Descartes is very generally regarded as "the father of modern philosophy," yet there have been few attempts in England to give a complete and detailed presentation of his doctrines. Mr. Boyce Gibson's volume seeks to achieve this task, and is thus of special interest and of particular value. Descartes' philosophy is sufficiently important and, as appears from Mr. Gibson's discussion, still sufficiently subject to controversial interpretation as to merit, as well as to require careful exposition and examination. Descartes' style is so simple and direct that it is apt to mislead by its simplicity; and, apart from the tendency to assume what constitutes and does

not constitute *greatness* in a philosopher, Mr. Gibson does succeed in showing that behind the simplicity of style there is profundity of thought. It is unfortunate that though there are many fine sentiments beautifully as well as effectively expressed, his exposition, on the whole, will be felt by many of his readers to be less easy than the original of his thesis. The argument is close and painstaking, and the treatment is predominantly critical. He attempts both criticism and exposition, which are difficult to combine successfully, especially where the exposition itself may be a matter of dispute.

The various topics which are familiar to students of Descartes are dealt with in an interesting manner. The doctrines of the *Cognito*, of the existence and the attributes of God, of the external world and of perception, of method and of scientific knowledge, are all discussed at length, and many important things are said in connection with them. But from the point of view of the average English reader, the most valuable part of Mr. Gibson's work is his effort to link Descartes with preceding philosophy and to interpret his mission. He owes much at this point to the stimulating influence of M. Gilson, and yet it is his view of the philosophical aim of Descartes that is likely to provoke controversy.

In this country at least the prevalent tendency has been to look upon Descartes merely as the forerunner of later systems of philosophy, while his relation to earlier systems and to contemporary disputes has been neglected. There were religious controversies; there were religious changes; there was the new scientific movement which was gradually undermining mediæval Aristoteleanism. At La Flèche Descartes was educated under the influence of the scholastic tradition and of mediæval thought; but he was even at an early age dissatisfied with what he was taught, and later broke away from the view of the universe which it represented. In a long chapter dealing with the mission of Descartes Mr. Gibson stresses Descartes' interest in religion and considers his aim to be the creation of a synthesis in which religion and the new science would be reconciled. Towards the end of the ninth chapter, on the Attributes of God, he re-emphasizes the importance of this purpose and declares that "the first and most constant element of the Cartesian philosophy is the subordination of science to a religious metaphysic," and that the second feature is "its belief in the integrity of scientific interpretation," provided that the guarantee that reality is rational is forthcoming.

Such is Mr. Gibson's own answer to the controversial question as to whether Descartes' interest is primarily scientific and his religious metaphysics merely a prop to his science or even a sop to religious organizations and to the religiously minded public. What he lays stress upon is Descartes' conciliatory spirit and his desire to reconcile science and religion; and he considers that Descartes in aiming at this is a greater philosopher than he could be said to be if he were merely a scientist seeking a foundation for his scientific view. It is true enough that Descartes is a scientist as well as a philosopher, but it is somewhat difficult to appreciate the issue that is raised. The science of Descartes requires certain initial data, and because of this it remains an incomplete system of knowledge. There are ideas of which science strictly takes no cognisance. In discussing the problems of the self, God, and external things he covers the whole field of human experience; and in doing so he can be said to be effecting a synthesis of science and religion. But he can also be said to be satisfying the demand of completeness. Philosophically his interest in the existence and the nature of God is just as genuine and independent as is his interest in the nature of the physical universe; and there is no need to raise questions concerning the genuineness

or independence of his philosophical interest because in his theory he argues for the logical dependence of the physical universe upon God.

All this does not run counter exactly to what Mr. Gibson maintains; but what it does imply is that the idea of a reconciliation between science and religion suggests to the modern reader notions which were unlikely to be present to the mind of Descartes. Mr. Gibson leaves the problem of reconciliation in a form that is too vague and indefinite. His interpretation does not serve to throw any special light upon his philosophical views and his method of treatment. It does not provide any clear explanation of why Descartes concerned himself with the self, God, and an external world with a criterion of truth and with the problem of method.

The impression which Mr. Gibson's discussion conveys is that of Descartes hopelessly entangled in the confusions of his own thought and laboriously but futilely struggling to clarify his position to his friends, critics, and opponents alike. If his aim were really to reconcile science and religion, the conclusion must be that he failed, for he himself does not seem to know where he stands, and in many of the controversial questions of theology he seems to have remarkably little interest. One cannot help feeling in the light of what Mr. Gibson says that against his own inclinations he has been dragged into theological disputes because of the implications of his theory, probably unnoticed by himself at first, but noted and pressed home by his critics. Confronted with the implications of his theory he seems at a loss. His views on theological matters lack definiteness, precision, and stability. The guarantee of human knowledge, which he finds in the existence and nature of the Divine Being, becomes likewise a bone of contention. Descartes himself, as Mr. Gibson well shows, has the greatest difficulty in meeting criticism of it. His opponents charged his argument with circularity; and though Mr. Gibson valiantly endeavours to show how he might have met the charge, the fact remains that he did not take any such line of defence. Once the hypothesis of the "wicked genius" is admitted, the demand for certainty becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, of fulfilment, for even intuition itself may be subject to the machinations of the evil sprite. If this result is to be avoided, something must be capable of being known with certainty, and something must be known of the extent of the influence of such a wicked spirit. What is or what is not on this matter "consistent with the whole tenour" of Descartes' philosophy must depend on the interpretation given to it and the view taken regarding the place to be assigned to the divine guarantee.

Mr. Gibson finds the source of Descartes' theological difficulties in his application of the method and concepts of science to metaphysical problems, and seems to imply that metaphysics requires a method different from that of science. Such a criticism raises the question of the place of Descartes' method in his philosophical system. Though he protests that the method he pursues is a purely personal one, it cannot remain so, since the method is based on reason, and reason is universal. If metaphysics is a rational inquiry, it must follow a rational method and the method of science. He declares also in the *Discourse on Method* that, provided a proper method is employed, there is nothing which can remain beyond the grasp of reason. His theological difficulties and his admissions suggest that his method is unable to fulfil his expectations; and its failure points not merely, as Mr. Gibson says, to the inapplicability of the method to metaphysical problems, but to a non-rationality of the universe as Descartes conceives rationality.

B. M. Laing.

Mysticism East and West: A Comparative Analysis of the Nature of Mysticism. By RUDOLF OTTO. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1932. Pp. xvii + 262. Price 16s.)

Professor Otto tells us in the preface to this important book how, fourteen years ago, on a visit to India, which involved the privilege of personal contact with the saints and sages of living Hinduism, he first "saw opening out before me the curious parallels between the feeling and experience of the Eastern and Western worlds." Asked at a later date to develop this subject in a course of lectures at an American college, he chose as types of Indian and European mysticism the great Hindu Achāryā Sankara, and the German Dominican, Meister Eckhart; and the studies then made form the substance of the present book.

Since mysticism is a form of life arising within every great religion, and tending towards Essential Being, it is to be expected that all its manifestations should have some common characteristics. But since it shares the tendency to variation which is implicit in all life, we must also be prepared for genuine diversities; resulting not merely from race, climate or cultus, but from fundamental differences of spirit and outlook. Thus on one hand the mysticism of Eckhart differs far more from that (*e.g.*) of his fellow Christian St. Francis than from the exalted monism of Sankara. On the other hand there are many close similarities between the Dominican and the Vedantist. The relation in which they stand to the traditional theology of their time and place is much the same: each develops his system by way of commentary on its sacred texts, each is at once theologian and philosopher—an inveterate highbrow in matters of the intellect, a humble contemplative in matters of the spirit. Each is beset by an intense metaphysical thirst. They share too a dislike of the three eternal types of pseudo-mysticism: the illuminism of the visionary, the emotional fervours of the devotee, and the nature-mysticism of the pious immanentist.

Though Professor Otto insists that the mysticism of Eckhart is rooted in "simple first-hand Christian experience," and his most daring speculations certainly take their departure from orthodox Thomist theology, most students would stoutly repudiate the suggestion that he was a typical representative of Christian mysticism in its richest and most balanced development. For the result of pushing to their logical conclusion the principles of the "exclusive" mystic, even though based upon the tradition of Christian Neoplatonism, is to bring him ever nearer to the thoroughgoing monism of the East in proportion to his alienation from the warmer, more homely, less consistent practice and experience of the West. Eckhart's more extreme positions, as given here, certainly seem to justify the critical attitude of the Church towards his teaching; for they involve the identification of self and God, not merely as to *esse* but also as to creativeness, and bear out Von Hügel's opinion, that "pure mysticism" is in the last resort little better than a disguised pantheism.

In all this, the fundamental similarity between the Hindu and the German is obvious. But there are other parallels of a more subtle and interesting kind. Whilst both are driven by their own ruthless logic to proclaim an impersonal Absolute—the "pure Godhead" of Eckhart, the Brahma of Sankara—both, because they are not only metaphysicians but also deeply religious souls, are obliged in the last resort to find room for something which corresponds with the personalist aspect of theism. The *Dominus Deus* of Eckhart qualifies metaphysical intuition with awestruck personal feeling. Isvara, the Creator Lord of Vedic religion, also brings the Unconditioned into a personal relation with the conditioned world of men. So East and

West are forced by experience into a twofold conception of spiritual reality; and this, not by way of a harsh opposition between natural and supernatural, but by an acknowledgment of the natural level as that from which the transcendental takes its rise—or better, perhaps, the matrix in which its secret is hid. For mysticism, whatever its method, deals with the concrete reality of God, and nothing else; and apart from this concrete reality has no meaning at all. Hence it is that the mystic can turn to his purpose and quicken with new meaning and new life all the doctrinal formulas of orthodox religion; embue them with a fresh and vivid realism.

All this is admirably demonstrated by Dr. Otto, and nowhere better than in the chapters which discuss the differences between Hindu and Christian spirituality. Both Sankara and Eckhart, as he points out, teach a doctrine of Salvation; they offer to man something lacking in the natural life. But whereas the Hindu sees beatitude in an escape from that natural life, the Christain looks rather to the fulfilment of life's unachieved purpose. The final question for Sankara is: How can I get endless bliss? The emphasis is on the self, and the ultimate opposition is between the fleeting and the changeless. The final question for Eckhart is: How can I achieve God's idea for me? Here the emphasis is on the fact and demand of the Transcendent; and the ultimate opposition is between holiness and sin. Full life is conceived by the Christian as an objective achievement; union with a God Who is at once Pure Act and Pure Good—and this means a deeply ethical conception of reality, and an activism which may change its form with the self's transcendence but is never done away. The "final state" for Sankara is one in which the redeemed spirit "leaves all activity and reposes in one-ness"; for Eckhart it is "not a mystical pleasure, but *agape*, a love of a kind which neither Plotinus nor Sankara mentions or knows."

EVELYN UNDERHILL.

Studies in the Nature of Facts. Lectures delivered before the Philosophical Union, University of California. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1932. Vol. 14. Pp. 232. Price $3.)

The annual publication of the lectures delivered before the Philosophical Union of the University of California at Berkeley benefits philosophers in other countries, who are thereby enabled to see how some topic of contemporary interest is being dealt with by a group of philosophers in contact with each other's thought. It is through such contact, combined with some degree of continuity of discussion, that philosophy may hope to advance. The subject of last year's lectures is one which should prove of interest to many philosophers in this country. Unfortunately, however, the title of this set of lectures is somewhat misleading; it suggests that the lectures will be concerned with the question, "What is a Fact?" But for the most part the lecturers have not concerned themselves with this interesting and difficult question. Instead, they have either discussed the distinction between the factual and the non-factual, or limited the discussion to some one or other *kind* of fact.

The substitution of *factual* for *fact* as the subject of discussion has led some of these lecturers to take *fact* as equivalent to *entity or object*, and *factual* as equivalent to *actual*. Thus Professor Lowenberg in his lecture ("The Factitiousness of Qualified Factuality") asks how are facts to be distinguished from fancies. He says that facts and fancies are "two separate sets of objects distinguishable by contrasted qualifying adjectives. Fancies are

private, impalpable, erratic, anomalous, incidental, negligible, incredible, elusive; facts are public, substantial, stable, normal, ubiquitous, irresistible, verifiable, extant" (p. 32). He suggests that these contrasted adjectives indicate one way "of fixing the boundary between the non-factual and the factual." It is not surprising that he reaches the conclusion that the factual is problematic. Professor Roelofs' lecture ("Factuality a Regulative Ideal") is concerned with the same problem. He says: "Factuality is simply another name for reality taken as that which, if found, would satisfy our cognitive and practical ideals" (p. 67). He contends that we ought not to try to identify "a certain class of entities as pre-eminently, absolutely, and without qualification *the* facts." On the contrary, he maintains, the facts are "what is independent of us in existence and character." Factuality, however, remains a regulative ideal. He explicitly asserts that he has "used indiscriminately as illustrations of facts, substances, qualities, relations, events, and these of any sort" (p. 84). Hence, he concludes that facts are "any entities which are certified or certifiable by an appropriate test to be genuinely what they are taken to be" (p. 91). Having adopted this position, Professor Roelofs never comes in sight of the distinction between *elements*, or *constituents*, and the *mode of their combination*.

The two most interesting lectures are those by Professor Dennes ("Fact and Interpretation") and by Professor Marhenke ("Fact and Descriptive Reference"). They agree in rejecting the identification of *fact* with *entity*, or *object*. Professor Dennes, however, does identify facts with what he calls "concrete events," that is, "charactered and related occurrences." He asserts that "to deny that facts are events, and events facts," leads to an "indefensible identification of fact and truth." He argues that facts cannot be distinguished from events on the ground that the former are unalterable or "abiding" and the latter not, since both facts and events are "unalterable," *i.e.* "are what they are" (p. 98). Those, however, who seek to distinguish facts from events would surely say that facts are *timeless*, not that they are *unalterable*. In the opinion of the present reviewer, for instance, it seems nonsense to say that facts are *alterable*, and equally nonsense to say that facts are *unalterable*. Professor Marhenke refuses altogether to identify facts with *any* kind of single entity; he insists that facts are complex, and maintains that "a thing is not a fact, in spite of the fact that a thing always has properties and stands in relations. A thing is always more than a bare particular, but it is at least a bare particular" (p. 125). The greater part of his lecture is concerned with the problem of the analysis of existential statements. His discussion of this problem is very interesting, but it is not easy to see what precisely is its connection with the topic with which his lecture begins.

Professor Henderson's lecture is entitled "An Approximate Definition of Fact," but it does not make clear what this approximate definition is. He makes use of a considerable number of translated symbols, which do not seem to clarify his exposition. The chief interest of this lecture lies in its insistence upon the importance of not being deceived by meaningless statements.

The opening lecture of the set, by Professor Pepper, is about what he calls "Middle-Sized Facts," and are what are often called "common-sense facts." An example would be afforded by perceptual facts. He is concerned to emphasize the importance of these facts for metaphysics, since they constitute "the material of experience." He urges philosophers to pay attention to such facts rather than to attempt to base their metaphysics upon an indubitable which they cannot discover. This recommendation has

much in its favour. But Professor Pepper's exposition of his thesis is a good deal encumbered by his long-drawn-out reference to "the three bears." This lecture hardly seems to fit into the topic selected for consideration. The same comment must be made with regard to Professor Lenzen's very interesting lecture on "The Metaphysical Import of Scientific Facts." His title indicates exactly the topic with which he deals. What he has to say is well worth consideration, but cannot be discussed here.

Professor Adams's lecture ("Fact and Perspective") comes fittingly at the end. He pays some attention to most of the preceding lectures and suggests certain conclusions. It is somewhat difficult to find out what Professor Adams himself understands by "fact." Making use of Professor Pepper's unfortunate parable of the three bears, he maintains that, like the middle-sized bear, "middle-sized facts, the data with which we start, grow up" (p. 229). It is extraordinarily difficult to see how *facts* can grow up and expand. This difficulty—which may be peculiar to the present reviewer—at least tends to suggest that whatever the enlightenment we derive from this volume of lectures may be, it is hardly likely to be an enlightenment with regard to "the nature of facts." But to have attempted to raise the problem is in itself worth while.

L. Susan Stebbing.

Peter Abailard. By J. G. Sikes, M.A., with a Preface by the Rev. A. Nairne, D.D. (Cambridge University Press. 1932. Pp. xvii + 282. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

Of theologians and thinkers of the earlier twelfth century two stand out conspicuous for their picturesqueness and also for their greatness, St. Bernard and Peter Abailard, though I could wish that Mr. Sikes had kept to the accepted English spelling of that well-known name. Both may be classed with what Shane Leslie calls sublime failures, for St. Bernard died soon after the collapse of the Crusade which he had preached, Abailard soon after his condemnation at Sens which St. Bernard had procured, but not until he had been reconciled to the saint who had ruined his career. Both, being of the Church, thought with it, but very differently. St. Bernard, mistrusting speculation, relies solely on tradition for what he teaches, is content to accept it as it stands, and of its symbols to seek the moral application. Abailard points out that what tradition teaches is often contradictory, that its text must be critically examined and its sources inquired into before its authority can be accepted, and that, when accepted, it has to be interpreted philosophically before its significance can be appreciated and its teaching be apperceived by a thinking mind. Between two men so divergent in their way of looking at things a clash was inevitable.

Mr. Sikes has written an excellent book, a book that was much needed, first because some of the most important of Abailard's writings, notably his logical treatises, have only recently become accessible to the reading public, and, secondly, because round his tragic life, the dates of incidents and the dates of publications, a vast literature has grown up which is scattered and not at all easy to get at. Mr. Sikes has been at great pains to collate and digest this, with admirable results. In the main body of his book and in its two appendices we have a full account of Abailard's teaching, considered both in its historical setting and in its relation to the theology of our own day, and a discussion of the findings of scholars in regard to detailed points of greater or less importance and interest. A chronological

summary might with advantage have been added, perhaps, especially as Mr. Sikes has divided his account of Abailard's life into two portions, one of which occurs at the beginning and the other at the end of his book.

To a discussion of contemporary views as to the relation of reason to faith the author rightly devotes a whole chapter, for it is basic. The maxim *Credo ut intelligam* inspires not only Anselm and Abailard, but all the genuine thinking that took place in their age. The Chartres School and the Victorines, no less than individual thinkers, such as Anselm and Abailard, were agreed in holding that Christian doctrines are incapable of demonstrative proof: understanding is conditioned by belief. But they are all convinced that understanding is possible, that Christian doctrines are rational and logical, and that it is the business of reason to elaborate them philosophically in such a way that they shall be understood. Nor is it only, or even mainly, for apologetic purposes that this elaboration is to take place. In their view, an understanding of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, and of the Atonement is integral to Christian life. Abailard's theory of the Trinity is very different from Anselm's, and his again from Richard of St. Victor's, but they are all attempts to show not only what the Trinity is, but what it must be, and in Abailard's case this necessitarianism is extended to all existent things.

The extent of this rationalizing movement is scarce realized by Mr. Sikes, who confesses to a bias against Intellectualism, yet it is essential to an understanding of the revolution in Christian thought which took place in the thirteenth century. The author's sympathies would seem to be with St. Bernard rather than with Abailard, and at times perhaps his judgments are a little harsh. Is it, for instance, quite fair to say of a man who tried to envisage divine action, not only in the Church's thinking but also in that of the world at large, to say that he was learned in patristic case-law but had "no real appreciation of the historic experience of the Church"? And can one with truth say of Fulbert, the man who had Abailard mutilated, that "his reprisal was indeed justified"? But if the picturesqueness of Abailard suffers somewhat from his biographer's puritan pen and his genius fails at times to be fully appreciated owing to a lack of sympathy with Platonism, the author has done full justice to the pioneer work which Abailard did in the sphere both of Logic and of Ethics, and has brought out with especial clearness the ethical basis of his peculiar theories.

L. J. W.

Schopenhauer: His Life and Philosophy. (Revised edition.) By HELEN ZIMMERN. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1932. Pp. 191. Price 7s. 6d.)

Since most philosophers spend most of their waking hours in thinking, their biographies have rarely much interest, and are only worth the writing when they provide, in terms of native constitution and modifying circumstance, a key to the difficult, perplexing, or merely strange elements in the thought of their subjects. By this canon the present book is fully justified. Schopenhauer's life, though devoid of exciting incident, was full of peculiarities that have evident correspondence in his writings, and Miss Zimmern is careful to point them out. Just because—to borrow a laconic remark of Faguet about Kant—nothing much happened to Schopenhauer except the possession of genius, she is obliged to depend on apparent trivialities; but since even to trivial events a genius often reacts like a genius, she has been able by the skill of her selection to convey a cumulative impression of what sort of mind Schopenhauer had.

The life is well told. On a few points criticism may be offered. The two accounts of Schopenhauer's personal appearance (pp. 19 and 83) do not tally. Although his attempt to become the translator into English of Kant is mentioned, nothing is said of his project to translate Hume into German. Moreover, his ability for the former task is, I suspect, overrated; some specimen of his written English would have been welcome to help us to judge the high estimate given. I doubt, too, whether Miss Zimmern is right in saying (p. 113) that it was his knowledge of English that gave him access to the ancient Indian writings in which he found an echo of his own pessimistic voluntarism; according to Wallace, he read them in Latin and German versions. On the other hand, Miss Zimmern discusses the central issue, the repellent side of Schopenhauer's character, with insight; her explanation of his strained relations with his mother, her palliation of his enormous egotism, and her separation of his misanthropy from anything that can be called malevolent, is admirably pondered and admirably expressed.

Miss Zimmern is not concerned with Schopenhauer's philosophical reading or with how he differed from his philosophical predecessors and contemporaries. To do this would have entailed an excursion into technicalities, and one of the most striking features of the book is the success with which she conveys the main contentions of Schopenhauer in lay and lucid language, a feature that is itself Schopenhauerian. The outline of the philosophical system is ostensibly confined to the last two chapters, but many well-chosen quotations interspersed in the biographical part prepare the reader's mind.

The book, sympathetic yet critical, and excellently composed, will serve as an attractive introduction for students of literature to one of the finest writers of the German language, and will help students of philosophy to approach his thought with more patience and understanding. Incidentally, the author merits our respect and congratulation for the fortune of time and tenacity of interest that have enabled her to revise and re-present a book first published by her fifty-six years ago.

T. E. Jessop.

The Limits of Purpose and Other Essays. By J. L. Stocks. (London: Ernest Benn Ltd. 1932. Pp. 303. Price 12s. 6d.)

It is a great pleasure to record the appearance of these admirable essays in book form. They are admirable both for their philosophical acumen and the dignity and ease of their style, and everyone will welcome the opportunity of studying them without having to search through the files of the various learned periodicals in which they originally appeared.

The essays, if divided according to their subject-matter, fall naturally into two main and two subsidiary groups. The first four are ethical, and the chief thread running through them is a criticism of the notion of purpose as a fundamental principle of morality. Any attempt to give an account of morality in terms of purpose, according to Professor Stocks, can only end in leaving out the essential feature that makes it morality. The arguments for the view are put with force and ability. But I must confess that they leave me still dissatisfied, because, as it seems to me, Professor Stocks tends continually to speak of the notion of purpose as if it were purely a question of means and ends, in the sense that the end is some final result to be attained, quite distinct from the means adopted to attain it. Yet surely few, if any, thinkers have seriously attempted to present morality in such a form. Neither Aristotle's Eudaimonia nor Mill's Pleasure can be represented as a "far-off divine event" to which all particular actions are *merely* means.

On the contrary, they are continually being realized in part in numberless particular actions. Even in ordinary speech we recognize the same thing. If we say of someone that his (or her) only purpose in life is "to have a good time," having a good time is not regarded as a single result aimed at, distinguishable and separable from the particular activities in which it consists. Professor Stocks seems at times ready to recognize this point. But his recognition is not consistent, with the result that his discussion seems to obscure the real points at issue which divide ethical thinkers.

Of the subsidiary groups, the one on political thought is a class with only one member, the essay on Representation. This is a most illuminating study of political representation, including a trenchant and convincing criticism of Mr. Cole's theories on the subject. The second subsidiary group is the logical, containing two articles, both equally interesting in their respective ways. The one, On Being Logical, will have the wider appeal, the other, on The Unity of Thought, raises deeper and more difficult questions.

We come now to the second main group, and the largest in size of all, the articles on some aspect or other of Greek philosophy. Two of them, on Epicurean Induction and The Composition of Aristotle's *Politics*, are of a more specialized interest than the rest. The latter, however, has one point of general interest, in that it suggests strongly that a patchwork compilation like the *Politics* is a most unfortunate choice for an elementary text-book of Greek political thought. In my own experience I have not often found it made any appeal to students. A more general, and in my judgment rather too severe a criticism of Aristotle's ethical views is contained in the article on The Golden Mean. Justice, however, is fully done to Aristotle in the admirable little piece of psychological observation recorded in the final article on Courage.

There remain only two articles, concerned with the interpretation of passages in Plato's *Republic*, the one on the Tripartite Soul, and the other on the Divided Line. The former is full of suggestive ideas, though I think some of the conclusions are open to criticism. The latter, which is the earliest in date in the book, is also, in its way, one of the most important, for it really marked a turning-point in the discussion of this much-disputed passage. Professor Stocks had the striking and original idea of examining what Plato actually said before drawing conclusions about what he must have meant. And in consequence it is not too much to say that all subsequent discussion of the question, if it is to be fruitful at all, must take its start from this article.

G. C. Field.

Plato and His Dialogues. By G. Lowes Dickinson. (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1931. Pp. 228. Price 6s.)

Aristotle's Psychology of Conduct. By A. K. Griffin, Ph.D. (London: Williams & Norgate Ltd. 1931. Pp. 186. Price 10s. 6d.)

The Platonic Epistles. Translated with Introduction and Notes by J. Harwood. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1932. Pp. xii + 244. Price 15s.)

Here we have three books on Greek Philosophy, each of them entirely different in character from the others. Mr. Lowes Dickinson's book is a reprint, with some additions, of a series of broadcast talks. It explains the historical background of Plato's work, the character of his dialogues, and the importance of Socrates in his life. The exposition of his views is mainly occupied with the political and social aspect. A few hints of his treatment of

more ultimate problems are given in the last chapter. Nearly half the book is occupied by well-chosen quotations from Plato's own works (in Jowett's translation), with passages also from Thucydides and Aristophanes. The book is naturally meant for those with no previous knowledge of the subject, and for such an audience it is very well adapted. It is, as one would expect, beautifully written and a pleasure to read. It might, however, be as well to warn anyone who is inspired by it to serious study of Plato, that there is a good deal in him very much more difficult than anything they will find here.

Mr. Griffin's book is a thesis presented for the degree of Ph.D. in the University of Toronto. It is a painstaking piece of work, in which Aristotle's expressions of opinion on the subject are brought together and arranged under the appropriate heads: Parts of the Soul, Pleasure and Pain, Human Instincts and Emotions, The Formation of Character, and so on. It is valuable mainly as a collection of material. Mr. Griffin's own essays in interpretation are not very illuminating.

The third book is on a different level altogether. It is the most complete and thorough study that we have in English of the Platonic Epistles, and shows high qualities of scholarship and learning. Little more than a quarter of the whole is occupied by the translation, the rest being devoted to a long introduction and to the notes. A large part of the introduction is given to a careful historical account of affairs in Sicily and Plato's visits there. There is also a discussion of the genuineness of the Epistles, and valuable notes on the lost letters of Timonides, which Mr. Harwood believes to have been genuine, the Socratic Epistle, which he, of course, recognizes as apocryphal, and the literary style of the Epistles. The notes are mainly concerned with historical questions and with points of language: there is only a little in the way of philosophical interpretation of the passages in the Second and Seventh Epistles.

On critical and historical questions Mr. Harwood is always sane and sensible. He accepts all the letters as genuine, with the exception, of course, of the First, and possibly the Twelfth. His views will not, of course, be accepted by everyone on all subjects. I do not myself, for instance, find him perfectly convincing in his treatment of the Second Letter. But this is only to be expected. He himself is careful to warn us against expecting demonstrable certainty in these matters. The translation is readable and reliable. In one or two passages I have felt that it might be possible to get a rather better effect by breaking up a long Greek sentence into shorter English ones. But that is largely a matter of taste.

Altogether, this is a very valuable work. Mr. Harwood has already put us into his debt by his translation of the *Epinomis*, and the debt is increased by the present book.

G. C. Field.

Fundamentals of Ethics: an Introduction to Moral Philosophy. By W. M. Urban. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1931. Pp. x + 476. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book belongs definitely to the text-book or manual class. It has, throughout, as the Preface indicates, the needs of the university student in mind, and represents "the minimum of an introductory course in Ethics." It attempts, therefore, to "cover the ground"—to use a phrase popular with university teachers—and to give a general conspectus of the whole subject.

After an introductory outline, the discussion begins with the consideration

of a particular practical moral problem. It is a very well-chosen problem, one that actually arose, and that led to great controversy at the time. The arguments used on one side or the other in the case are skilfully analysed in order to show how they lead on to various different types of moral theory. These are labelled and classified, Formalistic, Teleological Hedonistic Individualistic, Teleological Perfectionist Universalistic, and so on. Then certain typical representatives of the various views, such as Kant, are summed up and discussed. This seems to me, on the whole, the weakest part of the book. Such brief summaries and discussions of important views are necessarily misleading: potted Kant is not really Kant at all. And we have rightly come to be distrustful of dividing up and labelling under headings such subtle and individual things as philosophical theories.

We then get the largest section of the book under the heading of Moral Practice. Here we have interesting discussions of practical moral problems, in which the chief divergent views are adequately and impartially indicated. It is interesting here to contrast Professor Urban's rather advanced views on the right of property with his extremely conservative attitude on sex problems. Here, as elsewhere, he will seem to some a little too apt to appeal uncritically to the "ancient wisdom of the race," and "the healthy common sense of mankind," which may on occasions only be other names for prejudice against unfamiliar ideas.

The last section, under the title of Moral Philosophy, deals with the more ultimate postulates of morality, such as Freedom and the existence of God. Here again, though the discussion necessarily remains rather close to the surface all the time, the main issues are well and skilfully indicated.

Many of us may wonder whether a general outline of this kind is the right way of introducing students to Philosophy at all. But, granting its desirability, few would doubt that Professor Urban has done it extremely well.

G. C. Field.

The Essentials of Biology. By James Johnstone, D.Sc. (London: Edward Arnold & Co. 1932. Pp. xv + 328. Price 16s. net.)

One can imagine few more difficult undertakings than to set out briefly and systematically the main results of general biology and the chief theoretical conclusions which can be drawn therefrom. To attempt this with any hope of success the author must be both biologist and philosopher, and he must have more than a passing acquaintance with modern physical concepts. Professor Johnstone, we all know, possesses these qualifications, and his bold attempt to present "a balanced account of the theoretical matter of animal biology" within a reasonable compass has resulted in a stimulating book packed tight with ideas. Not that it is easy to read. The treatment is necessarily condensed, and the non-technical reader will lack as a rule the background of knowledge which would enable him fully to appreciate Professor Johnstone's somewhat aphoristic expositions. Nevertheless he will learn a great deal from the book—not least a vivid impression of the complexity and difficulty of the problems involved. It would have been well, in our opinion, if the author had given the non-expert reader some guidance as to supplementary study, and in particular had indicated the main sources which he has used in the preparation of this book; no references at all are given. The professional biologist will as a rule be familiar with most of the theories here discussed, but some help to him also, particularly in the fields of philosophy and psychology, would not have come amiss. To the professional

reader the book may be thoroughly recommended; he is not likely to agree with all of Professor Johnstone's views, but it will do him good to match his specialist knowledge and opinions against the well-reasoned, comprehensive and independent treatment of general problems provided by Professor Johnstone.

The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the Individual, the second with the Race. In the first part we are told how organisms differ from other natural objects, and we are given a rapid summary of animal structure and the functioning of the body; then comes a vivid treatment of animal behaviour, to which we shall return in a moment. The second part deals with reproduction and growth, development, heredity and evolution.

It will be apparent that to review the book in detail would take up far too much space here. We can safely say that the main facts are stated clearly and simply, and that the treatment of theories is judicious and critical. This is particularly so in his discussion of evolutionary fact and evolutionary theory. There *is* no adequate theory of evolution at the present day; against all the theories suggested there must still be placed a large question mark.

We propose, in order to give a fuller taste of the book's quality, to consider in outline Professor Johnstone's views about animal behaviour, and about development. He points out that the study of behaviour has been too much a laboratory subject, and too little attention has been paid to the real life of animals, to their natural history, to their ecological relations. Tropisms, taxis, chain-reflexes, "conditioning," all smell of the laboratory, and form an inadequate basis for the interpretation of the normal life of animals. Behaviour must be studied from a psycho-biological point of view if we are to make it really intelligible. We must recognize that the actions of animals show tendency towards an end, whether the end is consciously foreseen or not; we must regard them as monads, having each its own world of sense or perception, having each its own "point of view." Only by adopting this psychological standpoint can we adequately describe behaviour, and include these general and obvious characteristics which the analytic-summative method of the physiologist and the hard-shell behaviourist must necessarily ignore. "The motions of animals that we call their behaviour are therefore to be considered as the manifestations of urges, psychical in nature, though they may not rise into consciousness, and having 'purpose' in the sense that they are tendential in a direction in which a material-energetic system, as such, is not tendential. They operate so as to confer power over the immediate environment" (p. 139). Learning, experience, retention of the past, also come into the story, and they cannot be explained on any inorganic analogy. Professor Johnstone is inclined to carry over this psycho-biological conception into the field of embryonic development. He shows clearly that a mechanistic interpretation of development is in principle impossible; he accepts in its main lines the unanswerable criticism of that view put forward by Driesch. He sees most hope for the future in the mnemic hypothesis of Samuel Butler, Hering, Semon and others, according to which the ovum is continuous with its ancestors and retains an unconscious memory of the racial method of development. The ovum, on this view, "develops in the specific manner that it does because a very long series of individuals, with which it is organically continuous in time, have developed in this specific manner, and the practical knowledge, or ability to perform the embryogeny, is much the same thing as, for instance, the knowledge that a bird has of assembling natural material the first time that it builds a nest—this nest-building being, of course, only the completion of the development of the sexually mature animal. A *habit* has become established in the course of the

innumerable individual developments in a race, and the recurrence of specific embryogenies expresses this habit. The habit has its basis in the 'unconscious memories' of the individuals of the race, that is, in the retention, in some way, of past experiences in a psychic substratum" (p. 220). This is of course essentially a psycho-biological conception, though Hering and Semon attempted to give it a mechanistic formulation. Whether it is in fact the basic explanation of development and heredity is one of the biggest problems for the future to solve.

E. S. Russell.

The Theory and Practice of Modern Government. By Herman Finer, D.Sc. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1932. Two vols. Pp., Vol. I, xiv + 740; Vol. II, vii + 814. Price 42s.)

Dr. Finer steals much of his reviewer's thunder in the Preface to his book. For in explaining what the book is about—"State Activity, Constitutions, Federalism, Political Parties, Parliaments, The Executive and the Civil Service in the Modern State"—he holds that these subjects "were never before treated with such care," and that "even where the topics have been treated before, the present study contains something new, be it in facts or interpretation, on every page."

No one will cavil at Dr. Finer's own judgment of his work, although its tone is somewhat unusual and likely to be misunderstood. For his claims are not exaggerated. The novelty of interpretation may not be quite so certain as the "something new in facts." But one may discount this in a general appreciation of the book. For as a whole it is a brilliant essay of its kind. Dr. Finer's grasp of complicated detail is simply amazing. His observations and generalizations are invariably suggestive and illuminating. He writes with admirable clearness, impartiality and restraint; and his volumes contain a wealth of learning and accurate information not to found elsewhere in so compact and useful a form.

While, however, it is impossible to withhold one's admiration for Dr. Finer's achievement, one cannot but think that the final impression it will leave in the mind of the reader will be one of dissatisfaction. In our opinion, this feeling proceeds from the incompatibility of the ultimate object which Dr. Finer has in view with the method by which he seeks to attain it. For he tries to reach a single and comprehensive view of modern government by a method which is strictly inductive or scientific.

In a sense Dr. Finer cannot be justifiably criticized for attempting to review "the whole apparatus of government." This work must be done periodically in the interest of political theory. But there are obvious reasons for thinking that the time is not ripe for such a survey, unless one restricts the term "modern" to a general and more or less closed period of political history. The greater part of Dr. Finer's volumes falls within the classification of political history and forms an invaluable contribution to this branch of political science. But his analysis of the development of the institutional embodiment of modern government is also pursued to the actual moment of writing, and the scientific generalizations in which his analysis issues are intended to cover the events and tendencies of post-war years. Dr. Finer believes that his generalizations are so deeply rooted that they are capable of dealing with any contingency. For instance, the foundation of his study is the political activity of four democracies—Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States—and he does not think that this is too restricted a

basis for generalization for all government, or that what has happened in Italy or Russia prevent his judgments from having a universal application. But we venture to say that these and similar events have so profoundly disturbed the continuity of the modern period that scientific generalization at the moment is either premature or only possible in the most general way.

One is reinforced in this opinion by the preliminary conditions which Dr. Finer lays down for the achievement of his object. There are, he says, certain conditions "under which all government, be it local or central, unitary or federal . . . democratic or autocratic, labours." These conditions refer to the needs which all men have of the State and which are given particular validity in the State—the need for stability and order, regularity and associated effort, etc. But granting everything Dr. Finer has to say about the conditions under which all government operates, it is extremely doubtful if these conditions, taken by themselves, can carry one any distance towards a comprehensive and comparative view of modern government. All of them are much too general to afford a satisfactory basis of comparison for the actual uses which different countries make of them. For instance, to know that the appropriate material resources must be available in order that the State may be successful does little to explain the uniformities, much less the differences, between the particular pieces of mechanism used for this purpose by Great Britain, France and the other countries upon which Dr. Finer draws for his material.

The same remark applies to Dr. Finer's use of the comparative method which is a special adaptation of his general scientific approach. Unlike such writers as Lowell and Bryce, Dr. Finer treats the forms and institutions of government not "country by country" but "subject by subject—each set of institutions is taken for all countries together." Dr. Finer realizes that there is a disadvantage in such a dissection of separate institutions. But "against the loss of the all-dimensional relative sense" he places "the great gain of analysis and immediate comparison: clearer revelation of the uniformities of human nature in government."

While there is much to be said for this particular use of the comparative method, one cannot but feel that it involves a greater sacrifice than Dr. Finer is prepared to admit. In general, its defect is that it begins by eliminating something fundamental which it itself can never recover, and is apt to end, in consequence, by regarding what is omitted as of slight importance. In the case in point, what Dr. Finer leaves out of account are the several mentalities—the "spirit" of the organization—of the countries with which he deals. It is true that he realizes the importance of the psychological and environmental bases of government. But his desire to exhibit the value of a purely scientific approach involves him in the use of an equally "scientific" political psychology, *i.e.* a psychology which is only concerned with the *uniformities* of political behaviour. But such psychology is applicable only up to a point; and there is ample cause for believing that this point is largely inadequate to explain the finenesses and complexities of political conduct. Thus many of Dr. Finer's instances of the superiority of one country's political institutions over another's only exist in the mind of the abstract observer. They have no attraction for the nationals of the so-called inferior countries; and he is a very convinced rationalist who would say that this lack of appreciation is due to mere ignorance or prejudice.

There is just one condition under which the things for which Dr. Finer stands—belief in the uniformities of human nature in government, use of the comparative method, insistence upon the relationship between politics and economics, etc.—are possible and valid. The condition is that modern

government is not merely to be regarded as but is in fact a mechanism. For if all governments are mechanisms, their impersonal nature as mechanisms makes it legitimately possible to compare and contrast them. Under this condition the all-dimensional differences between nations can be omitted; the superiority of this or that country's political machinery can be allowed; the institutions of Fascist Italy can be aligned with those of democratic Britain; and, in particular, a sure relationship can be established between industry and government because of the stress which both these interests lay upon organization and efficiency.

Dr. Finer accepts this condition both on historical grounds and as the result of observation. It is the central feature of his doctrine, being his idea of what the State should be as well as the basis for his analysis of government. The essence of the State is "good management"; its end is "a machine of the appropriate complexity and sensitiveness," etc.

There is a sense in which no one can deny the force of Dr. Finer's "analogy" or its basis in fact. The modern State is fast becoming a mechanism. But how far this development is to be viewed as an advance is open to considerable doubt. This doubt is expressed by Dr. Finer himself in his concluding observations. There he asks himself: What can political science predict of the probable future of modern government? His answer is: "A deep misgiving; only by a singular good fortune will modern government prevent social catastrophe and avert its own ruin." The reason is that in modern government we have a highly complicated and fragile machine superexisting upon a citizen-body which is quite incapable of understanding, much less of guiding it. Consequently, if we are to avoid "the possibility of collision, destruction and terror," "everything depends upon education. If this fails, nothing else will succeed."

These conclusions of Dr. Finer are responsible for the feeling of dissatisfaction which, we suggested, is bound to arise in the minds of his readers—a feeling which is intensified by the brilliance of his own analysis. But we are not alone in possessing this feeling. As we have just indicated, it infects Dr. Finer himself. Indeed, in his case, it is scarcely to be distinguished from pessimism. Dr. Finer would entirely attribute this feeling to the facts of the situation. But there is another and more pertinent reason. This is suggested by Dr. Finer in another of the questions he puts to himself in his concluding chapter. "Is good fortune," he asks, "the last word of so much science?" We venture to say that it is. "So much science," as well as the actual facts, have brought Dr. Finer to the threshold of political pessimism. Just as the application of the physcial sciences to economic and political life produced the gulf between the mind of the ordinary citizen and the forces that rule him which is making a sham of democracy, so the application of the strictly scientific method to politics is responsible for the drastic and hopeless alternative with which Dr. Finer faces us—"collision, destruction and terror," or a nation of "abnormally capable experts." But this alternative, or that of Good-fortune and Science, or the association of such opposites as Mechanism and Education, would not arise, or at least to the same degree, were it not for the needs of the strictly scientific standpoint. For in order to perform its work of comparison and to meet the demands for a comprehensive view of government, this standpoint not only maintains that government is mechanism and organization (which it undoubtedly is), but proceeds to regard it as mere mechanism lacking any purpose whatever. But while science requires this condition, as Dr. Finer rightly points out, there is another approach to politics which considers that government is also an affair of human minds and wills for whom efficiency is merely one of the

values by which government should be judged and maintained. This second approach need not be mystical, as Dr. Finer suggests that it must. It is no less rational than the scientific; it is simply more human and, accordingly, more hopeful.

Were Dr. Finer's thesis only an exercise in the application of the scientific method to politics, one's sense of dissatisfaction with it could easily be dissipated. In its place it is impossible to quarrel with the scientific attitude. As practised by Dr. Finer himself, it is in every way to be preferred to the method of the "political reformer" who confuses amateur statesmanship with political theory. But to be in its right place, science must be supplemented by philosophy, efficiency by other values, what is by what ought to be, and the "scientific" by a less narrowly rationalistic psychology. Unfortunately, Dr. Finer believes that the scientific is the only proper approach to politics. Thus we are reluctantly forced to confess that some of his own pessimism (for it is nothing less than this) infects our appreciation of his work.

A. K. White.

Philosophical Analysis. By James Burnham and Philip Wheelwright. (New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1932. Pp. v + 462. Price 2.75.)

This book, intended to be an introduction to Philosophy, is concerned with the question "What is Philosophy?" According to the authors, Philosophy consists of (1) a technique, and (2) an attitude. As a technique it is the business of Philosophy to discover, and where possible to relate, the ultimate ideas and postulates underlying the different special sciences. In so far as the former is achieved Philosophy is critical, while to the latter is due its speculative character. Criticism alone would result in untenable scepticism, speculation alone in a similar dogmatism. "Dialectic" is the name given by the authors to the method of critical analysis and cautious speculation. Special difficulties besetting the method are briefly discussed; perhaps the chief of these are to avoid (1) hypostasizing factors used as tools, and (2) attaching pre-eminent importance to any one set of ideas to the exclusion of others. The use sometimes made of electrons is given as an example of (1), while (2) is illustrated by the extension of the mechanical explanations of physics to psychology or biology. Undoubtedly it is correct that different scientists select only those aspects of a concrete situation relevant to their particular science, but it is less certain that there is no one set of ultimate factors to be discovered in the situation; yet, if I have understood Mr. Burnham and Mr. Wheelwright, this is their belief. According to them, the decision that any one set of factors is ultimate is an emotive rather than a reflective decision. This may not be the case; hence, while I should agree with the authors that Philosophy requires an open mind and may therefore be said to involve an attitude as well as a technique, and should agree, moreover, that the systems of certain philosophers have been the result of emotive rather than reflective decision, I should not agree that there are no ultimate terms to be reached by critical analysis.

It is correctly, I think, assumed by the authors that logic is relevant to dialectic. This assumption explains why Chapters II to V are concerned with logical topics. It is to be regretted that Chapters II and III, which are about *meaning*, are not more clear. They seem to me to be the weakest in the book, and if, as seems to be the case, they are intended for the beginner in logic, it is doubtful if they could enlighten, and probable that they would

confuse. For instance, it is surely a mistake to use the same word "meaning" for such different factors as (1) that for which a word stands, (2) subjective accompaniments of understanding, and (3) perceptual objects; yet these are three only of the several factors which are classed together as *meanings*. There is thus a failure to indicate any difference between the relation of a sensible object to a perceptual object and that of a word to its referend, except that the former is said to be a "reflexive" sign because it is "part of what it means." Thus the only explanation offered of these two very different kinds of "meaning" depends upon the highly doubtful hypothesis that sensible objects are parts of perceptual objects.

Chapter IV contains a fairly straightforward treatment of the logical structure of certain kinds of arguments, while in Chapter V there is a brief, yet clear as far as it goes, exposition of what are the more important characteristics of reasoning concerning matters of fact.

The chapters in Part II which deal with some of the applications of the principles of dialectic, as described above, are all interesting.

E. M. WHETNALL.

The Mind in Action. A Study of Motives and Values. By A. CAMPBELL GARNETT, Litt.D. (London: Nisbet and Co., and Cambridge University Press. 1931. Pp. xiv + 226. Price 5s. net.)

This little book is a discussion of the phenomena of motivation at all levels of the mental life from a point of view which the author describes as that of 'Self-Psychology.' Whether this point of view is a consistent and unified one throughout is open to some doubt, but in any case the whole discussion is undeniably interesting, and in the later chapters on 'Moral Conduct,' 'Truth and Beauty,' and 'Morality and Religion' valuable. On the other hand, it must be confessed that the earlier chapters, in which the author discusses appetites and instincts, feeling and emotion, habits and sentiments, are rather disappointing. In these chapters McDougall's influence is plainly the dominant one, in spite of the fact that the author appears to differ from McDougall on several not unessential points. Unfortunately, however, the psychological analysis of the fundamental phenomena of human motivation and human behaviour lacks clarity and definiteness, and few psychologists working in this field will find any real contribution to the difficult and intricate problems involved.

Objection must also be taken to a certain looseness of expression which the author might easily have avoided. It is really astonishing to find a professed psychologist almost on successive pages speaking of consciousness as synonymous with mental life (p. 2), hypostatizing it by saying that consciousness "*must be* active" (p. 3), that it "must have an object that is ever new" (p. 4), that it "is constantly engaged in ever-changing active expression of itself" (p. 5), and describing it in between as a process. What does the author mean by 'consciousness'? To us it is simply a character belonging to certain events or processes.

While such looseness of thought and expression is apt to make the psychologist impatient of the whole discussion of fundamental phenomena, the value of the discussion in the later chapters is such that the book may be warmly recommended. The author is much happier when he goes on to discuss moral, æsthetic, and religious values.

JAMES DREVER.

The Education of Jeremy Bentham. By CHARLES WARREN EVERETT, Instructor in English, Columbia University. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1931. Pp. xxii + 216. Price 16s. 6d. net.)

Mr. Everett has many claims on the gratitude of those who are at all interested in Jeremy Bentham. For a century, or more, masses of Bentham's manuscripts (about 75,000 pages) lay neglected and mouldering at University College, London. Extremely few people showed even a fleeting interest in them, and these were mostly foreigners. At long last a good fairy appeared in the person of Mr. Everett, who energetically devoted several years to the examination and cataloguing of the voluminous material, and to the editing of some of it. Mr. Everett's familiarity with all the available material eminently qualifies him to act as Bentham's biographer. The present volume, although it is not exactly a full-dress biography, is really more comprehensive than the title is likely to suggest to most readers. The average English student of philosophy knows rather little of Bentham. Historians of Ethics have a way of treating his "felicific calculus" in a perfunctory manner, which shows more subtlety than insight. Leslie Stephen was an exception in this respect. His *English Utilitarians* shows a truer appreciation of Bentham's real aims and achievements. More recently Professor Halévy's book, entitled *Philosophical Radicalism,* casts a new light on Bentham's political philosophy. And now we have Mr. Everett's biographical study, which gives the most lifelike portrait of Bentham that has yet been published. Anyone who will take the trouble to read the three works just mentioned will have an adequate understanding of the life and work of Bentham. The recent celebration of the centenary of his death must have awakened a certain amount of interest in Bentham even among people who had heard little or nothing of him before. Mr. Everett's book may be commended to them as likely not only to satisfy their curiosity, but also to amuse them in no small degree.

A. WOLF.

Books received also:—

N. V. THADANI. *The Garden of the East.* Karachi: Bharat Publishing House. 1932. Pp. 127.

E. E. RICHARDSON, B.S., M.S., M.D., Ph.D. *Organic Idealism.* The Society for Philosophical Inquiry of Washington, D.C. 1932. Pp. 33.

Modern India Thinks. A Symposium compiled by K. R. LUCKMIDAS. (Foreword by K. H. Vakil, B.A., LL.B.) Bombay: D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1932. Pp. xix + 298. Rs. 6.

C. M. ATTLEE. *Philosophy in Educational Theory.* Birmingham: Cornish Bros. Ltd. 1932. Pp. 172. 5s.

HUGO BERGMANN. *The Philosophy of Solomon Maimon* (in Hebrew). Jerusalem: At the University Press. 1932. Pp. 180. 3s.

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F. W. FELKIN, M.A. *A Word-Book of Metaphysics.* Oxford: at the University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1932. Pp. xiv + 51. 3s. 6d.

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J. C. CHATTERJI, J.C. (Introduction by John Dewey, Ph.D., LL.D.) *India's Outlook on Life.* New York: Kailas Press. 1931. Pp. 75. $2.

Various. *College of the Pacific Publications in Philosophy.* Vol. I. 1932. College of the Pacific, Stockton, California. Pp. 157.

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JAMES CLARK MCKERROW, M.B. *An Introduction to Pneumatology.* London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1932. Pp. 179. 6s.

G. C. Field, M.A.,B.Sc. *Prejudice and Impartiality.* (Monographs of Philosophy and Psychology.) London: Methuen & Co. 1932. Pp. vii + 116. 2s. 6d.

C. A. MACE. *The Psychology of Study.* (Monographs of Philosophy and Psychology.) London: Methuen & Co. 1932. Pp. viii + 96. 2s. 6d.

Seneca's Letters to Lucilius. Tr. E. Phillips Barker, D.Litt. London: Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1932. Vol. I. Pp. xxvi + 324; Vol. II. Pp. 334. 12s. 6d. two vols.

D. S. SARMA, M.A. *The Kathopanishad and the Gita.* Triplican, Madras: M. R. Seshan. 1932. Pp. 99. Rs. 1.

WALTER GOODNOW EVERETT. *The Uniqueness of Man.* (University of California Publications in Philosophy.) Berkeley: University of California Press. 1932. Pp. 27. 30 cents.

G. H. MEAD. *The Philosophy of the Present.* (Ed. A. E. Murphy; Preface by John Dewey.) (Paul Carus Foundation Lectures, III.) London: Open Court Publishing Co. 1932. Pp. xl + 199. 15s.

KURT F. LEIDECKER, M.A., Ph.D. *Josiah Royce and Indian Thought.* New York: Kailas Press. 1931. Pp. 32. 50 cents.

PHILIPPE DEVAUX. *Lotze et son Influence sur la Philosophie anglo-saxonne.* Bruxelles: Maurice Lamertin. 1932. Pp. 48. Frs. 8.

Various. *Recherches Philosophiques.* (Publiées par A Koyré H.-CH. Puech A. Spaier.) Paris: Boivin et Cie. 1932. Pp. viii + 518. Frs. 60.

HENRI BROCHER. *Le Myth du Héros et la Mentalité Primitive.* Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1932. Pp. 124. Frs. 12.

Y. DE LA BRIÈRE, S.J. *La Communauté des Puissances.* Paris: G. Beauchesne et Fils. 1932. Pp. 391. 36 frs.

R. FOLLET, S.J. *Quelques sommets de la Pensée Indienne.* (Archives de Philosophie, Vol. IX.) Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1932. Pp. 199. 36 frs.

EUGÈNE RAIGA. *L'Envie: son rôle Social.* Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1932. Pp. xv + 268. 15 frs.

JEAN WAHL. *Vers le Concret. Études d'histoire de la philosophie contemporaine.* Paris: Librairie Philosophique: J. Vrin. 1932. Pp. 269. 30 frs.

ÉMILE BRÉHIER. *Histoire de la Philsophie.* Tome II. La Philosophie Moderne. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1932. Pp. 907–1,184. 25 frs.

VARIOUS. *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Vereins zu Santiago de Chile.* Santiago de Chile: Walter Gnadt. 1931. Pp. vii + 220.

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ERNESTO GRASSI. *Il Problema della Metafisica Platonica.* Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli. 1932. Pp. 227. Lire 14.

N. R. D'ALFONSO. *La Disoccupazione: cause e rimedi.* Torino: Fratelli Bocca. 1932. Pp. 20. Lire 3.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Dear Sir,

There is nothing whatever in Professor Keightley's endorsement of Mr. Douglas Fawcett's speculations that induces me to modify my opinions about *The Zermatt Dialogues*. He asserts that I have not dealt with the "fundamental, vitally important, and significant issues" raised. I showed, however, that "its positive conclusions are vitiated by being fallaciously circular." Further, I indicated the radical and inherent defectiveness of Imagination, as such, whether divine or human; and if Professor Keightley prefers to regard these criticisms as "verbal fault-finding," and to allow Mr. Fawcett's "main theses and contentions" to rest on an obviously circular argument, then his views about the methods and aims of Philosophy differ profoundly from my own.

I have not the slighest objection to the criticism of Hegel—as Professor Keightley quite gratuitously suggests—provided that this is competent. I have simply protested againt the too familiar device of prefacing one's criticism by sheer caricature. As contrasted with this, the thoroughgoing, and often adverse, analysis of Hegelianism by Baillie and Bosanquet, McTaggart and Bradley—not to mention foreign writers—is invaluable. As matters stand, Professor Keightley merely echoes current mis-statements about Hegel's theory of the relations between Thought and Reality, or the Absolute.

Can it possibly be the case that both he and Mr. Fawcett remain unaware that much, if not indeed all, of Hegel's finest work lies in the sphere, not of Logic and Metaphysics, but of Æsthetics?

J. E. Turner.

The University,
Liverpool,
August 3, 1932.

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Sir,

In the April and July numbers of *Philosophy* there have been two articles dealing with Entropy. The first of these, by Dean Inge, suggests that the Second Law of Thermodynamics applies to animate as well as to inanimate nature. The second article, by Professor J. Johnstone, concludes by saying that Entropy is increasing in the inorganic series concurrently with its decrease in the organic.

The result is indeed fanciful. "Time's arrow" seems to point in both directions at once. One is tempted to ask, therefore, if the Second Law of Thermodynamics can indeed be applied to animate as well as to inanimate nature. Is it not likely that the chief characteristic of life is its challenge to this Law?

The living organism is distinguished from all inanimate nature by its ability to "sort" materials into less and less "probable" combinations. Life in its earliest manifestations declares war on Entropy. For the individual the struggle is an unequal one; the principle of Carnot triumphs when senescence begins. Phylogenetically the principle is kept at bay in those races which are successful in the struggle of evolution. In the world of ideas the conceptions of Goodness, Truth, and Beauty are so "improbable" that their very birth seems to defy the process of Entropy.

Many of us feel that an end for organic and inorganic matter in a cold dead ball (or in radiation) is an intolerable prospect. We would welcome a dissertation from a biologist to protest with Lord Balfour against "the deeds and thoughts of man being wiped out like a child's sand castle by the incoming tide." The theologians protest very well in their own way. I, for one, would delight to see the biologists protest in theirs; for Life and Entropy seem to me to be at daggers drawn.

I am, etc.,

W. E. M. Mitchell.

612, Belmont House,
Victoria, B.C.,
August 3, 1932.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

MICHAELMAS TERM begins on October 3rd and ends on December 16th.

Members are urged to propose new names for membership.

The following courses of lectures have been arranged to begin in the Michaelmas Term of the Session 1932–33:—

"AN ELEMENTARY INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE," a course of six weekly lectures by H. H. PRICE, M.A., B.Sc. (of Trinity College, Oxford), on Fridays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, beginning October 14th. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

"INTERPRETING THE UNIVERSE," a course of six weekly lectures by Professor JOHN MACMURRAY, M.A., on Thursdays, at 8 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, beginning October 13th. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

"INTRODUCTION TO SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY," a class by the Director of Studies, on Wednesdays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, in the Michaelmas and Lent Terms, beginning Michaelmas Term, October 12th; Lent Term, January 18th. Fee for the course, £1 1s. Terminal, 12s. 6d. Members free.

The full syllabus for the Session can be obtained on application to the Director of Studies, University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1.

The first of the Evening Meetings for the Session will be held at University College, Gower Street, W.C. 1, on Tuesday, October 18th, at 8.15 p.m., when Professor F. A. Lindemann will give an address on "The Place of Mathematics in the Interpretation of the Universe."

It is hoped to form one or two reading circles at University Hall, Gordon Square, during the Session. Those desiring to join one of these should communicate with the Director of Studies.

PHILOSOPHY

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Thursday, November 24, 1932, will be the tercentenary of Spinoza's birth. The British Institute of Philosophy proposes to celebrate this event by holding a public meeting at which speakers will discuss aspects of Spinoza's life and philosophy. Professor S. Alexander will preside.

Tickets can be obtained on application to The Director of Studies, British Institute of Philosophy, University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London W.C.1.

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
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